ACHAEMENID HISTORY • II

The Greek Sources

Proceedings of the Groningen 1984 Achaemenid History Workshop

edited by
Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Amélie Kuhrt

Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten
Leiden
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ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Archäologischer Anzeiger.
ABL	Harper, R.F. (1892-1914), *Assyrian and Babylonian Letters belonging to the Kouyunjik Collection of the British Museum* I-XIV, London, Chicago.
AC	L'Antiquité Classique.
AfO	Archiv für Orientforschung.
AJSL	American Journal of Semitic Languages.
AMI	Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran.
ANET	J.B. Pritchard (ed.) *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*, Oxford-Princeton 1955^2 (1969^3).
An.Or.	Analecta Orientalia.
A&R	Atene e Roma.
ASNP	Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa.
BaM	Baghdader Mitteilungen.
BCH	Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.
BIDR	Bollettino dell'Istituto di Diritto Romano.
BiOr	Bibliotheca Orientalis.
BRM II	A.T. Clay, *Legal Documents from Erech dated in the Seleucid era (312-65 BC)*, New York 1913.
CAH	Cambridge Ancient History.
Camb.	Strassmaier, J.N. (1890), *Inschriften von Cambyses, König von Babylon (529-521 v. Chr.)*, (Babylonische Texte 8-9), Leipzig.
CHI	Cambridge History of Iran.
CDAFI	Cahiers de la Délégation Archéologique Française en Iran.
CJ	The Classical Journal.
CQ	Classical Quarterly.
CRAI	Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
CSSH	Comparative Studies in Society and History.
CT	Cuneiform Texts in the British Museum.
D.A.G.R.	Dictionnaire des Antiquités grecques et romaines, réd. Ch. Daremberg & E. Saglio, Paris 1877-1919.
FGrH	F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker, Berlin/Leiden 1923-1958.*
GGA	Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen.
HSCP	Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.
IrAnt	Iranica Antiqua.
JAOS	Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JEA	Journal of Egyptian Archaeology.
JEOL	Jaarbericht van het Vooraziatisch-Egyptisch Genootschap Ex Oriente Lux.
JHS	Journal of Hellenic Studies.
JNES	Journal of Near East Studies.
JSOT	Journal for the Study of the Old Testament.
JWI	Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute.
NEB	New English Bible.
NBD	Moore, E. (1939), *Neo-Babylonian Documents in the University of Michigan Collection*, Ann Arbor.

NRVU	Ungnad, A. & San Nicolò, M. (1929-1935), *Neubabylonische Rechts- und Verwaltungsurkunden übersetzt und erläutert, Bd. I: Rechts- und Wirtschaftsurkunden der Berliner Museen aus vorhellenistischer Zeit*, Leipzig.
OECT	Oxford Editions of Cuneiform Texts.
OIP	Oriental Institute Publications.
PCPS	Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society.
PFT	Hallock, R.T., *Persepolis Fortification Tablets*, (OIP 92), Chicago 1969.
PP	La Parola del Passato.
PTT	Cameron, G.G., *Persepolis Treasury Tablets*, (OIP 65), Chicago 1948.
RE	Pauly's Realenzyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft: bearbeitet von G. Wissowa (Stuttgart).
REG	Revue des Etudes Grecques.
RhM	Rheinisches Museum.
RLA	*Reallexikon der Assyriologie*, Berlin.
RSI	Rivista Storica Italiana.
RTP	P. Briant, *Rois, Tributs et Paysans*, Paris 1982.
SBAW	Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akad. der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Abteilung.
SDAW	Sitzungsberichte der Dt. Akad. der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Klasse für Philosophie, Staats-, Rechts-, und Wirtschaftswissenschaften.
SHAW	Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Klasse.
SPAW	Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
StIr	Studia Iranica.
TAPhA	Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association.
TCS	Texts from Cuneiform Sources
TPhS	Transactions of the Philological Society.
TRE	Theologische Realenzyklopädie, hrsg. G. Krause & G. Müller, Berlin 1974ff.
TvG	Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis.
UET	Ur Excavations, Texts.
UVB	Vorläufige Berichte über die von der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft in Uruk-Warka unternommenen Ausgrabungen.
VAB	Vorderasiatische Bibliothek.
VAT	Vorderasiatische Tontafelsammlung, Berlin.
VS	Vorderasiatische Schriftdenkmäler der Königlichen Museen zu Berlin.
VT	Vetus Testamentum.
YOS VII	Tremayne, A. (1925) *Records from Erech, time of Cyrus and Cambyses (538-521 BC)*, New Haven, Conn.
YOS/BT	Yale Oriental Series: Babylonian Texts.
ZA	Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und verwandte Gebiete.
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.

INTRODUCTION

Of the two most famous wars in ancient history, the Persian Wars and the Punic Wars, only the latter has, very recently, ended in an armistice. A newspaper clipping announced that the Mayor of Rome and the Consul of Tunisia had signed an agreement for the ending of hostilities. The Persian Wars are not over yet, and one might be tempted to see in the repeatedly uttered accusations of 'hellenocentrism' and 'iranocentrism' in scholarly literature a sign of continued warfare. The echoes of Marathon and Salamis are still resounding. Not only to the extent that two, often well defined, parties can be distinguished in the field of research on early Persian history, roughly corresponding with classical historians on the one side and archaeologists on the other, but also because the Persian Wars have caused the conceptual framework that profoundly influences all perceptions of the history of the Achaemenid period to come into being. History in the sense that we understand it is, at least partly, a result of the great conflict between Greece and Persia. In its formation it embodies a particular way of thinking that was typical of the Greek fifth century. However great, generous and honest the first historian of Persia may have been, he nevertheless participated in a conflict, no longer perhaps overt but still lingering on. Strict neutrality, if such a thing is ever possible for a historian, was beyond even the reach of Herodotus, although he made a serious attempt. Later, in the fourth century the parties became more clearly defined but at the same time real interest in the Persians was lost and consequently they were reduced to two-dimensional figures. Persian history was now neatly divided into two periods, one of vigour and one of decay: the boundary between these usually taken as coinciding with the 'Great Persian Wars.' The empire itself was no longer seen as an evolving state with problems and successes, with developments and changes within its administrative structure and in its relations with subjects, but as a petrified entity dominated by the shadowy figure of the King of Kings.

This was the picture of Persian history at the time of Alexander, when the original model of it gradually ceased to exist. The concept was frozen and immobile and has lasted for two millennia. It has had its functions and was used, first by Alexander and his troops and for centuries afterwards by European historians. It even remained quite unaffected by the great discoveries of the 19th century: the decipherment of Old Persian cuneiform hardly influenced the principal tenets on which Persian history was based. Not even the important excavations in Iran had any substantial effect on the received image: if the monuments did not agree with Herodotus, so much the worse for

the monuments. The Greeks could not have been too far wrong: they were first of all Greeks, and therefore almost infallible, and secondly, they had been contemporaries and thus had first hand knowledge.

This picture has only very recently become unsatisfactory. As Iranian linguists and archaeologists attempted to analyze their material within its own frame of reference the Greek brand of Persian history seemed to supply very few answers to their problems and was found to be less relevant. Ethno-archaeologists and anthropologists doing research in the area have further shifted the foci of research. At the same time important developments took place within the discipline of history itself. In the last two decades historians have become more interested in what might be called structural history, i.e. not so much the study of events and chronologies but the analysis of an entire society. In this type of research non-written evidence and written traditions of a non-literary character have become more important and have served to question the traditional view of the history of the Achaemenid period, based predominantly on the use of Greek historiographical sources.

In a structural approach to early Persian history the usefulness of the Greek tradition is obviously restricted (and at times even an obstacle, see below). The Greeks were usually not interested in the structure of the empire, their outlook being rather superficial and limited. Even in the few cases where an attempt was made to glance behind the curtain, the results were still distorted as even the most unprejudiced Greek author was necessarily influenced by the cultural and literary tradition in which he was working. Hence the paradoxical situation has arisen that, in order to move away from the dominant and oppressive Greek perspective, it is more than ever necessary to pay attention to Greek historiography and analyze it in a new way.

The content of the information about Persia in Greek literature was shaped and moulded to fit Greek artistic forms. Thus any historical information contained, not only in a very specific literary genre such as tragedy, but also in historiography will have been affected by the techniques either demanded by a particular literary form or characteristic of a specific author. The methods and techniques of individual authors have received much attention by classical scholars who have been able to single out patterns, designs and narrative structures in some of the main Greek authors on Persia. This increasingly sophisticated approach to the Greek sources, however, does not seem to have influenced the overall view of the Persian empire. Frequently authors of syntheses on the Persian empire use the data of Greek historiography indiscriminately, as though it were all equally relevant and reliable, ignoring (or perhaps simply unaware of) the discussions by classical scholars of, e.g., the narrative structure or the literary form that directly affects the trustworthiness of the source in question. On the other hand, classical scholars frequently fail

to indicate the relevance of their source criticism to the historiography of the Persian empire, usually because they are not well enough acquainted with the Iranian evidence to make a comparison between their own results and the Persian data. This gap, further widened by the different channels through which specialists in both fields make their results public, has been as unprofitable for Greek studies as for Iranian research. As the progress made on both sides is undoubtedly to be ascribed to specialization in each of the separate fields, Iranian and Greek, it is unlikely that the gulf separating historians and philologists from archaeologists and Iranologists will be, or indeed can be, bridged by a single scholar. It was, therefore, desirable for 'East' and 'West' to meet and discuss the results obtained so far. The Groningen Workshop of 1984 aimed at precisely this type of meeting and discussion.

The Introductory Note to the Workshop suggested the following two problems as important items for papers:

1) Studies of the mechanisms of Greek historiography and other Greek literature concerning Persia.
2) Case studies of specific examples where Iranian and Greek sources are seemingly in conflict and discussions of how to resolve such apparent contradictions.

The papers collected in this volume represent some of the possible answers to the questions indicated above. They are by no means an exhaustive treatment of all aspects of the problem but demonstrate some of the approaches possible. The problem of literary forms which affects the reliability of the sources on Persian history is confronted directly in the papers by Griffiths and Murray. Griffiths' analysis of story-patterns and motifs shows very clearly that while the names of the protagonists may be genuinely historical, the events to which they are related are unlikely to contain a real historical core. The consideration of oral traditions underlying Herodotus' work has led Murray to postulate the inclusion of genuine Persian material within it; though he would argue that such material would have been 'deformed' as a result of the function it was required to perform within the very different social and political milieu of the Greek states. By virtue of the same argument the existence of such Persian material would reflect something of the type of society that produced the tales. A rather different aspect of Greek historiography was tackled in the papers by Briant and Sancisi-Weerdenburg. The former concentrates on the apparent use of a comparative method by Greek writers generally, which turns out to be no more than Greek self-definition by drawing contrasts with schematic and rigid perceptions of Persian institutions. Sancisi-Weerdenburg uses a similar line of argument by discussing the concept of Orientalism and seeing its origins in Greek fourth century formulations of

the Persian world. She argues that these perceptions have been far more influential than their historiographical merit warrants. Greek and subsequent European ethnocentrism also forms the theme of Walser's discussion of the early phases of Persian imperialism. He emphasises the fact that very frequently the Greek activities which led to Persian military intervention and subjection of Ionian *poleis* have been interpreted only from the viewpoint of the Greeks while neglecting the Persian imperial perspective. Tuplin and Stevenson have concentrated on subjecting fourth century Greek historiography to detailed internal criticism. Tuplin focusses on our lack of real understanding of certain key-terms (such as *phoros*) as used in the material available to us. Differing interpretations of such words may seriously affect our grasp of the functioning of Achaemenid imperial policies in Asia Minor. Stevenson argues for a substantial reappraisal of Deinon, Ctesias' successor as the main Greek historiographer on fourth century Persia. While she concedes that he may have invented to some extent, she does not consider such inventions to have resulted in any serious distortion of his own source, which she identifies as one close to the Persian court.

The question of the supposed incompatibility of Greek sources and Near Eastern material is taken up by Lewis. He demonstrates that a neglected and disregarded piece of evidence contained in a late classical source may well have preserved authentic information derived from fourth century Greek investigation of Persian royal customs and finds support for this in neo-Assyrian and Persian documents. A similar stand is maintained by Metzler and Calmeyer. Metzler suggests that certain episodes and details mentioned by Greek historians preserve genuine Persian material, the significance of which only emerges if one compares it with the sparsely preserved Near Eastern documents; this implies that Greek writers must have made use of Persian sources. The same conclusion is arrived at by Calmeyer on the basis of the Persian material remains, although he identifies a shift in Greek knowledge of the details of Persian life from the fifth to the fourth century: this improved in the fourth century while the appreciation of Persian history declined. A very different and important problem, that of Persian kinship structures, is the subject of Herrenschmidt's paper. She attempts to reconstruct part of the Iranian kinship system on the basis of Greek sources, which are unfortunately the only ones available for such a study. Although it remains questionable to what extent these sources may be considered reliable the obvious importance of such an analysis on anthropological lines for Iranian social institutions makes the attempt worth pursuing. Using Babylonian *minutiae* and Greek evidence, Kuhrt and Sherwin-White were able to demonstrate conclusively that Herodotus, when examined carefully and without reading later accounts into his narrative, provides extremely important information which, though it may refer to no more than a minor detail, can considerably affect our overall

understanding of the Persian empire. The authors further show how regularly the Babylonian evidence has been made to conform with and confirm the framework of Persian history established by the Greek sources

As a preliminary conclusion one might say that real curiosity in Persia was displayed in the fifth century, but while knowledge of factual details increased in the fourth century the fifth century impetus was not sustained but replaced by a standard schematic image of the Achaemenid empire. One wonders how much the extension of the political centre of the empire to include Babylon and the continued interaction with Mesopotamian culture influenced the information that eventually entered Greek literature. As a consequence an important starting point for further research would thus be the identification of Iranian and Mesopotamian elements derived from oral, literary and iconographic material which found their way into the Western tradition.

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Amélie Kuhrt
Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg

INSTITUTIONS PERSES ET HISTOIRE COMPARATISTE DANS L'HISTORIOGRAPHIE GRECQUE

Pierre Briant — Toulouse

L'intérêt accordé par les Grecs à l'Empire achéménide, à son histoire et à son organisation n'est pas niable: en font foi en particulier les nombreux *Persika* écrits au Vè et IVè s., ainsi que, dans un tout autre contexte, les fréquentes références faites par les auteurs hellénistiques aux *nomoi persikoi*. En dépit de cet intérêt — trop souvent anecdotique — aucun ouvrage, semble-t-il, n'a jamais été consacré par un auteur grec à un exposé systématique sur les institutions sociales et politiques de la Perse achéménide — si l'on met à part les jugements d'ensemble (souvent de nature polémique et à l'emporte-pièces) portés sur le pouvoir illimité du Grand Roi. Ce n'est que de façon éparse qu'Hérodote y fait allusion, en dehors du passage bien connu qu'il réserve à cet effet dans le Livre I (131-140) de ses *Enquêtes*. Il est bien possible — comme l'a suggéré R. Bodéüs (1973) — qu'Aristote avait consacré une large part de son enseignement à la royauté perse: il n'en reste pas moins que la Perse ne figure pas dans la liste des 69 Etats dont V. Rose a recueilli les fragments de *politeiai* (Bodéüs 1973: 463). En définitive, la vision grecque des institutions achéménides ne se reconstruit pas à partir de traités théoriques,[1] mais bien plutôt à partir d'anecdotes ou d'événements retransmis 'en situation' par les auteurs grecs qui, heureusement, peuvent parfois être confrontés à des sources proprement achéménides (écrites et figurées).

Dans certains cas — à l'étude desquels sont consacrées les pages qui suivent, les auteurs grecs rapprochent, opposent ou assimilent telle institution perse à telle institution d'une cité ou d'un Etat mieux connu de leurs lecteurs. Il parait intéressant de se demander sur quels critères de choix et d'analyse ils fondent de tels rapprochements, et quelles conclusions ils tirent ou font suggérer de ces comparaisons explicites ou implicites. On peut se demander en même temps quel profit peut en tirer l'historien d'aujourd'hui.

1. Comparaisons, oppositions et assimilations

1.1. On mettra à part les comparaisons de nature ethnographique grâce auxquelles des auteurs grecs veulent rendre concrète aux yeux de leurs lecteurs

[1] Seule exception notable: le Chapitre II des *Economiques* du Ps. Aristote, écrit en Asie Mineure dans le dernier quart du IVè siècle av.n.è. (*RTP*: 26-27). Sur la date de l'opuscule, voir en dernier lieu Foraboschi 1984: 82-87 qui propose de rabaisser la datation d'un ouvrage qui, selon lui, ne peut pas dater d'avant le début du IIIè siècle.

telle ou telle particularité (physique, climatique, botanique etc.) des pays achéménides. Décrivant la Carmanie, Arrien (*Inde* 33,1) écrit par exemple: «Cette région déjà était accueillante et fertile, pourtant les oliviers n'y poussaient pas» — marquant par là même les limites de la prospérité agricole pour un Grec;[2] en revanche, sur la côte perse, il remarque qu'on y trouve «de nombreux dattiers et tous les arbres fruitiers qui prospèrent en Grèce» (38,6). De même compare-t-il (41,1) les méthodes de navigation au fond du Golfe Persique à celles que l'on adopte dans le détroit situé entre l'île de Leucade et l'Acarnanie. C'est de la même manière que Xénophon (*Anab.* II 4,13) décrit les canaux dérivés du Tigre: «On en avait dérivé aussi des ruisseaux qui se répandaient dans la campagne, les premiers étaient larges, ensuite ils étaient plus étroits, à la fin ce n'étaient plus que de petites rigoles, comme en Gréce pour les champs de millet». Pour bien faire comprendre à un Grec la grosseur exceptionnelle de certaines dattes récoltées en Babylonie, le même Xénophon (II 3,15) emploie également le système de la comparaison/opposition: «Quant aux dattes elles-mêmes des palmiers, celles qui ressemblaient aux fruits que l'on voit en Grèce étaient laissées aux serviteurs; les autres, réservées aux maîtres, étaient des dattes de choix, d'une beauté et d'une grosseur admirables». Pour donner une idée de l'étendue considérable des domaines perses, Platon emploie aussi la méthode comparative: après avoir souligné que «les richesses des Lacédémoniens sont grandes par rapport aux Grecs», il ajoute (*Alc.* 122-123a-b): «Mais comparées à celles des Perses et de leurs rois, ce n'est rien», mentionnant en particulier l'importance d'un domaine ('la ceinture de la reine') dont un témoin digne de foi «lui avait affirmé qu'il fallait une journée de marche pour le traverser». Les auteurs grecs savent bien en effet que leurs auditeurs ou leurs lecteurs ont du mal à admettre les énormes différences d'échelle, qu'il s'agisse des distances ou des mensurations. C'est bien l'amère expérience dont fait part Hérodote (I 193) parlant des rendements agricoles en Babylonie: il préfère renoncer à donner la taille des arbustes de sésame («bien que je sache à quoi m'en tenir»), car il «n'ignore pas que chez ceux qui ne sont pas allés à Babylone, déjà ce que j'ai dit sur le chapitre des céréales a rencontré beaucoup d'incrédulité». Entre l'exposé oral et le compte-rendu écrit, Hérodote a jugé plus prudent de disposer le filtre de l'auto-censure!

1.2. S'agissant des institutions politiques perses — et singulièrement de la royauté — les comparaisons et rapprochements sont aussi divers que peu argumentés.

1.2.1 A propos de la coutume du don, Thucydide (II 97,3-4) établit une opposition entre les pratiques perses et les pratiques thraces (odryses). Il signale qu'en plus des tributs, cités et territoires du royaume odryse devaient

[2] A rapprocher de Xénophon, *Anab.* VI 4,6.

verser «des présents (*dôra*) non moindres en or et en argent, sans compter tous les tissus ouvragés ou unis, non plus que les autres cadeaux en nature; et on n'en offrait pas seulement au roi lui-même, mais à tous les Odryses revêtus de quelque autorité ou nobles. En effet, ils s'étaient fait une règle (*nomos*) contraire à celle de la royauté perse; et sans doute, elle existe également chez les autres Thraces: c'est plutôt de recevoir (*lambanein*) que de donner (*didonai*) (ainsi il était plus déshonorant de satisfaire à une demande que de la faire en vain); mais cet usage s'était développé à proposition de leurs moyens: on ne pouvait rien faire sans offrir de cadeaux. Aussi la monarchie parvint-elle à un haut degré de puissance».

1.2.2. De son côté, Arrien (*Anab.* IV 13,1) note une similitude entre une institution perse et une institution macédonienne, celle des jeunes gens attachés au service du roi et qui devaient l'accompagner à la chasse 'à la manière perse' (*ton persikon tropon*).

1.2.3. Citant Satyrus, Athénée (XIII 557b-c) marque une opposition entre la pratique matrimoniale de Philippe II et celle des Grands Rois: alors que ceux-ci emmènent leurs 360 concubines lors des expéditions militaires, celui-là «à chaque occasion avait l'habitude de contracter des mariages *kata polemon*». Cette comparaison entre dans le cadre d'un discours sur les femmes mariées, dans lequel un contraste est souligné entre la jalousie des femmes grecques et la tolérance des femmes et concubines du Grand Roi (Tronson 1984: 118-119).

1.2.4. D'une manière moins allusive, c'est entre certaines pratiques spartiates et certaines pratiques perses qu'Hérodote (VI 59) établit un rapprochement, en écrivant: «Les coutumes des Lacédémoniens, lors de la mort de leurs rois, sont les mêmes que celles des Barbares d'Asie; car la plupart de ceux-ci se comportent de la même façon lorsque leurs rois viennent à mourir». En dépit de la restriction apportée par l'expression «la plupart de ceux-ci», il ne peut faire de doute que c'est bien aux Perses qu'Hérodote fait référence. Quatre coutumes sont explicitement notées:

— deuil général: tous «se frappent le front avec ardeur et poussent des gémissements infinis...»;

— «si un roi a péri à la guerre, ils fabriquent de lui une figure, qu'ils portent au tombeau sur un lit de parade»;

— vacance de pouvoir pendant dix jours;

— «les Spartiates s'accordent avec les Perses sur un autre point que voici: lorsque, après la mort du roi, un autre roi prend possession du trône, le roi qui entre en fonctions libère tous les Spartiates qui devaient quelque chose au roi ou à l'Etat; chez les Perses, le roi qui s'installe fait remise à toutes les villes du tribut dû antérieurement».

Précisons également que ce rapprochement Perse/Sparte est suivi d'un rapprochement Egypte/Sparte à propos de l'hérédité de certaines charges publiques.

1.3.

Dans deux passages de la *Cyropédie* (Livres I et VIII), Xénophon propose une description de l'éducation des jeunes Perses, et en analyse la décadence. A aucun moment, l'auteur n'établit de rapprochement explicite avec le système d'éducation spartiate sur lequel il s'est pourtant longuement attardé dans la *Constitution des Lacédémoniens*. Néanmoins les rapprochements et analogies sont trop nombreux pour être fortuits: c'est pourquoi l'on s'accorde pour considérer que Xénophon assimile implicitement mais éloquemment conditions perses et conditions spartiates (Tigerstedt 1965: 177-179).

A cet égard, il convient de souligner que le rapprochement est établi explicitement par Arrien (*Anab.* V 4,5). Après un développement sur l'Inde, il écrit en effet: «Car je ne peux comparer avec les Indiens les anciens Perses (*Persôn tôn palai*), ceux qui avec Cyrus renversèrent le pouvoir des Mèdes et gagnèrent toute l'Asie... Ils étaient pauvres et habitaient dans un pays rude, et leurs coutumes (*nomima*) étaient aussi proches qu'on peut l'imaginer du système d'éducation spartiate (*tè lakônikè paideusei*)». Il ne fait aucun doute qu'Arrien a tiré ce rapprochement de la lecture de Xénophon, qu'il cite au moins une fois dans l'*Anabase d'Alexandre* (II 7,8-9). On sait en effet qu'Arrien a beaucoup lu et imité Xénophon (Bosworth 1980: 4-7). L'insistance mise à exalter les vertus des Perses de l'ancien temps — de l'époque de Cyrus — rappelle tout aussi bien l'opposition marquée par Xénophon (*Cyr.* VIII 8) entre les Perses du temps de Cyrus et les Perses de son temps, que tel passage des *Lois* de Platon sur la décadence des moeurs et de l'éducation des Perses qui, au début, «habitaient dans un pays rude et recevaient une rude éducation de pasteurs» (Briant 1982: 33-34). Selon Elien (*VH* X 14), Socrate opposait également Indiens et Perses aux Phrygiens et Lydiens: alors que les premiers ne se vouaient pas au commerce et étaient donc les plus valeureux et les plus libres, les seconds étaient tombés dans l'esclavage (*douleuein*). Si l'on ajoute qu'ailleurs (*Inde* 10,8-9), Arrien établit un rapprochement entre institutions sociales spartiates et institutions sociales indiennes, on ne peut douter que les thèmes qu'il transmet sur l'éducation perse/spartiate remontent tout entiers à Xénophon et au cercle où s'est développé le 'mirage spartiate'. En ce sens, la comparaison Sparte/Perse établie par Hérodote ressortit à une autre conception historique.

2. Royautés perse, odryse, macédonienne et spartiate

2.1. Il convient tout d'abord de souligner que ces rapprochements n'interviennent pas dans des développements sur les institutions perses, mais bien dans des exposés sur les institutions odryses, macédoniennes et spartiates. La référence achéménide n'agit en quelque sorte qu'en contre-point qui permet soit de replacer la royauté étudiée dans un ensemble ainsi décrété homogène,

soit de mettre en exergue telle spécificité de la royauté étudiée (odryse). C'est pour mieux faire comprendre à leurs lecteurs telle particularité des royautés odryse, macédonienne ou spartiate que Thucydide, Arrien et Hérodote ont recours à un rapprochement avec des pratiques achéménides. De ce point de vue, l'appel à comparaison obéit aux mêmes motivations que dans les exemples ethnographiques cités ci-dessus (§1.1). L'adoption d'un tel procédé d'écriture implique que les lecteurs grecs étaient considérés comme relativement bien informés sur la royauté perse, ou qu'à tout le moins les comparaisons avec les institutions perses ne pouvaient ni les surprendre ni les désorienter: pourquoi, dans le cas contraire, établir une comparaison entre deux termes aussi étrangers l'un que l'autre aux lecteurs potentiels? Il est clair en particulier que si Thucydide oppose l'usage du don chez les Odryses et chez les Perses, c'est que — comme on le sait par ailleurs — les Grecs disposaient d'informations nombreuses et concordantes sur la *polydôria* des Grands Rois. De même peut-on supposer, à partir du rapprochement allusivement établi par Arrien (§1.2.2), que les usages auliques achéménides étaient connus des Grecs, informés sur les chasses royales aussi bien par les représentations figurées (cachets en particulier) que par les renseignements oraux ou écrits rapportés par des Grecs ayant séjourné à la cour du Grand Roi. Quant à la polygamie du Grand Roi et à sa nombreuse suite de concubines, c'étaient là deux coutumes bien connues des auteurs grecs.[3] Enfin, si l'on examine le texte d'Hérodote, on doit également relever que des informations circulaient en Grèce sur les usages de la cour achéménide au moment de la mort d'un roi: l'usage des remises d'impôts est confirmé par d'autres sources grecques,[4] de même que celui de la vacance du pouvoir pendant quelques jours,[5] ou bien encore celui du deuil solennel.[6] En définitive, cette simple observation pose les limites de telles comparaisons pour qui étudie les institutions achéménides: il est bien clair qu'elles ne cherchent pas fondamentalement à apporter des informations nouvelles sur la royauté achéménide, dont les usages (certains au moins) sont supposés connus par les lecteurs.

2.2. Par ailleurs, elles sont ou bien trop rigides ou bien trop allusives pour être éclairantes et enrichissantes. L'opposition thucydidéenne entre le *lambanein* odryse et le *didônai* achéménide n'est pas véritablement opératoire au plan de l'histoire comparée. Il est vrai que tous les auteurs grecs fournissent

[3] Cf. pour la polygamie: Hérodote III 66 et 88; sur les concubines grecques à la cour du Grand Roi et des satrapes, voir Plutarque, *Thém.* 28,5-6 et 31,2; Plutarque *Artax.* 26,5-9 et 27,1-5. Hérodote (VIII 63) précise que les Immortels ont emmené leurs femmes avec eux en Grèce; coutume royale également comme l'indiquent les auteurs alexandrins à propos de la suite de Darius III: Quinte Curce III 3,24 (360 concubines) et Diodore XVII 35,3.

[4] Hérodote III 67 et Justin I 9,12-13; également Plutarque *Artax.* 26-27.

[5] Textes cités et analysés par Volkmann 1967.

[6] Polyen VII 7,11; également Hérodote VIII 99-100 et IX 24.

d'innombrables témoignages sur les dons opérés par les Grands Rois: Plutarque (*Apopht. Reg.* 173D[19]) rapportait que, selon Artaxerxès, «il était plus digne d'un roi de donner (*prosthenai*) que de prendre (*aphelein*)».[7] Mais, dans sa sécheresse, la notice de Thucydide laisse dans l'ombre le fait essentiel, à savoir que les Grands Rois recevaient (et suscitaient) eux-mêmes des dons nombreux, comme en font foi de nombreuses historiettes rapportées par les auteurs anciens et les reliefs de Persépolis (Calmeyer 1979), ainsi que l'existence de dignitaires auliques chargés de répertorier et de conserver les cadeaux faits au roi ([Arist.], *De Mundo* 398a: *dôrôn apodokteres*). D'une manière plus générale, le texte de Thucydide témoigne surtout d'une profonde incompréhension de la coutume du don liée indissolublement à celle du contre-don: «Les Grecs de l'époque classique ne comprennent plus rien à un mode de circulation où le chef reçoit mais par définition donne aussi, et où ils s'imaginent un commerce qui ne veut pas dire son nom» (Gernet 1968: 201 à partir de l'exemple de Syloson; Mauss 1921: 390 citant Thucydide; Briant 1982: 88-92). De ce point de vue, l'opposition entre Thraces et Perses est formelle, voire artificielle. Les rois thraces savent et doivent eux aussi donner: c'est le caractère mutuel des dons qui donne tout son sens social et politique à cette coutume (Mauss 1921). Contrairement à ce que peut laisser croire la proposition de Thucydide, le roi thrace n'est pas le seul à en retirer un surcroît de puissance matérielle et politique: c'est grâce à leur *polydôria* que les Grands Rois ont réussi à cimenter le loyalisme et le dévouement envers leur personne et leur dynastie (Briant 1983). Bref, l'opposition marquée par Thucydide obscurcit plus qu'elle n'éclaire les pratiques monarchiques achéménides.

2.3. Les comparaisons ébauchées ne sont jamais menées jusqu'à leur terme et elles ne présentent jamais un caractère exhaustif. On ne peut que s'étonner en particulier du caractère exceptionnel, accidentel et allusif du rapprochement opéré par Arrien entre une pratique achéménide et une pratique macédonienne. Il est vrai que les auteurs grecs sont encore plus discrets sur le fonctionnement des institutions macédoniennes que sur celui des institutions perses — nonobstant les nombreuses références aux *Macedonum mores* que l'on trouve chez les historiens d'Alexandre, chez Quinte-Curce en particulier. On est d'autant plus surpris d'une telle lacune que des rapprochements nombreux peuvent être relevés entre institutions monarchiques macédoniennes et institutions monarchiques perses — à tel point qu'on a pu conclure à une influence des secondes sur les premières à l'époque de Philippe II (Kienast 1973: 264-66 à propos d'Arrien IV 13 rapproché de Quinte-Curce VIII 6,2). Entre autres exemples, on notera que les dons de terre et de villes bien connus par les Grecs dans l'Empire achéménide ne sont pas sans rapport avec une

[7] A rapprocher de Plutarque *Phocion* 18.

pratique royale macédonienne (Funck 1978), ou que les dons de vêtements, fréquemment cités chez les Perses, sont également connus en Macédoine (Plutarque *Eum.* 8,12).

2.4. De leur côté, les rapprochements établis par Hérodote entre monarchie spartiate et monarchie perse ne paraissent pas être de nature à approfondir le fonctionnement de l'une et de l'autre — tant la première s'inscrit dans le cadre de la 'monarchie contractuelle' et la seconde dans celui de la *pambasileia*, l'une et l'autre analysées par Aristote. Il est vrai qu'Hérodote ne fait référence qu'à deux pratiques très précises et très circonstancielles, dont la mention n'implique pas un rapprochement global. Néanmoins on peut s'interroger sur le bénéfice argumentaire qu'espérait tirer Hérodote d'une comparaison aussi hasardeuse. Il est bien vrai que la mort du Roi devait donner lieu en Perse à un deuil bruyant et prolongé — mais cela ne paraît pas très spécifique ni de Sparte ni de la Perse. En revanche, Hérodote passe sous silence — probablement parce qu'il les ignorait — d'autres pratiques perses plus spécifiques comme:

— l'obligation faite au successeur de faire rapatrier en Perse la dépouille d'un roi mort en campagne ou loin de la Perse (Ctésias §9,13,44-45): il n'est nulle part fait mention en Perse de fabriquer une 'figure' du roi disparu;

— l'inhumation des rois dans des tombeaux construits (Cyrus) ou creusés dans le roc (Darius et ses successeurs): il est vrai qu'Hérodote ailleurs (I 140), a un développement quelque peu différent sur les usages funèbres perses;

— l'extinction des feux sacrés à la mort du roi (Diodore XVII 114,4).

On a l'impression que, comme dans les cas précédents, le recours à comparaison est d'ordre plus anecdotique qu'informatif.[8]

3 — Education perse et éducation spartiate

Par rapport aux textes que l'on vient d'analyser brièvement, la longue assimilation implicite proposée par Xénophon entre éducation perse et éducation spartiate a été (et reste pour une part) de plus grande portée historiographique. A la différence des passages de Thucydide, Arrien et Hérodote qui, au fond, ne modifient pas (ou fort peu) notre vision de la monarchie perse, le long passage de Xénophon engage l'interprétation dans une direction bien affirmée, sur la validité de laquelle on ne manque pas de s'interroger.

3.1. Il est bien clair tout d'abord que nombre de renseignements qu'il donne sur l'éducation du jeune Cyrus ne peuvent pas être assignés sans examen aux règles qui prévalaient en Perse des VIè-IVè s. — tant il est évident qu'il a plaqué sur la société perse un modèle spartiate lui-même largement ré-élaboré

[8] Sur les rapprochements entre institutions spartiates et institutions perses voir également Lewis 1977: 148-152.

à travers le prisme déformant du mirage spartiate (Tigerstedt 1965: 179-181). Pour autant, il serait méthodologiquement erroné d'en conclure que tout le passage du Livre I appartient tout entier au seul genre de l'utopie politique (contra Pelekidis 1974: 23-24). Une utopie — comme le montrent par exemple les *Lois* de Platon — ne se construit qu'à partir d'éléments connus: et, dans ce passage, l'éducation perse et spartiate est sans doute plus présente que l'éphébie attique (nonobstant l'emploi du terme *éphéboi*). Ensuite, il ne s'agit pas d'un simple décalque: il y a aussi des différences (Carlier 1978: 142). Par ailleurs, il est évident que, comme tout système fondé sur la reproduction d'une élite, la reproduction du système de pouvoirs en Perse et dans l'Empire suppose l'existence d'un dressage des jeunes gens appelés à devenir les fidèles du roi et les cadres de l'Empire (*RTP*: 449-451; Briant 1983). Enfin, des textes concordants d'Hérodote (I 136) et de Strabon (XV 3,18, celui-ci beaucoup plus détaillé que Xénophon) ne laissent aucun doute sur l'existence d'institutions éducatives perses qui — par certains traits — se rapprochent des institutions spartiates (ce qui n'avait pas échappé à Arrien V 4,5): en particulier le texte de Strabon évoque de façon saisissante un rite de passage analogue à la cryptie lacédémonienne. Ajoutons que les rapprochements avec une inscription grecque de Lycie (cf. L. Robert, *CRAI* 1975: 328-330) et avec les textes iraniens sont eux-mêmes riches d'enseignements (Knauth 1975).

Il paraît donc difficilement niable que Xénophon a écrit ses chapitres du Livre I en ayant connaissance d'institutions perses. Mais, ce qui est non moins certain, c'est que son premier objectif n'est pas d'informer ses lecteurs sur la Perse: dans le cas contraire, il aurait pu mener une comparaison explicite et raisonnée.[9] Tout compte fait le texte de Xénophon est beaucoup moins informé et informatif que celui de Strabon. Les déformations de Xénophon sont assez facilement décelables par comparaison avec d'autres sources relativement abondantes, et c'est ce caractère même qui annihile pour une part sa portée historiographique: à la limite, l'historien des institutions socio-politiques perses peut faire l'impasse sur ces passages de Xénophon.

3.2. Beaucoup plus pernicieux, en revanche, apparaît le dernier chapitre du Livre VIII (8), qui porte sur la 'décadence' des moeurs et de l'éducation perses, car la thèse qu'il transmet a eu un grand succès dans l'historiographie. Si «subsiste encore l'usage que les enfants sont élevés à la cour» (§13), ce n'est plus qu'une règle vide de sens: les Perses sont amollis par le luxe (§15), ils ne s'entraînent plus à la chasse (§12) ni à la guerre (§6) — si bien que «quiconque va faire la guerre aux Perses peut, sans combat, se promener tout à son aise

[9] Il n'aurait pas manqué de noter que, comme à Sparte, les jeunes filles perses (certaines d'entre elles au moins) recevaient une éducation militaire comme le montre Ctésias (§54: Roxane «des plus adroites à l'arc et au cheval») et comme l'indique tout un courant de la littérature persane qui aime à mettre en scène les femmes-guerrières: Hanaway 1982.

dans le pays» (§7) ou bien: «les ennemis se promènent partout dans le pays des Perses plus librement que les amis» (§21). L'une des manifestations les plus évidentes de leur amollissement, ce sont les longs banquets et les beuveries sans fin auxquels ils s'adonnent (§9, 11, 16). Bref, vus par Xénophon, l'Empire achéménide est un état en pleine décadence et la société perse une société en pleine décomposition.

Xénophon ne se donne pas la peine de donner des arguments à ses lecteurs. En réalité, ce texte — ô combien suspect — n'est pas sans rappeler le développement de Xénophon (*Rep. Lac.* XIV) sur la décadence de Sparte. De même que les Perses ont abandonné les règles édictées par Cyrus, les Spartiates ont abandonné les lois de Lycurgue: deux personnages aussi mythiques et aussi 'idéologisés' l'un que l'autre. Les 'arguments' employés ressemblent trait pour trait à ceux qu'utilise le même Xénophon dans l'*Agesilas*, où il dresse en parallèle le portrait d'Agésilas (mais est-ce bien l'Agésilas historique ou le Cyrus an-historique?) et celui du Grand Roi du IVè siècle.[10] Le premier représente aussi bien la Sparte idéale de la *Rep. Lac.* que le Cyrus idéalisé de la *Cyropédie*, tandis que le Grand Roi de l'*Agésilas* ressemble étrangement aux Perses 'décadents' du dernier chapitre de la *Cyropédie*:

Agésilas	Grand Roi
Abord facile	Inaccessible
Réponse rapide	Lenteur en affaire
Frugalité des repas	Recherche effrénée de nouveaux mets et boissons
Couche à la dure	Artifices pour le sommeil
S'adapte aux conditions climatiques	Fuit le froid et la chaleur
Homme de coeur	Faiblesse d'âme

Ces rapprochements témoignent avant tout de l'aspect profondément polémique du dernier chapitre de la *Cyropédie* qui, comme tel passage des *Lois* de Platon, est fondé sur la thèse de la décadence perse immédiatement après la disparition de Cyrus, en raison de l'amollissement des moeurs et de l'abandon de règles éducatives de départ. Ce sont des thèmes que l'on rencontre chez la plupart des auteurs grecs du IVè siècle, en particulier chez Isocrate soucieux de prouver à ses auditeurs et à ses lecteurs que la conquête d'un Empire perse décadent constituera une simple promenade militaire.

[10] Voir également Ollier 1933: 433-439.

En définitive — et sous réserve d'une enquête à la fois plus large et plus exhaustive — il apparaît que l'historien d'aujourd'hui a peu à apprendre des comparaisons antiques où la Perse constitue l'un des termes. Dans tous les cas étudiés, ces comparaisons ont surtout tendance à écraser les perspectives achéménides, l'élément perse jouant surtout le rôle de faire-valoir. Il s'agit majoritairement de comparaisons ou d'analogies fondées sur une approche anecdotique et très partielle — sans que jamais on puisse parler véritablement d'histoire comparatiste au sens où nous l'entendons aujourd'hui. Dans un des cas étudiés (Xénophon), l'analogie (à la fois implicite et forcée) entre Sparte et la Perse tend même à défigurer l'évolution de l'Empire au IVè s. En ce sens, les comparaisons nous renseignent moins sur l'Empire achéménide et les institutions perses que sur l'état de l'opinion publique grecque face aux Perses, et sur les connaissances que les Grecs avaient des institutions achéménides.

GREEK HISTORIOGRAPHY AND ACHAEMENID RELIEFS

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I. *Median Tales.*

> But of all men the Persians most welcome foreign customs. They wear the Median dress, deeming it more beautiful than their own, and the Egyptian cuirass in war... . (Hdt. I 135, transl. A.D. Godley, Loeb ed. 1960; cf. also Hdt. VII 62).

From the monuments we now know that the Persian dress was identical with that of the Elamites, the identification being confirmed by the captions on two of the royal tomb reliefs (Schmidt 1970: 109; cf. Fig. 1). As the reliefs of the Assyrian king Assurbanipal show, this dress was typical for Elamites already in the 7th century. It seems that the Persians took it over when they came into contact with the Elamites in Fars and Khuzistan; it is possible that they wore trousers when they first arrived.[1] In contrast to this, the Medes had tight trousers and a jacket which ended horizontally over the hips (Fig. 1); this and their main weapon, the *akinakes*, they had in common with their neighbours: the Armenians, Cappadocians, western Scythians and probably the Sagartians and the Dahae, i.e. all the western Iranian peoples. Trousers were common to all Iranians; the eastern and northern peoples, however, always had wide ones, often, in the form of knickerbockers, combined with boots.

It would seem highly improbable that the Persians should have first (at the moment of their arrival in Iran without trousers[2]) assumed the Elamite dress, and later, "deeming it more beautiful", the Median dress in war. On the

[1] Identifiable (though with difficulty) on the two latest (?) reliefs at Izeh/Malamir: cf. Calmeyer 1975, s.v. Hose and (forthcoming) s.v. Malamir.

[2] Nagel 1982: 152f. has missed the identity of the Elamite costume both in Achaemenian and Neo-Assyrian times (see below); instead, he assumes that it was brought to Elam by the *Kissioi*, near relatives of the Persians. Consequently, he denies the existence of trousers in southern Iran before they were taken over from the Medes who got them from the Scythians (*ibid*: 26). This must have happened before ca. 600 B.C., to which period he attributes the first trousers in Malamir. I cannot believe this reconstruction for three reasons: it relies on the theory that the Kissioi were an Iranian people; it makes the army of the Elamite king Teumman on Assurbanipal's reliefs an army of Iranians (cf. Reade 1976: 97ss.; compare below n. 6 for the dagger); and it gives no explanation for the uniformity of the dress of all the Iranian peoples on Achaemenian monuments with the exception of Elamites and Persians: what did they all have before they took over 'Scythian' attire? On the other hand, the Elamo-Persian dress must have been in use over quite a large area, perhaps by the upper class or for special religious ceremonies, not as the typical local dress. Evidence is supplied by the tomb relief of Ishaqvand in Media, some small offering objects in the treasure of the Oxus and Frada of Marguš on the Bisutun rock relief, cf. below n. 3.

contrary, speaking a western Iranian dialect they would already have been familiar with the customary western Iranian garment for a long time, at least from the time they first began to ride horse-back. They would have kept it for the very purpose for which it was suitable: riding. When they took over the Elamite outfit for ceremonial purposes and for their infantry, they retained the western Iranian dress for the cavalry and higher military command — and that is precisely what the Persepolis reliefs show: the rulers, the chamberlain, the lance-bearing body guards (Fig. 3) and the long-bow infantry dressed in Elamo-Persian garments; the *chiliarch* (Fig. 2) and the carrier of the king's *gorytos* (a bow-case for the short cavalry bow: Figs. 1 and 3) in Median outfit.

The Greeks and other peoples in the West apparently only saw Persians in the latter dress: as cavalry and noblemen. Only their headdress shows that they are Persians: it is not the (Median) tiara, but a complex cover of head and neck, leaving only the face exposed as is also known from some representations of Persian civilians (e.g. Fig. 3: the chamberlain, Shahbazi 1976: 151ff.). Even the king was known to the Greeks only in his chariot (Fig. 5), in his Median costume (v. Gall 1974: 144f.). Herodotus' brief remark gives most of the facts correctly: the Persians were fond of foreign customs; in their wars with the West their outfit was (nearly) the same as the Median. He was wrong only in the historical explanation. His source acknowledged that there were originally two totally different styles of dress — something the Greeks did not know[3] — but explained this fact by the 'invention' of the dress by the Medes. His source, apparently, was a Mede. From a similar source Herodotus must have taken some of his geographical ideas (Hdt. I 104; III 37; IV 37ff.; not from Hecataeus cf. Calmeyer 1982: 176ff.). Further, his account of Cyrus' rise to power is written from a Median, nationalist point of view, possibly originating within the surroundings of Harpagus' family.

II. *An Anecdote from Asia Minor*

A source from the Far West was used by Herodotus in the following story (Cf. Demandt 1972):

> There was one Otanes, son of Pharnaspes, as well-born and rich a man as any Persian. This Otanes was the first to suspect that the Magian was not Cyrus' son Smerdis but his true self; the reason was, that he never left the citadel nor summoned any notable Persian into his presence; and in his suspicion — Cambyses having married Otanes' daughter Phaedyme, whom the Magian had now wedded, with all the rest of Cambyses' wives — Otanes sent to this daughter, asking with whom she lay, Smerdis, Cyrus' son, or another.

[3] At least not from their own experience: in all Asia Minor there seems to exist only one representation of an Iranian in true Persian dress (on the Payava tomb at Xanthos, amongst numerous others in 'Median' dress); cf. Shahbazi 1976.

> It is known that Cyrus, son of Cambyses, had in his reign cut off the ears of this Magian, Smerdis, for some grave reason — I know not what. So Phaedyme, daughter of Otanes, performed her promise to her father. When it was her turn to visit the Magian (as a Persian's wives come in regular order to their lord), she came to his bed and felt for the Magian's ears while he slumbered deeply; and having with no great difficulty assured herself that he had no ears, she sent and told this to her father as soon as it was morning. (Hdt. III 69, transl. Godley)

From what one could have observed at the Achaemenid court this story is implausible. There the king appears in his Persian *kidaris* which leaves both ears exposed (Figs. 2, 3). The tale must have been invented, and believed, in a province where nobody had ever seen Persian courtiers or infantry,[4] as, for instance, at Xanthos, where the friezes of the Nereïd Monument show dignitaries only in western Iranian dress.

III. *An Egyptian Story*

In Egypt[5] too, the king was conceived as wearing western Iranian dress. The description of Cambyses' death is indicative:

> ... as he mounted [his horse], the cap slipped off the scabbard of his sword, and the naked blade struck his thigh, wounding him in the same part where he himself had once smitten the Egyptian god Apis... (Hdt. III 64, transl. Godley).

This could not have happened with an Elamo-Persian dagger which has a pointed sheath without a cap.[6] The *akinakes*, however, always had such a cap, often beautifully worked in some precious material,[7] which could slip off easily.

IV. *Persian Sources?*

Later Greek historiography had other accounts at its disposal. Thus Polyaenus, in his *Stratagemata*, knew that when in urgent need of water

> ... Darius fixed his sceptre in the ground, tying round it his kandys, tiara and the royal diadem; and climbing an eminence, implored Apollo in this moment of distress to preserve his army, and give them water. The god heard his prayers; and a plentiful shower ensued. (XI 8, transl. R. Shepherd)

[4] This could have been Greece, as has been assumed by Demandt 1972: 100f., or any (western?) Anatolian province; see above n. 3.

[5] All commentators agree that the account of Cambyses' 'mad' behaviour in Egypt comes from a later slanderous and chauvinistic Egyptian source.

[6] Stronach 1974: 62, fig. 20, 24 pl. XXI. Elamite origin: Hinz 1969: 79, Taf. 35, always worn stuck into the belt.

[7] Stucky 1976: 13ff.; worn suspended from the belt over the left thigh.

The author not only knew that the king would wear the western Iranian costume with kandys during the campaign, but also that the tiara and diadem[8] were part of it. How the tiara was fixed is known to the author of another fragment, also preserved by Polyaenus:

> When Darius and the seven Persian chiefs agreed to fall upon the Magi in the night, in order to know each other in the dark, he proposed to them to wear the button, that fastens the tiara behind, on their forehead; that feeling the button, they might know their friends (XI 2, transl. R. Shepherd)

We can see these buttons on the reliefs: at the back of the tiaras of highranking officers (Fig. 3). Knowledge of Persian dress at this date was much better than that of earlier Greek authors. On the other hand, we know from Darius himself (and from Herodotus) that only seven persons participated in the assassination of the Magi: Darius was one of them; 'The King and the Seven' is a much later concept (Daniel, Esther).

V. *Excellent Descriptions from Alexander's Time.*

In most cases the comparison between text and reliefs is more difficult. When we try, for instance, to identify the several units of guards around the Persian king it is usual to start with the two best known and best preserved descriptions by Herodotus (VII 40f.) and Quintus Curtius Rufus (III 3,8ff.): (see diagram p. 15).

The comparison between the two descriptions shows that they must go back to different sources, sources independent of each other. Only the main elements are the same: the divine (Calmeyer 1974: 49ff.) and royal chariots, the Ten Thousand following them and several thousand in front, all of them infantry. Some of the differences may be explained by the different occasions: Xerxes had left his family at home, when he marched against far-away Greece; Darius III, apparently, had sent all his cavalry elsewhere.

One part of Quintus Curtius' narrative, on the other hand, might be suspected of being a later, somewhat mythical interpretation. Jupiter/Ahuramazda, surrounded by the sun(-god), 12 and 365: that is the representation of the creator of the universe, surrounded by the cosmos, the order which he has created i.e., the year. That this represents the Iranian year is confirmed by Curtius himself (III 3,10):

> ... threehundred and sixty-five young men clad in purple robes, equal in number to the days of a whole year; for the Persians also divide the year into that number of days. (transl. J.C. Rolfe)

[8] Not in the modern English sense: the ancient (Iranian) tiara is a round or pointed headdress, probably of leather; the diadem is a ribbon 'wound round' the head. Cf. for both: Calmeyer & Eilers 1977: 171ff.; 174ff. and especially v. Gall 1974.

Herodotus	Curtius
Baggage train	
Mixed host of all nations	
	Fire on silver altars
Space left	Magi
	365 young men in purple robes
1000 horsemen, chosen from among all Persians	
1000 *aichmophoroi*, chosen as before	
10 Nesaean horses	
Sacred chariot of Zeus	Chariot consecrated to Jupiter
	Steed of the Sun
	10 chariots embossed with gold and silver
	Horsemen of 12 nations
	10 000 *immortales*
	15 000 *cognati regis*
	doryphoroe
Xerxes' chariot	Darius III's chariot (... *cidaris*) between ca. 200 *propinqui*
1000 noblest *aichmophoroi*	
1000 chosen Persian horsemen	
10 000 chosen Persians (spears)	10 000 *hastati*
	30 000 foot soldiers
	400 of the king's horses
10 000 Persian horsemen	
Space of 2 furlongs	Interval of 1 stade
	King's women in chariots
	King's children etc. in *harmamaxae*
	King's eunuchs
	365 concubines of the king
Multitude	Guard of bowmen
	King's money
	Other women and households
	Light-armed troops

Also part of this cosmos were the ten chariots, unfortunately not described in detail. They must have represented the (three) groups of ten days into which the Iranian month — and only the Iranian month — was divided (Al-Biruni, transl. Sachau 1879: 52ff.)

Finally the curious notion of representing the vast Achaemenian empire by only twelve nations (*gentes*) can be shown to have existed at the Persian court. When Artaxerxes III completed the *Tačara*, the private palace of Darius I, he added a small staircase on its western front. The façade of this staircase he adorned with his inscription and with reliefs of 12 delegations (Fig. 6):

VIII. Araber/Libyer (24/26)	II. ELAMER (2)	I. MEDER (1)	VII. Skudra (20)
X. [indisch?]	IV. ASSYRER (8)	III. Drangianer (7)	IX. kleinasiat. Thraker?
XII. Libyer/Araber (26/24)	VI. SAKA (tigrakh.?)	V. Baktrer? (13?)	XI. SAKA (haum.?)

These 'delegations'[9] were taken, mechanically, from the innermost and from the extreme parts of Artaxerxes' I façade (Tilia 1974: 133f., Roaf 1974: 89). According to the programme of that façade they represent the nations nearest to the capitals (and to the king) and the nations at the frontiers. Of course, the number of peoples by no means corresponds to the number of units that actually formed the Persian empire, be it nations, provinces, super-satrapies or parts of the world. The number twelve is complete in itself: as complete as a federation of twelve cities, an amphictiony of twelve tribes, a zodiac of twelve signs or a year of twelve months. In its latest phase, with Artaxerxes III and Darius III, the Achaemenian empire was symbolized as a Community of Twelve.

So even those parts of Quintus Curtius' description which at first sight seemed to be rather artificial or even mythical, must have come from genuine Iranian, late Achaemenian sources. The more realistic features of his and Herodotus' account, however, are difficult to compare with works of art. The chariot of the chief deity can be found only on Urartian and Assyrian reliefs (Calmeyer 1974: 49ff.), the different kinds of troops and their order nowhere. The reason is, of course, that, as far as we know, scenes of war were never depicted on the walls of the palaces of Persepolis, Susa and Babylon. For this reason we would not expect to see the king in a chariot nor soldiers on horseback.

At Persepolis, we find the different kinds of royal guards in a more peaceful role: as guardians of the private palaces *Tačara* and *Hadiš*; once, on the Apadana, they stand behind the king and his son (Fig. 3) as they receive gifts from their subject nations (Calmeyer 1980: 56). Here both the rulers and all the guards wear the (Elamo-)Persian garment; nevertheless, we can discern four different units:

a) lance-bearers with crowns (*mitrai*): immediately around the royal *ouraniskos* (Fig. 3);
b) lance-bearers with fluted crowns and large shields: on the inner side of the parapet, above the king;
c) lance-bearers with the same crowns wearing long bows and quivers: on both sides of the staircases;
d) lance-bearers with a kind of rope (*strophion*) around the head: behind the last-named group.
e) Behind this last unit follows a mixed group of Persians and Medians,

[9] For the gifts brought by these representatives of different peoples cf. Calmeyer 1980: 56f.

gesticulating and apparently talking to each other, only half of them armed with daggers and bow-cases (Fig. 4).

While we do not find anything like this in Herodotus and Q. Curtius, a very precise description of the same order of five units or groups has been preserved elsewhere. Surprisingly, it is the 'daily splendour', not of an Achaemenid, but of Alexander the Great that offers the same sequence:

ruler;
somatophylakes surrounding him (a);
argyraspides: "silver-shield-bearers" (b);
toxotai (c);
melophoroi: "applebearers", i.e. with lances ending in apples (d);
Susians and *akinakes*-bearing "Persians" (e).

This account is preserved in three versions by Polyaenus (IV 3,24), Athenaeus (XII 539d-f) and Aelian (*Var. Hist.* IX 3), all writers of the second and third century A.D. It goes back to the third century B.C., to Phylarchus (*FGrH* 81; Bosworth 1980 8f.). Alexander here is said to have used this 'splendour' (*dapane*) to impress his eastern subjects, Bactrians, Hyrcanians and Indians. In order to do so, he must have copied a ceremony of his Achaemenid predecessors.

Similarly, the latest, post-Achaemenian sources are the most reliable for the much debated question of the number of satrapies of which the Achaemenian empire consisted. On the occasion of the settlements at Babylon (Diod. Sic. XVIII 5; Trog. *ap.* Just. XIII 4,5-24; Arrian *ap.* Phot. 92 = 69a,30-69b,40; Dexippos *ap.* Phot. 82=64a; Q.C. X 10,1-4) and Triparadeisos (Arrian *ap.* Phot. 71b,18-72a,10; Diod. Sic. XVIII 39,6) the empire was divided and given to Alexander's *diadochi*; the records of these events all make use of a list which may go back to Hieronymus of Cardia (Lehmann-Haupt 1921: 153ff.; Jacoby 1913: 1540ff.; Tarn 1921: 8; cf. Calmeyer 1982: 182f.). This is the earliest document which professed to list 'satrapies'. In the light of this list all earlier inscriptions and reliefs of the Achaemenids appear incomplete, abridged and edited for the occasion, not listing systematically governmental units, but lands and/or peoples illustrating the boundaries of the empire:

> Look at the sculptures (of those) who bear the throne, then shalt thou know, then shall it become known to thee: the spear of a Persian man has gone forth far; then shall it become known to thee: a Persian man has delivered battle far indeed from Persia.[10]

The least reliable of all the documents on 'provinces' is what Herodotus apparently amalgamated from Hecataeus' map (Altheim & Stiehl 1963: 124ff.; 1970: 145ff.), possibly from some other sources and from his own western

[10] Darius, Naqsh-i Rustam close to his figure: Kent 1953: 138. None of the lists mentions the term satrap or satrapy.

Anatolian point of view. O. Armayor (1978: 7) has convincingly shown that the sum of the supposed tribute payments was apparently pre-determined: 19 times 400 talents; 400 talents for one province was probably the only solid fact Herodotus could rely on.[11] Also pre-determined must have been the sum of 67 peoples mentioned. Indeed, to start with this list in reconstructing the Achaemenian system of government is to put the cart before the horse (Gignoux 1979: 138f.).

From the point of view of an archaeologist we can only add, that the reliefs contain cycles of 30, 24 (Darius), 24 (Xerxes), two times 28, 30 (Artaxerxes I) or 12 (Artaxerxes III) peoples (Calmeyer 1982: 107) but never 19 or 67. Neither these cycles nor the list in the inscriptions of the Achaemenids have any resemblance with the peoples and tribes mentioned by Herodotus.

VI. *The Persian Legend of the Three Empires*

But we should try to understand Herodotus rather than convict him. Tracing his use of Hecataeus' map was one step in this direction; to replace the false notion of a general constitutional reform under Darius with a glimpse of the immense difficulties faced by Herodotus would be another. When Herodotus (III 92) says about his 9th *nomos*:

> Babylon and the rest of Assyria rendered to Darius a thousand talents of silver and five hundred boys to be eunuchs... (transl. A.D. Godley)

then Babylon is only a city, Assyria the name of the whole province, including that city.[12] This would be in line with the provinces of the late Arsacid and early Sassanian empires (Calmeyer 1982: 184 n. 250), but not with the time of Darius, Xerxes and Artaxerxes I, when we always find two names in the lists (*Babiruš* and *Athura*) and two figures or delegations on the reliefs. Has Herodotus merely been misinformed, or can we fit his statement into a historical development of ideas which were held by Orientals about the province and the old kingdom of Babylonia?

Cyrus, in his famous cylinder inscription, knew or pretended to know that it was Marduk, ruler of the Babylonian pantheon, who had given him the govenment of the Four Quarters of the world. In the oldest Achaemenian list we possess (column I of the Bisutun inscription), the empire of Cambyses is divided into groups of countries as the Persians had taken them over from older empires: the Babylonian group comes second, just after Elam, long before Media (Calmeyer 1982: 124ff.). In Darius' later lists and reliefs Babylo-

[11] Altheim and Stiehl 1963: 132ff. think that the sum was the starting point of the otherwise arbitrarily itemized list of tribute. Unfortunately, Armayor was unaware of their discussion.

[12] Cf. the next province: "Agbatana and the rest of Media" and the foregoing: "Susa and the rest of the Cissian country". I 178: Babylon was "after the fall of Niniveh, the seat of government" of Assyria; I 188 "Labynetos... was king of the Assyrians". Cf. n. 14.

nia is always one of many countries, placed geographically between Media and the West or Southwest (*ibid.*: 109ff.; 170f.); the Babylonian delegation is still represented on the façades of Xerxes and Artaxerxes I (*ibid.*: 147ff; Hinz 1969: Tafel 49).

In the time of Artaxerxes II, Assyrians and Babylonians were no longer precisely distinguished from each other. The ruins of Niniveh were described by Xenophon (*Anabasis* III 4,7ff.) as those of a Median city, destroyed by the Persians; in the Median folk legend of Cyrus the Great (Christensen 1936: 122), on the other hand, the same author heard that it was the Assyrian, not the Babylonian empire which was subjugated by Cyrus for his Median father-in-law (*Cyropaedia* I 5,2-3) and that Babylon was its capital (II 1,5; V 4,34; VI 1,25; VI 2,10), speaking Syrian (VII 5,31).[13] Xenophon's contemporary, Ctesias, must have been taught much the same (hi)story at the Achaemenian court: there was only an Assyrian, a Median and a Persian rule, one after the other — nothing else.[14] A pseudo-Aristotelean letter to Alexander (III 4) reflects the same unhistorical theory:[15]

> For some time it was the people Šam and the land Sūriya that ruled over Asia; to them the Medes succeeded, followed by the Persians.

So by this time any former knowledge of the Neo-Babylonian empire had been superseded by the idea of the succession of three empires.[16] The Babylonian dynasty of the Chaldaeans had been forgotten,[17] even the Labynetos of Herodotus. On the staircase of Artaxerxes III (Fig. 6), consequently, the Babylonians were left out; Assyrians were enough to represent that part of the world. Finally, Darius III had on his chariot statues of Ninus and Belus on both sides of an eagle, the symbol of the Achaemenid family (Q. Curtius III 3,16): the *heros eponymos* of the Assyrian capital Niniveh and one of the apellatives of the Babylonian god Marduk had degenerated into members of the royal lineage.

Nearchus saw 'Assyrians' doing trade along the coast of the Persian Gulf (Arrian *Indica* 32,7); they must have been (Aramaean?) inhabitants of the Shaṭṭ al-Arab region. From late Arsacid time onwards, *Aṣoristān* was the name of all the lands of present day Iraq (Honigmann & Maricq 1953: 41ff.).

[13] Rather curiously the Assyrian king had already conquered Hyrcania and Bactria: a parallel to the empire of Ninus in Diodorus. Cf. *Cyropaedia* I 1,4 where the Babylonians are mentioned as being subjugated by Cyrus — but as one of 19 peoples, not as an old established empire.

[14] *Ap.* Phot. 35b, 35; 36a, 10ff. Cf. König 1972: 197 = Schol. Aristeides *Panath.* 301 = *FGrH* 688 F33a. Cf. Diod. Sic. II 1,27. (it goes back to Herodotus I 95; 130,1: Metzler 1975: 443).

[15] Bielawski & Plezia 1970: 58, esp. n.6; 87. I cannot believe that Aristotle himself wrote this: in *Politics* III 13 = 1284b 1ff. he is much more precise.

[16] Out of which the 'Four Empires' were developed: Flüsser 1972: 154.

[17] Similarly: Tobit XIV 4ff. which probably has a Median-Jewish background. Many other books of the Bible, of course, commemorate Nabuchodonosor, the waters of Babylon and the liberation through Koresh/Cyrus.

All this was, of course, not history, but consists of fragments of a legend concerning the empire preceding that of the Medians. The legend is stuffed with romantic stories about gigantic Nimrod, mighty Ninus, his fascinating consort Semiramis, and an effeminate late ruler who is sometimes called Sardanapallus. Gradually, this legend replaced what was left of the history of the real Babylonians and Assyrians.

Herodotus must have been puzzled by what he was told. He had at his disposal excellent information about the city of Babylon, some speculations about the gods and cults there, but all this was described to him as the last capital of Assyria. Of the famous Assyrians, on the other hand, he had no evidence: he had to describe them in his army-list (VII 63) with the help of some archaising *topoi* (Armayor 1978: 5f.) e.g. iron-studded wooden clubs. The actual Assyrians of his time were no longer warriors: as the reliefs show them they must have resembled modern Arabs, with long shirts and *kefiyes* (Fig. 6 upper left).

VII. *Conclusion.*

Reliefs, and other works of art, if we want to interpret them and use them for historical purposes, always need to be compared with and controlled by textual evidence. Only very rarely can we, by contrast, control the texts with the help of works of art. This can be useful mainly, as our examples show, if the texts contain what we call *antiquaria*: details on weapons, garments, gifts and so on. In the case of Persepolis we are more fortunate than elsewhere because we possess reliefs and inscriptions, even captions, closely connected to each other. I have tried to choose items that allow conclusions on the kind of source material that might have been at the Greek historian's disposal. The whole sequence might suggest, that there was some kind of development in the understanding of Achaemenian Iran: knowledge of *antiquaria* improved (to reach its climax probably with Dinon and Cleitarchus); the understanding of oriental history, prehistory and geography, on the other hand, became less and less realistic, more and more legendary, and even mythical in nature.

Fig. 1. Detail from the tomb of Darius I at Naqsh-i Rustam: the Persian, the Median and the Elamite (from left to right) carrying the royal *gathu* and Aspačina, the royal bow-carrier (on the left). Photogr. B. Grunewald.



Fig. 2. Detail of the same tomb: Darius I praying (in front of a fire altar and a figure in the winged disc. Photogr. B. Grunewald.

Fig. 3. Relief in the treasury at Persepolis, originally the centre of the eastern façade of the Apadana: Xerxes I, his son and co-regent Darius, the royal chamberlain and the bearer of the bow-case behind them and the chiliarch before them, all surrounded by guards. Photogr. B. Grunewald.

Fig. 4. Detail from the Eastern façade of the Apadana: Persians and Medians (originally behind the rulers on Fig.3 and behind the guards). Photogr. B. Grunewald.



Fig. 5. The mosaic in *Casa del Fauno*, Pompei, showing the battle between Darius III and Alexander. Drawing by W.J.K. Zahn, from: B. Andreae, *Das Alexandermosaik aus Pompeji* (1977) Abb.24.

Fig. 6. Façade of the western staircase, added to Darius' Tačara in the time of Artaxerxes III. Author's photogr.

LIES AND INVENTION IN DEINON'S *PERSICA*

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Deinon, if we are to believe some fairly recent assessments of his work,[1] was something of a fool: not content to confine his inventions and his corrections of Ctesias to events of the distant past or of the period after 398/7 (where Ctesias finished his history), he deliberately falsified his information to give an alternative account for various episodes from 405 to 398, when Ctesias was personally at court and actually involved in some of the incidents he relates, and yet apparently expected to be believed. It seems highly unlikely that he would be believed: as Plutarch (*Artaxerxes* 1,4) much later points out, when Ctesias and Deinon disagree on Artaxerxes' original name, it is unlikely that Ctesias, whatever his faults, would not know the name of the king at whose court he spent some time. It seems equally unlikely that Deinon should be stupid enough to expect his blatant lies to be believed, and so it seems sensible to look further for reasons to explain divergences between his account and Ctesias'. The murder of Stateira by Parysatis, described by Plutarch (*Artax.* 6,19) is a good starting point, since both authors give essentially the same account, but differ in some details.

In the first place they disagree on when the murder took place, Deinon putting it during the war against Cyrus, Ctesias after its end. In the description of the actual plot, Deinon says Parysatis' maid, Gigis, worked along with her mistress, whereas Ctesias says she was only a witness, and that against her will. According to Ctesias it was a servant named Belitaras who provided the poison; Deinon calls him Melantas, and says he actually cut the bird in two with the poisoned knife, while in Ctesias' account it was Parysatis herself who did this. It should be admitted right away that Plutarch is to some extent responsible for our impression of the differences between the authors, since by including variants in the same version of the story he hides any serious divergences there may have been while highlighting those which are apparently trivial.[2] It is however probably safe to assume that Plutarch would also have

[1] Drews 1973: 118 especially: "but unlike Ctesias, Deinon intentionally falsified history in order to make it more dramatic"; 117: "Deinon corrected Ctesias just as often as Ctesias had corrected Herodotus, but since Ctesias' subject matter was inconsequential, Deinon's 'corrections' seem less grotesque".

[2] There may also be some confusion, since according to Plutarch Ctesias says Parysatis herself gave the poison, but earlier says that Belitaras did. The name is almost identical to 'Belitanas' in Ctes. 13.26 (all references to Ctesias are to *FGrH*:Ctesias 688) and it could be that Plutarch has mistakenly repeated the name. But since he appears to be taking care over details this seems

drawn attention to any major factual differences there were, and that such differences as he does conceal were probably of presentation.

Clearly Deinon is not trying to sensationalize; if anything Ctesias' account, where the queen-mother herself administers the poison and an innocent servant girl is put to death, is more dramatic. In fact there are other episodes which show that Deinon does sometimes play down some of Ctesias' more dramatic features to give what he sees as more appropriate details. In the story of the rise of Cyrus, where Ctesias describes his progress from sweeper to king's cup-bearer, Deinon has him rise through the military ranks at court, from cup-bearer to spear-bearer, a progression more in line with Cyrus' later military role.[3] Deinon's alterations to the story of Stateira's murder could be explained similarly. According to Ctesias, Gigis was later arrested and put to death as a poisoner; it would therefore be more appropriate to make her a willing participant in the crime. Parysatis' involvement could hardly be denied, but it could be lessened if she did not actually administer the poison. Parysatis had originally been banished to Babylon, but was later recalled and forgiven, and thereafter it may have seemed sensible to play down her part in the murder. Thus it could be supposed that Deinon used his common sense to alter details of Ctesias' account which did not seem to fit later events.

This however does not account for the change of names. Plutarch's *Gigis* for Photius' *Gingè* (Ctes. F27,70) merely shows up a textual error, or a mistake, probably by the latter. But Melantas and Belitaras are clearly different names, both quite plausible. Apart from an Assyrian king who appears elsewhere[4] there is no other extant occurrence of Belitaras, but there is evidence for a Lydian Beletros: the name is Semitic with a *bltr* root into which Belitaras can be fitted. *-taras* appears elsewhere as a Lydian name ending.[5] Melantas on the other hand has no such oriental root: the name is clearly Greek, as an example

unlikely, and it is better to assume that the name is correct, and that Ctesias simply means that Belitaras supplied the poison to Parysatis, who herself gave it to Stateira.

[3] The account in Nicolaus of Damascus (*FGrH* 90 F66,26) can reasonably be attributed to Ctesias. Deinon's is *FGrH* 690 F9. The ranks through which Cyrus progressed is the sort of detail which could easily vary according to who told the story, and we might at first imagine that someone like Ctesias, who himself came into contact with the king, might see a position such as cup-bearer as best, and that he gives a variation of Deinon's standard version. However, this does not seem to be the case. As Amélie Kuhrt has pointed out to me, one of the oldest elements in the legend of Sargon, with which Ctesias' story of the rise of Cyrus has similarities, is that Sargon became cup-bearer to the king whose throne he eventually took (see further Drews 1974: 387f.). Ctesias therefore seems to give the original version while Deinon changes and rationalizes to give Cyrus a more dignified and appropriate role.

[4] *FGrH* 273 F81b - perhaps the same person as Ctesias' Belitanas.

[5] Zgusta 1964, para. 159, Int. 55: "Die Annahme, dass der Name semitisch ist... mit Recht abgelehnt worden". Par*taras* appears in Zgusta as a Lydian name. (Sa*taras*) is Lycian). B'ltrz also appears on the coins of Tarsus, but this is Baal of Tarsus, who appears frequently on the obverse from the late 5th century onwards (Kraay 1976: 282), rather than a personal name.

from Lesbos, among others, shows.[6] This is surely significant, since there is no reason why Deinon, looking at the literary evidence at his disposal, should change the servant from an oriental to a Greek. While the changing of names is a fairly common device for suggesting that someone else's story is one's own, it is usually the name of a major character which is altered.[7] The detail must therefore have been in Deinon's source, whose account he seems content to follow. We do not know who Deinon's source was, but the evidence of his *Persica* as a whole suggests that it was someone favourable to and closely connected with Tiribazus, who is much more prominent in Deinon's work than elsewhere, and of whom there is no serious criticism in it.[8] This then should be a source close to the events described, and one must ask why, in these circumstances, Deinon should give a different version from that of Ctesias, who was also at court. The king himself may be involved. There is evidence (Plut. *Artax.* 6,9) that Artaxerxes despised Greeks (Spartans in particular), and it is not impossible that he should wish to imply that one of them was responsible for his wife's death. She after all, did not have Parysatis' sympathy for Greeks such as Clearchus, and according to one version it was her hostile attitude to him which led to her death (Plut. *Artax.* 18,9). The changed timing — Deinon puts the murder actually during the war against Cyrus (Plut. *Artax.* 6,9) — also points to an attempt to increase Greek responsibility. If these changes are the king's then it seems likely that the others are too, and that Deinon's version could represent official feeling, probably after Parysatis' recall from Babylon, when the king would be keen to shift blame off her. Some of the blame was shifted on to Gigis: Ctesias' detail, preserved by Photius (*FGrH* 688 F27,70), that it was the king who condemned her while the judges acquitted, suggests the king's hand behind this too. Ctesias, on the other hand, reflects opinion at the time of the incident, before any royal propaganda, or perhaps rather apology, had crept in. It is worth noting that the relatively pro-Parysatis Ctesias (cf. Ctes. F16,60) writes the more critical account, and this could perhaps be taken to show his basic honesty in the description of contemporary events in which he was not personally involved.

[6] Diog. Laert. 5,36, a 4th century example, the father of Theophrastus of Eresus in Lesbos, cf. also Dem. 18,249; Meiggs & Lewis 1969: 42.43.

[7] As, for example, in the case in Ctesias where he says the same of Megabyzus as Herodotus says about Zopyrus (Hdt. III 150f). Cf. Ctesias F13,26.

[8] Except for a passing reference to his command at Cyprus in Isocrates (*Paneg.*135) other sources lose interest in him after 387, when he no longer has any direct contact with prominent Greeks. This however is because Greek sources generally are not interested in internal Persian affairs. More important is the fact that Tiribazus has a much greater role in Deinon than any other individual has, and that he is presented in a favourable light, even when being criticized - Plut. *Artax.* 5,4: '*ēn gar ou ponēros, hypokouphos de kai paraphoros*'; cf. also 24,4 and 29,7. Others related to him also seem to receive favourable treatment, as is the case with Glos, whose good services to the king are emphasized before his revolt, Diod. XV 3,9.3.

Support for the idea of royal propaganda recorded by Deinon comes in another incident also described by Ctesias (Plut. *Artax.*10-11), the battle of Cunaxa, in particular the fight between Artaxerxes and Cyrus. Ctesias gives a version in which after the king has missed Cyrus and hit Satiphernes with his spear, Cyrus wounds his brother in the chest, causing him to fall from his horse. The king is then taken by his companions to a nearby hill, while Cyrus is carried on through his enemies and is struck first by Mithridates, then brought down by a Carian.[9] In Deinon's version Cyrus first wounds the king's horse rather than his person, and causes him to fall. Tiribazus remounts him, only to see him fall again. At the third attack the king strikes Cyrus, as do some of his attendants, and Cyrus dies, by a wound either from the hands of the king or, as some say, from a Carian. It can be noted generally that Deinon's account, in which the king does not himself receive a wound from Cyrus, and may have delivered the blow which killed him, is more favourable to Artaxerxes. Ctesias points out that after the event Artaxerxes was eager to take the credit for Cyrus' death (Plut.*Artax.*14,5) and gives examples of his treatment of those who did not allow him to do so, the Carian and Mithridates. Ctesias' statement may find support in the fact that when the king sends his messengers to the Greeks (Diod.XIV 25,1; Xen.*Anab.*II 1,8; 11) he says he is the victor because he has killed Cyrus, though it is possible that he speaks here only as the representative of his side.[10] However, if the king was anxious to let it be thought that he killed Cyrus, then it could be that once again Deinon is giving the officially sanctioned version of events. There are however two points which may be considered problematic: a) If Deinon is giving the version of events favourable to the king, why does he have him falling from his horse more often than Ctesias does? b) Why is doubt left as to whether it was Artaxerxes or some Carian who killed Cyrus? The first is easily answered. Plutarch (*Artax.* 11,1) says his account of Ctesias' version is more abbreviated, and it is quite possible that Ctesias did have the king dismounted more than once. Tiribazus' presence may also be relevant, since if Deinon is following a pro-Tiribazus source fairly closely, as is suggested above, then he will not want to omit any of his part at the king's side.[11] Besides, two falls does not necessarily reflect very badly on the king, but rather magnifies the importance of the contest which he ultimately wins. The other objection is more difficult, though it may be possible to suggest that it, too, can be accounted for by Tiribazus' presence. Propaganda needs time or distance to become established, and

[9] In fact Plutarch says here a Caunian, but later (in 14) refers to a Carian, as does Photius (Ctes. F16,67). Plutarch's text is probably the result of some confusion with the other group of Caunians whom he has bringing water to the thirsty Artaxerxes (12,5)

[10] Cf. also the example of the cutting off of Cyrus' head and right hand. In Ctes. 16,64 it is said that Artaxerxes did this, whereas in 16,66 Bagapates is blamed.

[11] There is no reason to doubt Tiribazus' involvement. Support for his role as the man who mounts the king on his horse is found in Xen. *Anab.* IV 4,4.

Tiribazus must have known that it was far from certain that the king dealt the blow which killed Cyrus. Even if he himself was willing to accept it he may have felt it necessary to say that not everyone agreed. More likely, however, is that Tiribazus only passed on the 'official' version, and that Deinon himself, seeing that Ctesias did not simply get some details 'wrong' but gave a totally different, plausible account, provided the alternative, whether because he personally gave some weight to Ctesias' personal involvement or because he thought his readers would. In fact Ctesias' account here, as in the case of Stateira's murder, is likely to be substantially correct.[12]

It can then be seen from these two examples that blatant lies are recorded in Deinon's *Persica*. It is not however he who falsifies history, but his court source, who remembers and records the officially sanctioned version of events at court.

The charge of falsification can also be levelled against Deinon in connection with some episodes which seem to be pure invention. There are two incidents in particular which I wish to consider: Tiribazus' trial (Diod.XV 10)[13] which should take place around 380, sometime after the slanders by Orontes, and Darius' request for Aspasia, in the late 360s (Plut.*Artax.* 26f.) which leads to his revolt against his father.

Clearly the first question to be asked here is how we can be sure that these episodes are complete invention, and one useful indication is the amount of material in them which can be paralleled elsewhere. Deinon begins the account of the trial by saying that about this time royal judges who were believed to have been corrupt had been flayed alive, and their skins stretched tight over the judicial benches. This story finds a parallel in that of Sisamnes in Herodotus V 25, and one must ask whether Deinon describes a genuine repetition of the incident or simply takes the story from Herodotus for interest. It is not possible to prove either case: there are other tales in Herodotus of judges such as Sandoces (VII 194) punished for corruption (the fact that he is reprieved is not relevant here) and earlier (III 31) there is a general statement that royal judges are chosen to serve till they die or are detected in some injustice, so it seems that they are regularly punished for offences, and Deinon's could be a separate case. Flaying too, though it seems somewhat extreme, appears to have been reasonably common, and examples can be found elsewhere. On the other hand, the general lack of detail in Deinon, which could of course be due to the fact that the incident is not of central importance, suggests that this might well just be a detail repeated from Herodotus. Tiribazus' trial then commences. The charges are not denied, just

[12] It receives some support from Xenophon, who was also at Cunaxa, though he would not himself have seen the duel between Artaxerxes and Cyrus.

[13] This whole episode is assigned to Deinon because of its close connections with Plut. *Artax.* 24, for which Deinon is almost certainly the source.

answered, and in case this defence is inadequate Tiribazus also reminds the king of his former good services: as well as a general statement that his judgement was good, he mentions a particular occasion when he saved the king from danger in a hunt by slaying lions which had attacked him. That past good service should be able to outweigh present crime is a theme found frequently in Herodotus. Sandoces, referred to above, is taken off his cross when the king remembers his past services, and in book one (I 137) there is a clear statement that an offender is only punished if his offences are greater than his services. The choice of the hunting incident to illustrate Tiribazus' services is interesting, for it is one which is common in the literature. Xenophon (*Anab.*I 9,6) remarks that Cyrus showered rewards on a man who saved him from attack by a she-bear. More interesting is a story in Ctesias (F14,43) in which Megabyzus, whose family is as much favoured in Ctesias as Tiribazus' is in Deinon, kills a lion which suddenly comes on the king. Instead of being grateful, Artaxerxes (I) is annoyed that Megabyzus hit the beast before he did, and threatens to cut off his head — quite the opposite of Tiribazus' experience in the same circumstances. Deinon may use this incident to make a general remark about Artaxerxes II's milder nature, but his account might have seemed more truthful if Tiribazus had recounted his considerable services to the king at Cunaxa, or, more recently, against the Cadusians (Plut. *Artax.* 24),[14] instead of this stock tale. The details which follow are no more convincing: after judgement is given the king summons his judges and asks each why they acquitted Tiribazus, which is slightly reminiscent of the later Deinon episode on the condemnation of Darius (Plut.*Artax.*29,8), when the king asks the judges how they decided, since he was not present himself. Here each judge gives a different answer, and between them they cover every reasonable means of reaching a decision to acquit Tiribazus. It is possible that it was with this in mind that the number three was chosen for the judges: seven appears more often, though the number is not fixed.[15] The story finishes with Orontes being dropped from the king's list of friends[16] — no detail however is given, and this is simply said to round off the story. The fact that any individual point can be paralleled elsewhere does not necessarily imply that it is untrue, but when virtually every point can be, this must cast doubt on the truth of the episode as a whole.

When we turn to Darius' request for Aspasia, we find that the chief objection is one of plausibility. No matter how young she was at the time of

[14] Diod. XV 8,5 says Tiribazus' trial was postponed because of this war.

[15] Seven in Esther I 14; Josephus *Ant. Jud.* XI 6,1; Xen. *Anab.* I 6,4, though these are just seven distinguished Persians.

[16] Considering the tortures he could have suffered (cf. Put. *Artax.* 14,7) one might doubt whether this constitutes '*tais eschatais atimiais*', but it was no doubt quite serious for someone in Orontes' position.

Cunaxa, when she came into Artaxerxes' posession, Aspasia must have been well over fifty by the time Darius was appointed successor near the end of Artaxerxes' reign, in the late 360s. Attempts can be made to explain this away, whether by supposing that Plutarch's dating is wrong,[17] and the incident occurred much earlier, or by suggesting that Aspasia's age is not relevant and need not cast doubt on the tale. A new king took over the harem of his predecessor (Hdt III 68,3; 88,2), and asking for Aspasia, the most influential of its members, may simply be a sign of wanting recognition as king there and then, rather than after Artaxerxes' death. Co-regencies are known, and Akkadian documents confirm the occasional, though rare, association of the king's son with his father as successor, but he is not co-king with the same titles as his father.[18] Given Persian jealousy about their women we may suppose that successors did not have access to their father's concubines, and that Darius' request was presumptuous and annoyed his father on these grounds. However, though plausible, this doesn't seem to be how Deinon saw the situation; references to the fact that being a priestess of Anaitis requires chastity (*Artax.* 27,4) and that *Kyprogeneia d'ou pampan anaitios* in Darius' plot (28,5) suggest he thought, or wished to give the impression, that Darius wanted Aspasia simply because he found her attractive. The fact that Deinon mentions that Darius was fifty himself may suggest that he saw there was a problem about Aspasia's age, but this could be mentioned only as a detail of interest in connection with his being appointed successor, and it doesn't make it any more likely that the story is true. A further possibility would be that Deinon has confused Aspasia and some younger, but less well known woman at court (the importance of the court women is illustrated by Ochus' dealings with them, Plut. *Artax.* 26,2f.; 28,1, and it may be that one of them did cause Darius' revolt); but other factors suggest that the story of request and denial is largely invention. In the first place it is parallel to the stated grievance of Tiribazus, who incited Darius to revolt, though he had been deprived, apparently, of not one but two women. In addition it should be noted that women are very often said to be the cause of revolt or disaffection : the case of Masistes (Hdt. IX 108f.) probably provides the closest parallel, but Ctesias' Megabyzus (F14,34) is also led to disaffection by his feelings about his wife's behaviour, and Gyges' revolt (Hdt.I 8f.) is caused by Candaules' wife. We also have a reminiscence of an earlier episode in the comment that barbarians are

[17] As does Fogazza 1970: 422, who says Ochus' elimination of rivals need not follow immediately on Darius' plot, which should not be after 380. Presumably he bases this view on Plutarch's reference to Darius as '*tōi neaniskōi*' (*Artax.* 28,1), but this can be otherwise explained, in terms of the subordinate role Darius plays in events.

[18] Dubberstein 1938: 417-9 for co-regency (whether or not at the end of Cyrus' reign). There is no evidence for any 4th century example. Frye 1984: 107 n.72 for other points.

jealous about their women, and the waggons story, repeated from Themistocles (Plut. *Them.* 27,1), where it is more appropriate. It seems then that this episode can also be regarded as invention.

Deinon's 'lies' are those of his source, which records royal apologetic: can the same be said of his inventions? Here it seems more likely that Deinon himself is responsible. As has been said above, Deinon's source had a fairly detailed knowledge of Tiribazus' life, and it seems unlikely, though not impossible, that he should invent a trial scene if he knew that the charges had just been dropped, as would be possible, after Tiribazus' good services against the Cadusians.[19] Tiribazus' personal involvement may also be relevant in the Aspasia episode, where it can be imagined that Deinon's source would remember much better Tiribazus' cause, or at least stated cause,[20] for disaffection than Darius', about whom he may not have said much more than that he was afraid of Ochus, a point which does come out in Deinon's account. If this is the case then why should Deinon invent the episodes described above? Clearly he must have felt that such explanation as his source gave for Tiribazus' reinstatement and Darius' revolt was inadequate; after all, accusations should be removed before someone is allowed to come back into favour, and revolts should have a specific grievance as their cause. His source did not deal with either of these points, so Deinon himself set out to explain the facts he had to relate. Tiribazus' case was relatively straightforward. Charges had been made, and the easiest way to remove them was to answer them in a trial which resulted in Tiribazus' acquittal. Darius' revolt was more complex, as he had to look outside his immediate material for an apropriate incident. He was probably prompted by Tiribazus' alleged reasons to settle on Aspasia, who possibly had been made a priestess of Anaitis shortly before; she was getting old and should have been dismissed from the harem. Given her past influence it would have been reasonable to give her some honour, and since the cult of Anaitis flourished under Artaxerxes[21] she could well have been made a

[19] If there actually was a trial we should expect Deinon's source to give a more factual account of it, or perhaps just to say that Tiribazus was acquitted.

[20] We may doubt whether this was Tiribazus' genuine motive for action: although he could justifiably be angry at being deprived of any relationship to the king by marriage when Artaxerxes himself married each of the two daughters he had promised to Tiribazus, it does not appear that this was a recent event. Of the other daughters listed, Pharnabazus married Apame in the early 380s (Xen. *Hell.* V 1,28), and Orontes is said to be married to the king's daughter at the time of Cunaxa (Xen. *Anab.* II 4,8). Tiribazus himself has a married daughter by 380 (Diod. XV 9,3). If this was his real grievance we might have expected Tiribazus to take action against Artaxerxes considerably before this. It is more likely that Ochus put him up to inciting Darius — he is the main benificiary of the action, and Tiribazus' son is later found assisting him (Plut. *Artax.* 30,8). Clearly Tiribazus would need to have some grievance to put to Darius, and we may reasonably suppose that his complaints hinged on his being deprived of a royal wife, particularly Atossa, who was now actually helping Ochus to insinuate himself into the harem and a position of power (Plut. *Artax.* 26,2-3).

[21] He introduced it: Kent 1950: A^2Sd, A^2Ha; Berossus, *FGrH* 680, F11

priestess. Deinon used his knowledge of Persian customs and attitudes to turn this incident into a source of grievance for Darius.

We should then accept that Deinon's *Persica* includes accounts of things which did not happen, but Deinon does not deserve to be greatly blamed for this. He does invent episodes, but not with the intention of misleading or simply amusing, but rather of filling gaps in his sources, which might be felt by his readers. There are enough hints (in the number of stock themes involved) to show the observant reader that some episodes are given as examples of what could have been, rather than what was, the case, but even those who did not notice this would not be greatly misled, since what is invented is plausible, and not in itself of great importance: it is the fact that Darius revolted or that Tiribazus was reinstated which matters. More criticism may be attached to Deinon's apologetic, but as shown above, this is not his own but comes from the Persian court itself. We may claim that Deinon made a mistake in making so much use of this source, but, given its close involvement in the events in question, it is hardly surprising or to his discredit that he did, particularly since he does not accept its version uncritically where other accounts differ significantly. In fact, it should be admitted that Deinon emerges from this study as a reasonably serious and careful historian, keen to give his readers a full and detailed account of the events he chooses to relate.

DEMOCEDES OF CROTON: A GREEK DOCTOR AT THE COURT OF DARIUS

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RESUME: *Even if they cannot quite bring themselves to believe that the Marathon campaign was a direct result of pressure exerted by Democedes on Atossa (Hdt. III 134), modern scholars are happy to accept that the broad outlines of his adventures, as reported by Herodotus, are substantially accurate. This paper argues, on the contrary, that Democedes' biography conforms so closely to a widespread ancient story-pattern that the balance of probability must be that the account is largely fictitious.*

"Herodotus' information must go back directly or indirectly to a tale told by Democedes. Only Democedes could tell of the illnesses of Darius and Atossa, which marked the beginning of his successful career." So Momigliano; and this ready acceptance of the long and detailed narrative offered by Herodotus at III 129-38 is typical of recent scholars, most of whom are content to serve up a neutral précis of the story, allowing or encouraging their readers to treat as reliable fact all elements which are not patently unhistorical (such as Atossa's control of Persian foreign policy from the royal bed).[1]

But the story is far too interesting to be left unexamined in such a limbo of indifference. Both in broad structure and in detail it can be made, under analysis, to yield up a wealth of usefully diagnostic features; and (to anticipate my results) these seem to me all to point to the same conclusion. Herodotus' account of the adventures of Democedes displays so many tell-tale characteristics of what one might call 'traditional Eastern Mediterranean popular narrative', and in particular of one famous story-pattern within that genre, that it properly belongs not in the history-books of Archaic Greece but on the shelf marked 'Picaresque Novellas'.

I must emphasise at this point that I am well aware that life can imitate art with uncanny accuracy.[2] I am not claiming that the presence throughout the

[1] Momigliano 1977:30 = 1966:814f; cf. also Powell 1939:67. A short bibliography on Democedes may be found in Hofstetter 1978:46f; the article by Pedicino there listed is worthless. Further brief references to the story: Dunbabin 1948:370; Cook 1983:17; Snodgrass 1980:168, expressing unspecified scepticism; and Murray 1980:243. I have not seen Swerr's historical novel *Arzt der Tyrannen* (Munich 1961), nor D. Brandenburg, *Medizinisches bei Herodot. Eine literatur-historische Studie zur antiken Heilkunde* (Berlin 1976).

[2] Two examples (if they really are examples) of this phenomenon, of which the first relates directly to our story:

(1) John Aubrey, *Brief Lives*, on the wife of William Holder:

Democedes story of *Märchen* parallels proves that it could not really have happened that way; merely that a proper recognition of the existence of those parallels significantly alters the balance of probability, and shifts the onus of proof on to those who wish to maintain the historicity of the events described.[3]

Such a claim — that 'Democedes' is essentially a folk-tale hero who has taken over the identity of a historical doctor — is of course made much easier to sustain by the fact that all other ancient references to the story are derived directly or indirectly from the Herodotean text, and provide no independent corroboration of its material.[4] We are thus thrown back to a single time and place at which Herodotus was told, by a person or persons unknown, a story about a local doctor who had lived some three-quarters of a century earlier. The identity of the teller, the previous history of the tale, and the axes that were being ground, are subjects to which we shall recur later; but the situation is not one which seems *prima facie* conducive to the error-free onward transmission of historical fact.

Further, it is self-evident that the story contains at least some facts that *Herodotus* could not have known, at least some that *Democedes* could not have known, and a mixed bag of improbabilities, incoherences and internal inconsistencies. If it can be shown that such problematic details do make sense

> 'His majestie king Charles II had hurt his hand, which he intrusted his chirurgians to make well; but they ordered him so that they made it much worse, so that it swoll, and pained him up to his shoulder; and pained him so extremely that he could not sleep, and began to be feaverish. Someone told the king what a rare she-surgeon he had in his house; she was presently sent for at eleven clock at night. She presently made ready a pultisse, and applyed it, and gave his majestie sudden ease, and he slept well; next day she dressed him, and perfectly cured him, to the great grief of all the surgeons, who envy and hate her.'

(2)*Dallas Times Herald*, 24.9.83 (as reported in *Private Eye*'s 'True Stories'):

> 'Denying permission for her Rotweiler dog, Byron — who killed her four-week-old daughter — to be destroyed, Mrs Rognaldsen of Dallas said: "I can always have another baby, but I can't replace Byron".'

In view of the learned circles in which it is reported, one might suspect literary 'massage' of the first incident under the influence of Herodotean reminiscence; but impersonation of Antigone or Intaphrenes' wife, whether conscious or unconscious, by lady Texan dog-fanciers seems unlikely.

[3] Appendix 2 discusses another example, relevant both in general and particular: the case of Alcibiades and Agatharchus.

[4] The sole exception is possibly the detail of his paternity, provided by the *Suda*; see Appendix 1. We may briskly dismiss two postulant candidates for the status of independent witness: (1) The aetiological elaboration of the story of the confrontation in the agora at Croton retailed by Athenaeus (XII 522b) is clearly a later and secondary development, perhaps influenced by the fact that the Democedes story in Herodotus abuts directly on to another famous story about a Persian cloak — the one given by Syloson to Darius. (Though it is worth remembering that cloaks twice play a crucial role in the Joseph saga). (2) The inclusion of Democedes' name among the Pythagoreans listed by Iamblichus (*Vit.Pyth.* 257ff), and the actions there ascribed to him, cannot bear any weight at all as evidence owing to the utter unreliability of the source; see for example Kirk & Raven 1960: 221 n.5, and Dunbabin 1948: 370 n.3.

when evaluated against the background of popular oral narrative tradition, the case for regarding the doctor as a folk-tale figure will be that much stronger.

These pre-emptive preliminaries out of the way, we can proceed with an analysis of the story incident by incident. It will be convenient to number its different sections for the purpose of reference, starting from the major division into two parts, the *outward* journey in search of fame and fortune (meeting dangers and obstacles en route), and the *homeward* journey to claim the adult role (in particular, the right to a wife) which he has earned by his adventures. Even at this gross level of analysis, be it noted, Democedes' history displays standard folktale form.

1 *The Outward Journey*

1.1 *Democedes leaves his home at Croton to get away from a brutal father. Setting up in Aegina as a doctor, he out-performs all his established rivals, even though he has none of the necessary medical equipment.*

Could be historical, of course; but it has enough of the *Wunderkind* element to make one doubt whether it really happened like this. Note particularly the emotional rift with his father (possibly a doctor himself, see App.1); this is a regular feature of the type of folktale which acts as a prescriptive model for the growing child, by encouraging him or her to develop an independent role in life. Inevitably such a psychological break involves tension and conflict. Next time we meet the father it will be *Democedes* who is in the position of power — returning laden with riches which are explicitly stated to be a present for the very father who had rejected him and (perhaps) refused to kit him out with the instruments he needed to pursue the family profession. That is the sort of strategy employed by the folktale to encourage children to behave better than their parents.[5]

1.2 *His skills are so much in demand that he is awarded successive annual contracts, at an ever-increasing salary, by the Aeginetan public authorities, by the Athenians, and finally by Polycrates of Samos. On the fall of Polycrates he becomes a slave of Oroetes, satrap at Sardis; on the fall of Oroetes he becomes a slave of Darius, unrecognised as a doctor and languishing anonymously in a dungeon.*

Two typical motifs here: (1) the over-neat schematisation of the yearly promotions; (2) the pattern 'initial success → utter disaster, depression, degrada-

[5] See Bettelheim 1975 for a good analysis of the programmatic function of folktale and fairy story in our society; this role will not have been very different in Greece. Grimm No.108 *Hans mein Igel* offers an (admittedly extreme) paradigm of the sort of story pattern I have in mind.

tion' —› final and lasting success.' The latter sequence is familiar from examples like those of Robert the Bruce, or Christ crucified and three days in Hell; its central negative component serves both as a foil, to highlight the glory of the eventual triumph, and also (regarded from Bettelheim's perspective of individual psychology) to remind the listener that life involves cruel setbacks, and that the aspiring adult must be prepared to endure them. The 'solar hero', as it might have been put a century ago, must overcome the threat of his eclipse, his winter solstice.

Behind this superficial patterning, however, the residual *curriculum vitae* is very probably accurate. That a successful 'society doctor' (Dunbabin) should move at short intervals from Aegina, to Pisistratid Athens, to Polycrates' court at Samos, all the time improving his income by putting himself out to competitive tender, is just what we have come to regard as typical of the way in which talented individuals were treated, and rewarded, in the age of the tyrants; anyone with a special skill, whether poet (like Anacreon, also resident in turn at Samos and Athens), prophet (compare the Elean diviner in III 132), architect or whatever, would be happy to move around like a modern footballer, going where the pickings were richest and staying for as long as it took for a better offer to materialise. All of which raises, of course, the question: if his dungeon-experience looks suspiciously legendary, and if all his *other* moves were made for mercenary reasons — how exactly did Democedes end up at the Persian court? The question may be left till later.

1.3 *Darius dislocates an ankle in dismounting from his horse; his Egyptian doctors only succeed in exacerbating the injury. After he has endured seven days and nights of agony, somebody who had known Democedes' reputation as a surgeon back in Sardis remembers that he is on hand and mentions him to the king. Darius has him brought up, ragged and in irons. He denies being a doctor until threatened with torture, when he reluctantly admits to a little amateur knowledge. He cures the king by applying gentler methods than those used by the Egyptians.*

We now reach the kernel of the whole story, the event which marks the sudden and triumphant rise of the doctor from the depths of humiliation to the peak of success. It is, of course, the most transparently legendary incident of all. Pausing only to note that Persian Kings seem to have been very careless horsemen (Darius' predecessor Cambyses had stabbed himself accidentally but fatally when *mounting* his horse, III 64,3; Cyrus died in a fall from his charger, Ctesias F9,7f.), and to observe the conventional nature of 'seven days and nights he suffered, and on the eighth ...'[6]— we may turn to confront the essential core of the situation. Which is this:

[6] See Fehling 1971:160f.

> The famous expert has been unjustly imprisoned and lies forgotten. A crisis arises; all the other experts are helpless. Somebody remembers the hero. He is brought out, filthy, starving and unkempt. After a wash and brush-up he solves the problem and is restored to honour and power, either revenging himself on his enemies or else magnanimously forgiving them.

Four main exemplars of this pattern are similar enough, and accessible enough to Herodotus' cultural milieu, to be worth citing:

(1) Joseph (*Genesis* XXXVII and XXXIXff.). Expertise: dream-interpretation, a speciality since boyhood. Separated from his father, made a successful career abroad in Egypt; then falsely imprisoned on a morals rap.[7] When Pharaoh's resident 'magicians and sages' (NEB) are unable to explain his dream, the butler remembers Joseph who, unshaven, etc... (Other important parallels with this story will be discussed later).

(2) Ahiqar (see Conybeare *et al.* 1898[1], 1913[2] and Cowley 1923).[8] Expertise: statecraft, solving puzzles. This archetypal mandarin, having served King Sennacherib as his faithful vizier for many years, was defamed and deposed by the very adopted son whom he had so carefully groomed to succeed him. His execution is decreed, but he is secretly kept alive in a pit. Then Pharaoh delivers a challenge which the new usurping advisor is helpless to meet. Panic. If only Ahiqar were here! The officer who failed to kill him as ordered admits he is still alive;[9] Ahiqar is brought out unshaven, etc. ...

(3) Daniel (*Daniel* II). Expertise: dream-interpretation. Taken off to Babylon, trained up to be a 'wise man'. Then Nebuchadnezzar has a dream; his experts are ordered not just to interpret it, but to *divine what the dream was*. They are all, Daniel included, about to be executed, when Daniel is granted special inspiration and manages to get the Captain of the Bodyguard to intercede with the King. Daniel succesfully performs the 'impossible' task and is elevated to power (verse 48).

(4) Melampus (Apollodorus I 9,11ff. etc). Speciality: clairvoyance. Imprisoned in Phylace for demanding the cattle he needs so that his brother may marry. King Phylacus is distraught at the impotence of his son; the gaoler brings to his attention the fact that his prison currently holds a man with second sight (as he knows from the incident of the woodworms and the collapsing building) and suggests that he may be able to help. Melampus is brought out unshaven, etc. ...

[7] Actually the 'Potiphar's wife' incident is very likely a later graft on to an original, simpler version in which Joseph was 'in prison' as a direct result of having been sold into slavery by his brothers; in which case the parallel with Democedes becomes still closer. See Redford 1970: 180ff.

[8] At least the core, and I believe the whole basic structure, of the medieval tradition goes back to antiquity; see the Elephantine papyrus published by Cowley (also partially edited in *ANET*[3], pp.427-30). I hope to write about this fascinating text elsewhere.

[9] Compare the Croesus/Cambyses incident at Hdt. III 36,4-6.

There can be no argument but that this last story, at least, was familiar to Herodotus and his informants; it was already known to Homer and Hesiod. Personally, I believe that tale-patterns are so pervasive that it is legitimate to regard the whole Near Eastern area as a single 'gene pool' for the purposes of investigating relationships; trade, and the travels of mercenary troops, had by this time interpenetrated so many different cultures that a story available in, say, Gaza would not need long to reach, say, Miletus.[10] At all events, the reason for suspecting the veracity of Democedes' cure of Darius here is not that truth can be stranger than fiction (of course it can), but that *truth rarely mimics a well-known fictional pattern so closely*. Especially when the pattern is so improbable.

For we may close this section by noting briefly two inconsistencies in Herodotus' presentation. First, *who is to recall that the prisoner-slave is an expert doctor?* The butler in the Joseph-story, and the guard-captains in the other three, are all given credibly-motivated grounds for their actions. In Herodotus, 'somebody who remembered him from Sardis' (when he had been a slave of Oroetes) is press-ganged into the text. Yet if Democedes had been recognised by his first Persian master in Sardis as a skilled specialist, and employed in that capacity, how come that when Oroetes' slaves were transferred to the ownership of the King he had been relegated to the position of a mere chain-dragging labourer? (Note, by the way, how much deliberate care Herodotus takes to get Democedes from Samos to Sardis in III 125). Secondly: *why does he initially deny all knowledge of medicine?* The reason offered is that 'he was frightened that if they found out, he would never see Greece again.' This explanation fits perfectly well with the later development of the story, but it is nonsensical as the reaction of a slave in rags and chains, who would do anything to improve his position; and what better chance did he have of returning home if he retained his current status?[11]

1.4 *The King is so delighted at Democedes' success that he presents him with two sets of gold chains. 'Do you want to double my torment, as a reward for curing you?' replies the doctor. The King likes this reply, and sends him off to the harem where he is given vast quantities of gold coin — so much that a slave called Sciton grew rich just from the gold that got spilt. Democedes then intercedes for his less competent Egyptian colleagues, saving them from im-*

[10] The story of Ahiqar offers perhaps the most striking example of this cosmopolitanism: written in *Aramaic* on a papyrus found in a *Jewish* colony in *Egypt* under *Persian* rule, it deals with the dramatic life of an *Assyrian* official. It has numerous points of contact with stories told in Herodotus (and is supposed to have been known to Democritus).

[11] Appendix 3 presents a medieval version of the story of 'The Doctor at Court' in which the 'doctor' does have the very best of reasons for denying his art; but I hesitate to assume that this variant was already in circulation in the fifth century B.C.

palement, and also secures the rescue of another Greek — an Elean prophet who had been a fellow-employee of Polycrates — from slavery.

Improbability aside, some notes on the detail: (1) the 'gold chains' are here fitted rather uneasily into the idea of the King's prodigal gratitude. Does the 'double trouble' idea relate to the fact that gold weighs more than iron, or to the gift of *two* sets where previously he had only one? And *why* is he given two sets? One for wrists and one for ankles? One for weekdays and one for Sunday best? These chains are much more at home in the stories of Joseph (XLI 42) and Daniel (V 29) where they are genuine marks of dignity, to be worn with pride around the neck. The Greek version has done its best to retain them in an ironical role, but the integration is imperfect. (2) The tyrant's pleasure at receiving a bold or cheeky reply from an *eleutheros* is a cliché: cf. Croesus I 27,5; Darius IV 97; Xerxes VIII 69; Gyges in Nic. Dam. (i.e. Xanthus of Lydia?) *FGrH* 90 F47,14. (3) The King's Harem and his Treasury were of course the two institutions which the Greeks found irresistibly fascinating because of their inaccessibility. Here Democedes goes one better than Solon (who only *saw* Croesus' treasury, I 30) or Alcmeon (who similarly loaded himself with Croesus' gold but never saw the inside of a harem, VI 125). (4) The 'slave Sciton' is an especially interesting feature. He bears all the hallmarks of the phenomenon which has been recognised by Detlev Fehling ('Detail macht glaubwürdig', Fehling 1971:91) and T. P. Wiseman (1983: 21), who calls it 'spurious *akribeia*'; the idea, which comes instinctively to a good story-teller like Herodotus, is that precise accuracy in some quite trivial piece of information has the psychological effect on the reader of seeming to validate the much more important material in which it is embedded.[12] (5) Democedes' magnanimity to the condemned Egyptians: a rather surprising feature, perhaps. Certainly Nebuchadnezzar threatens his experts with death in case of failure (*Daniel* II 5), but Daniel's success seems there to save them all. Whence this idea that the winner nobly and altruistically puts in a word for his rivals? The feature is only really at home in the morally improving folktale — *Hans mein Igel*, already referred to, and Rossini's Cenerentola (but not the Grimms' Aschenputtel). Or is it perhaps trade union solidarity between fellow-practitioners?[13]

[12] Two speculations about 'Sciton' (the name is attested elsewhere, cf. Dem. *in Meid.* 182, p.573): (1) he may be a literary cousin of another Greek who was lucky enough to grow rich from a Persian gold treasure — Ameinocles at VII 190; (2) if Photius' sources were right in explaining the name as meaning *asthenēs, axios oudenos*, then the point will be 'the man who was worth *nothing* was suddenly worth a great deal' — rather like Anacreon's Artemon.

[13] Perhaps Ctesias was thinking of Democedes' paradigmatic behaviour when he treated the captured Clearchus so sympathetically after Cunaxa (Plut. *Artax.* 18).

The centre of the story — Democedes' apogee

The good doctor is now in a paradoxical position: rich and respected, dining at the King's table, he yet lacks the one thing he wants — his *nostos*.[14] The fear that he was made to feel earlier (if anachronistically) is now real: his specialist knowledge makes him indispensable to the King, and rules out a return to Greece. Unlike Melampus (who *was* allowed to return with his cattle), Democedes is trapped; he is now in the situation of that other seer, Polyidus, and of the skilled engineer Daedalus, both of whom were forcibly kept by King Minos on his island kingdom and made to continue their work.[15] Democedes' mind, like theirs, is now set on escape, to be won by craft and cunning — and his experience remains no less mythologically patterned than before. (Appendix 2 discusses yet another *Escape of the Expert* story, whose status is even more delicately poised between legend and history.)

2 *The Homeward Journey*

2.1 *Democedes is now called in by Queen Atossa, who is suffering from a breast abscess. The price he exacts for a cure is that she should grant him whatever he asks for (though 'nothing improper' will be requested). What she must do is help him to return to freedom. In bed, she persuades Darius that an expedition against the Greeks, not the Scyths, is what is required. To that end, a preliminary reconnaissance expedition is needed; and who better to act as guide than Dr Democedes? Darius agrees. Fifteen Persian nobles will ensure that he doesn't escape; meanwhile, he is to take a huge quantity of riches as presents for his father and brothers. The expedition sets sail.*

That any of this stuff should have been accepted as history is really beyond belief. What we are dealing with, patently, is an example of the *general* pattern in which the Greek hero manages to escape from the foreign King by sea, aided by a woman: Theseus and Ariadne, Jason and Medea. More *particularly*, contemporary Euripidean drama offers two adventure-plots in which the hero and the woman set up a deliberate trick — just as the 'reconnaissance mission' is a trick — to fool the King: (1) *Iphigenia among the Taurians*, in which Orestes and his sister intrigue to persuade the barbarian King Thoas to grant them use of a ship 'in order to purify the statue'; (2) *Helen*, which features a similar getaway (on the pretext of a 'burial at sea'), achieved by Helen and the King's sister Theonoe who combine to bamboozle the blustering tyrant Theoclymenus. These escape-stories are always better, of course, if

[14] This longing for the homeland is something of a *Leitmotiv* hereabouts in Herodotus: compare the stories of Gillus and Syloson. Here one thinks of Odysseus chez Calypso.

[15] Joseph's attitude towards his homeland is obviously more problematic: he is forced by historical exigencies to do nothing beyond keeping the bed warm for Moses.

the hero not only wins his freedom, but also returns home with a trophy from the enemy: thus the image of Artemis stolen by Orestes and Iphigenia, the golden fleece, and the 'no expense spared' accoutrements carried off in the *Helen*. That is why we have the merchant ship loaded with expensive presents 'for Democedes' father and brothers'. Who are these brothers we suddenly hear of? And why should he wish to shower gifts on the father whom he had earlier angrily deserted? I suspect that once more we are dealing with an imperfectly-integrated detail from the Joseph story, in which father and brothers are of crucial importance; often, when a particular version dominates its general type, features which belong properly only to that version tend to creep over and establish themselves, illogically, in other variants. Otherwise, I suspect, the function of the shipload of goodies would be to provide a dowry for the marriage with which our hero, quite properly, terminates his adventures in the next section.

2.2 *When the squadron reaches Taras, Democedes jumps ship and escapes to his home-town of Croton, while the local ruler delays the Persian escort. Eventually they catch up with him and try to detain him; but his fellow-citizens bravely ignore the threats of Darius' future anger and force them to leave empty-handed. As they depart, Democedes calls out to them to inform the King that he is about to marry the daughter of the famous athlete Milon. Subsequently, the two remaining Persian ships are wrecked and their crews enslaved by the Iapygians; they are repatriated by an exile from Taras called Gillus. Darius grants him any wish he cares to ask in return for this favour; he asks to be restored to his home; but the attempt fails.*

Improbable that fifteen Persians should seek to throw their weight about in this fashion so far from home. The whole story looks like a South Italian attempt, after Salamis and Plataea, to demonstrate that they too, in their own way, had been bold enough to stand up to the Persian menace. There remain two points of interest: (1) The 'Engagement Announcement'. This part of the story obviously embarrassed Herodotus, for he had to provide two special explanations: one to justify (even if only by bare assertion) the Persian King's interest in Greek athletic stars (about which How & Wells 1912 are suitably sceptical), and the other to explain the speed with which Democedes, only back in Croton a few days ago after many years abroad, has managed to contract an advantageous marriage! The correct perspective from which to assess this detail is of course that of the conventional folktale conclusion, in which the hero returns home, makes a good marriage with the wealth he has acquired, and lives happily ever after. With this has been combined the motif of the *boast*: once safely removed from the ogre's power, the hero can't resist the temptation to brag and jeer: compare Odysseus' repeated taunting of the Cyclops, in which he at last reveals his true name (*Od.* IX 475ff., 502ff.). A

much more effective irritant, in Democedes' case, would have been a claim to have seduced some royal Persian lady — is the Atossa incident, and the careful exclusion of sex from the *carte blanche* oath which he makes her swear, a sort of inverse reflection of the fact that this was once part of the story?[16] (2) Gillus the Tarentine. Perhaps his repatriation of some Persians who got into difficulties in the West (but not necessarily Democedes' escort) really took place. But the open-ended promise he gets from the King, and the use he makes of it to ask for a *nostos* for himself, suggest that he has at least to some extent been moulded into a complementary figure to Democedes; rather as Scythes, tyrant of Zancle at VI 24, who was allowed to revisit Sicily *but yet returned voluntarily to Persia*, makes a contrasting figure in the tradition. (The two are explicitly compared by Aelian, *VH*, VIII 17)

To sum up. The account of Democedes' picaresque adventures given by Herodotus evinces too many characteristics of the popular hero-story to be taken seriously as history. To return to the quotation from Momigliano with which I began: Democedes is in my view the only person who could *not* credibly have told the story Herodotus has preserved for us, for no-one would have believed such a *crambe repetita* of legendary material.

This leaves two questions to be answered: (1) what really happened? and (2) why were the real facts massaged to produce our story?

(1) I do not doubt that a talented doctor called Democedes went East and worked successively in Aegina, Athens and Samos. Nor do I doubt that he went to work in Persia (perhaps via Sardis); but the reason for his working there was probably the same that had led to his previous moves: *money*. On the expiry of his contract he no doubt returned home a rich man and settled down to a comfortable existence — for all I know, marrying Milon's daughter.

(2) Though perfectly respectable as a career for any ambitious Greek professional in the sixth century (and also later: witness Apollonides of Cos and Ctesias of Cnidos), such a biography must have been embarrassing at the time of the Ionian Revolt and in the aftermath of the Persian Wars, when the Greeks of the West were very sensitive to charges that they had done nothing to repel the Mede. (Actually, it is interesting that Croton was the one western city which did *not* need to feel ashamed: according to Hdt. VIII 47 their famous athlete Phayllus had taken a ship — the only one from Magna Graecia — to Salamis). It must have been at that time that Democedes' biography was romanticised to make it more acceptable to current political fashion; and this was the version that his descendants, or his fellow-pro-

[16] Potiphar's wife may again be lurking in the background; and we should remember that another Greek doctor at the Persian court, Apollonides of Cos, was certainly supposed to have had a liaison with Amytis, wife of Megabyzus (*FGrH* 688 F14,44).

fessionals, told to Herodotus when he came to South Italy. Democedes had by that time been metamorphosed into the Don Pidduzzu still told of in Magna Graecia, who cured the sultan's itch and sailed home loaded with riches to marry his princess Pippina.[17]

Appendix 1

DEMOCEDES' WIFE AND FATHER
(*Suda*, ed. Adler, II 42f., Δ 442)

With three exceptions, the *Suda*'s information about Democedes — like that of all other ancient sources (see above, n.4) — is derived entirely, and self-confessedly (οὕτω φησὶν Ἡρόδοτος ὁ λογοποιός), from Herodotus. The first apparently new piece of information is that he wrote a book; the second concerns his father Calliphon, whom the *Suda* claims to be able to identify as a priest of Asclepius at Cnidus. Leaving these items aside for the moment, we may turn to the third novelty, which relates to Democedes' early career:

> ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ἰάτρευσέ τε καὶ ἔγημε, καὶ Πολυκράτην τὸν Σάμου τύραννον ἰάτρευσεν...

Well: ancient Pythagorean or medical sources may just have preserved genuine traditions about the doctor's biography (though I am sceptical in the extreme), but in whose interest would it have been to record, and keep alive down into Byzantine times, a memory of the time and place at which he married a wife who has no part whatsoever to play in his story? — or rather, who is a positive embarrassment to it: for the climax of his story is in fact his triumphant boast to the King that he is engaged to marry the daughter of Milon the athlete!

Further: not only do we have an unwanted element here, but there is, at exactly this point, an unexpected omission. The encyclopaedia is, as I have said, closely paraphrasing Herodotus; and Herodotus records a spell at Athens, precisely between his employment on Aegina and Samos. Solve both problems by reading:

> ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ἰάτρευσέ τε καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις...

The mistake probably originated, insofar as it is worthwhile speculating on these matters, in a scribe's subconscious expectation that the τε καί would link the immediately preceding verb with a second one; if we start from that presupposition, ἔγημε can be understood as a sort of dittography, aurally generated, of Αἰγίνῃ.

[17] Calvino 1982, no.155, from Palermo: 'The Sultan with the Itch' ('Il Balalicchi con la rogna').

One of the *Suda*'s new pieces of information thus vanishes; what of the others? What can be said of the claim that the doctor's father had been priest of Asclepius at Cnidus?

Let us examine first the sceptic's side of the argument. Is it not unlikely that such a detail should survive so long without appearing in some intermediate text? So, if the information is *not* genuine, who might have had an interest in inventing it? One thinks first of the Pythagorean hagiographers (above, n.4); but that hypothesis would not explain the specific detail. Why particularly *Cnidus*, for example? Should we classify it as a simple fiction, based on the implicit assumption that all doctors who did not come from Cos (like Hippocrates) must have been associated with the rival Cnidian school? (In reality, of course, that 'school' was not yet in existence; see Ilberg 1924.)

Somebody does come to mind, though, who had reason to foist such a pedigree on Democedes: the notorious Ctesias. Also personal doctor to a Persian King, also (or so he says: *FGrH* 688 T3) elevated to that position as a result of being discovered among prisoners-of-war — Ctesias would of course have been aware of the parallels between his own position and that of his famous predecessor. Further, he would have had a vested interest in emphasising those parallels, in order to justify his employment at the court of the foreign King by citing Democedes' distinguished precedent; and we have reason to suspect from his other writings that Ctesias had a vivid imagination and a cavalier attitude towards truth. So, to focus on our problem: Ctesias himself came from Cnidus, and claimed descent through his medical family from Asclepius (Galen xviii.A p.731 K); he therefore has a credible motive for ascribing similar characteristics to Democedes too (just as perhaps his own P.O.W. story was borrowed from the same source); the more links he could forge with the heroic sixth-century medic, the better for his own reputation.

On the other hand, the information is not quite so easily dismissable. Biographical data of this type is material that the Alexandrian, and other, libraries might well have been interested in gathering from local sources for their Πίνακες — especially if we recall the third of the Suda's *new* details, that at least one medical book circulated under Democedes' name (cf. also Pliny *NH*, I 12 and 13). If the information was preserved in archives of that type, the *Suda* is just the sort of scholarly alluvial deposit, or terminal moraine, in which one might expect to find it lying.

Further, the facts are in themselves perfectly credible:

(1) Cnidus is a very likely place from which to have escaped to the West in the sixth century. Diodorus (V 9) and Pausanias (X 11,3-5 = Antiochus of Syracuse *FGrH* 555 F1) both tell of an expedition to the West, led by one Pentathlus, to escape tyrannical rule at home. Historians date this to around 580; if Democedes was born about 560, and his father was by that time already elderly, that would allow enough time for him to have been priest at

Cnidus before the emigration. A better candidate from the chronological point of view is however the surrender of Cnidus to the Persian advance under Harpagus in 545; many citizens must have preferred exile to slavery, and perhaps a priest called Calliphon may have left at that time, along with his adolescent son, to join friends and relatives already established in Sicily and South Italy as a result of the earlier emigration.

(2) The Asclepius connexion. There certainly existed a sanctuary of the god at Triopium, between Old and New Cnidus, in later times (Bean 1971:14153); it may go back earlier. Democedes' very name suggests that he had a father who was connected with medicine, and had ambitions for his son to continue in the profession: for *Carer-for-the-people* is formed on the old principle that epic heroes give their sons names which reflect their own characteristics (Ajax — *Eurysaces*, Achilles — *Neoptolemus*, Odysseus — *Telemachus*, Nestor — *Pisistratus*, Cadmus — *Polydorus* etc.); and just as his elder contemporary Stesichorus was presumably called *Chorus-master* because his father had been a poet before him, so Democedes' name should be a reflection that he too came, not surprisingly, from a family with established medical skills.

All in all, then, I am inclined to regard the *Suda*'s information about Democedes' Cnidian father as being possibly genuine. If so, it is the *only* genuine extra-Herodotean tradition to survive.

Appendix 2

THE STRANGE CASE OF THE MAVERICK POLITICIAN AND THE RELUCTANT INTERIOR DECORATOR

'O Life, O Menander, which of you imitated the other?' This is the central point at issue in all the material this paper has surveyed. Since the burden of the argument has been that Democedes' story is 'too good to be true', it would clearly be seriously challenged if another story could be produced, exhibiting many of the same features, and yet provably historical.

Andocides' fourth speech, *Against Alcibiades*, seems to satisfy those requirements. Among the allegations there made is included the following (§17, Loeb tr.):

> Why, there are no limits to his impudence. He persuaded Agatharchus, the artist, to accompany him home, and then forced him to paint; and when Agatharchus appealed to him, stating with perfect truth that he could not oblige him at the moment because he had other engagements, Alcibiades threatened him with imprisonment, unless he started painting straight away. And he carried out his threat. Agatharchus only made his escape three months later, by slipping past his guards and running away *as he might have done from the King of Persia.* [my italics]

Here then is an apparent real-life doublet of the treatment handed out by Minos to the craftsman Daedalus, or (as the final remark seems to suggest the author is aware) by Darius to Democedes. And if one artisan's experience could be patterned in such a typologically regular way, why should not another's?

Luckily for my case, the evidence for Agatharchus' forced labour, when inspected more closely, begins to look very fragile. First, Demosthenes has a different account of the incident: at *in Meid.* 147, in a passage which is difficult to interpret, (and is anyway hedged about with λέγουσιν, ὥς φασιν), he says that Alcibiades locked up the painter because he caught him misbehaving, πλημμελοῦντα; and Ulpian's gloss on this is that Agatharchus was found *in flagrante* with his employer's mistress.

Much more important is the fact that the whole speech is not what it claims to be — nor could it be, for Greek politics has no place for impeachment speeches on the occasion of an ostracism. It is certainly not by Andocides, and is probably a rhetorical exercise of the early fourth century: see for example Gärtner 1975:343 ("ziemlich plump gefälscht") and Maidment's comments in his introduction to the speech (Maidment 1941:538f): "The most likely explanation is that it is a literary exercise, written long enough after the final disappearance of ostracism for the author to be uncertain of the procedure followed. As parallels we have the two spurious speeches included in our MSS. of Lysias, which also belong to the first ten years of the fourth century and which are also concerned with Alcibiades."

If the whole speech is then a piece of shadow-boxing (and the beginning of §23 looks to me remarkably like a teacher's criticism, followed by an amplification in the manner suggested, both disturbing the earlier sequence of argument), then automatically its value as historical evidence is cut right away. Clearly Alcibiades and Agatharchus had some sort of dust-up; what it was however is quite unclear, for even Demosthenes in 348 knows only of rumours. Our aspiring orator will certainly have felt free to elaborate on the incident by patterning it according to various legendary scenarios: Daedalus confined by Minos; Phoenix imprisoned for sleeping with his father's παλλακή, and finally escaping from his captors (if Ulpian was right, or if that story was already circulating); and lastly Dr Democedes nimbly evading the clutches of the Great King. Far from threatening the tendency of this paper, in other words, it seems to me rather to reinforce it.

Appendix 3

THE PEASANT DOCTOR

Why did Democedes (at least until the instruments of torture were displayed) deny that he was a doctor? Herodotus offers the explanation that he could

already foresee the risk of being held in captivity for ever, once his skills were publicly known. Other tellers might perhaps have suggested that his Greek patriotism wouldn't allow him to collaborate with the enemy; or that he was frightened of the lethal consequence of failure.

An entertaining story which circulated in medieval Europe provides a fourth possibility: *the hero actually wasn't a doctor at all.* The tale has a tripartite structure, most fully exemplified in the Old French version, *Du Vilein Mire*:

> 1 A peasant is always beating his wife. To get her own back, she claims to the king that he's a doctor, but one who always denies the fact, and only functions if given a good beating. The husband gets a thrashing.
>
> 2 To save his skin, the peasant agrees to take on the job of curing the Princess, who has swallowed a fishbone. He makes her laugh by stripping and scratching himself [note again the motif of sexual misbehaviour with royal ladies], and out pops the offending bone.
>
> 3 The peasant is then forced to stay until he has cured all the patients in the kingdom [just like Democedes and the other ancient experts]. He 'cures' them all miraculously by warning them that the person most gravely ill will have to die so that the rest can be saved. No-one is prepared to accept that label; all in turn make an excuse and leave.

The sections also occur separately: Part 1 in J. de Vitry's *Exempla* (no.237), and later in Molière's *Le médecin malgré lui*; Part 3 as de Vitry's no.254 and as no.190 in Poggio's *Facetiae*. The tale may well go back to antiquity, having reached western Europe via the Arabs and Spain, and could perhaps have been available to those who constructed Democedes' life-story.

NOTES SUR LA PARENTE CHEZ LES PERSES AU DEBUT DE L'EMPIRE ACHEMENIDE

Clarisse Herrenschmidt — Paris

Parmi les nombreux aspects de l'histoire achéménide où l'historiographie grecque demeure prépondérante, la question de la parenté chez les Perses a été l'une des moins étudiées, sauf erreur de ma part. Cette question est bien sûr intéressante en elle-même; elle s'avère également très importante dès lors que l'on cherche à connaître la composition de la classe dirigeante perse et les rapports de la famille royale avec la noblesse.

Les lignes qui suivent ne sont qu'une introduction à un travail beaucoup plus vaste qui englobera toute la période achéménide et peut-être l'Iran pré-islamique dans son ensemble; ici même, je ne voudrais que poser les problèmes. On verra en premier lieu les différents types de mariages, classés selon les rapports de parenté unissant les époux, que l'on connaît pour les règnes de Cyrus à Xerxès, puis on verra si nos sources permettent de conclure à l'existence d'un mariage préférentiel chez les Perses et aux problèmes que celui-ci pose; enfin on envisagera rapidement certains problèmes d'histoire achéménide sous l'aspect de la parenté.

I. *Les mariages*

I.1. *Le mariage entre cousins croisés*

Hérodote nous livre un petit nombre de mariages, parmi lesquels on trouve deux mariages entre cousins croisés. Pharnaspe, un Achéménide, (III 2) eut d'une femme inconnue de nous au moins deux enfants: Cassandanè, devenue l'épouse de Cyrus II et Otanès (III 68); Cyrus et Cassandanè eurent Cambyse II (II 2) et Bardiya-Smerdis (III 30); Otanès, de son côté, d'une femme inconnue de nous, eut une fille nommée Phaidymè (III 68). Or Cambyse épousa cette Phaidymè, la fille du frère de sa mère, sa cousine croisée matrilatérale:



De même on sait que l'un des conjurés, Gobryas, épousa une soeur de Darius (Hérodote VII 5) et qu'ils eurent un fils, Mardonius; ce dernier épousa Artozostra, une fille de Darius (VI 43 et VII 5), c'est à dire la fille du frère de sa mère, sa cousine croisée matrilatérale.[1]



Ces mariages entre cousins croisés mettent en scène des personnages importants du récit d'Hérodote: Phaidymè et son père Otanès, Mardonius et son père Gobryas, et il y a tout lieu de penser que pour les Perses qui les rapportèrent à Hérodote, ces unions étaient hautement signifiantes.

I.2 *Un mariage entre cousins parallèles.*

L'historiographie grecque que j'ai consultée systématiquement jusqu'à ce jour ne m'a fourni qu'un mariage entre cousins parallèles: il s'agit de celui de Darius, fils de Xerxès et d'Amestris, avec Artayntè, fille de Masistès, un fils de Darius I et d'Atossa (Hérodote VII 82; IX 108-113), frère de Xerxès.



Darius, fils de Xerxès, épousa donc la fille du frère de son père, sa cousine parallèle patrilatérale. Tel qu'il est raconté par Hérodote (IX 108), ce mariage est entouré d'un récit; Xerxès est en effet amoureux de la mère de la jeune fille, sa belle-soeur: «(ayant rencontré un refus discret à ses avances) Xerxès change alors de tactique et arrange le mariage de son fils Darius avec la fille de cette femme et de Masistès, nommée Artayntè: il pensait la gagner plus facilement par ce moyen». Par la suite, Xerxès tombe amoureux d'Artayntè, qui lui cède, et l'intrigue découverte par la reine-mère Amestris finit dans le sang de Masistès et des siens. L'arrangement particulier à ce mariage et sa conclusion sanglante peuvent donner à penser que l'union avec la cousine parallèle patrilatérale était interdite.

[1] On ne connaît pas la mère de la jeune fille; tout se compliquerait évidemment si l'on supposait qu'il s'agit de la fille de Gobryas, épousée par Darius Ier avant son accession au trône (cf. ci-dessous I.5), auquel cas Mardonius aurait épousé en Artozostra non seulement sa cousine germaine croisée matrilatérale, mais aussi sa nièce, fille de sa soeur. J'ai éliminé cette solution i) parce qu' Hérodote ne signale pas ce fait, ii) parce que, même dans ce cas, le mariage avec la cousine croisée matrilatérale demeure.

Mais cette conclusion ne doit pas s'imposer trop vite. On trouve en effet plusieurs mariages entre cousins (ou parents) patrilatéraux dont le degré de parenté nous est inconnu:

— Cyrus II épousa Cassandanè, fille de Pharnaspe l'Áchéménide (Hérodote II 1 et III 2); quoique nous ignorions tout de l'ascendance paternelle de Pharnaspe, le fait qu'il ait été un Achéménide indique que Cyrus et lui avaient un ancêtre commun et donc que Cyrus et Cassandanè aient été soit des cousins (s'ils étaient de la même génération) parallèles patrilatéraux à un quelconque degré, soit dans une autre relation de parenté patrilatérale.

— lors de son accession au trône, Darius épousa les deux filles de Cyrus II, Atossa et Artystonè, qui étaient ses cousines au quatrième degré, car ils avaient en la personne de Téispès un arrière arrière grand'père commun.

— à la même époque, Darius épousa également Phaidymè, la fille d'Otanès, fils de Pharnaspe l'Achéménide (III 88); les époux devaient être cousins à un degré que nous ne pouvons pas préciser.

Les unions entre cousins parallèles patrilatéraux (au premier et au quatrième degrés) sont donc attestées suffisamment bien pour qu'on ne puisse pas interpréter l'horrible histoire de Masistès à coup sûr[2] comme un mythe visant à concrétiser l'interdiction du mariage avec la cousine parallèle patrilatérale; peut-être en effet est-ce la concupiscence du Grand Roi à l'égard de la femme[3] de son jeune frère qui est visée; peut-être encore est-ce un roman (cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980: 58), entrant dans le cycle des horreurs commises par la reine mère; sans compter que ces diverses significations peuvent se combiner.

I.3. *Le mariage entre oncle et nièce, fille du frère.*

On connaît encore le mariage de Darius I avec sa nièce Phratagunè, fille d'Artanès, fils d'Hystaspe (Hérodote VII 224). Celle-ci avait été donnée en mariage par son père «avec, en dot, tous ses biens, car il n'avait pas d'autre enfant».

[2] Il n'est pas certain que cette histoire véhicule l'interdiction du mariage entre parallèles patrilatéraux, mais je le crois néanmoins probable. Voilà comment je verrais le problème: la trame de la parenté perse est fournie par l'échange généralisé, qui engendre l'hypergamie, et donc les pratiques endogames, ainsi que l'a démontré Cl. Lévi-Strauss (1949); les pratiques endogames sont décriées par les lignées qui s'en trouvent lésées; ainsi l'histoire de Masistès serait, sinon un mythe visant à illustrer l'interdiction du mariage entre parallèles, mais le malheur que cette pratique apporte.

[3] On est en effet étonné de voir que la reine Amestris torture la mère d'Artayntè, donc la femme de Masistès, qui pour sa part a une conduite irréprochable dans l'épisode entier, et non Artayntè elle-même, qui était la maîtresse de Xerxès pour de bon, qui subit 'simplement' le sort de toute la famille de Masistès; on serait très intéressé de savoir qui était le père de cette femme.



Il semble que cette union soit due à la volonté de conserver les biens d'Artanès dans la proche famille achéménide. Car si Phratagunè avait épousé un de ses cousins croisés patrilatéraux, par exemple un des fils d'une des soeurs de Darius et d'Artanès qui avaient épousé l'une Gobryas, l'autre Téaspis, il semble que ces biens eussent quitté la famille achéménide, pour rentrer dans la famille de l'époux.

Par ailleurs, dans l'épisode de la famille de Masistès qu'on a vu plus haut (Hérodote IX 108-111), au moment du banquet royal, Xerxès somme son frère Masistès de renoncer à sa femme, parce qu'Amestris l'avait prié de lui livrer cette dernière: «Masistès (c'est Xerxès qui parle), tu es fils de Darius, tu es mon frère et tu es aussi un homme digne d'estime. Renonce à la femme que tu as ajourd'hui dans ta maison; à sa place je te donne ma propre fille: prends la pour épouse...» En compensation de son divorce obligatoire, Masistès épouserait donc sa nièce, la fille de son frère. Rappelons enfin que Darius Ier, en épousant Parmys, la fille de Bardiya, épousa probablement sa nièce, puisque Bardiya devait être le cousin au quatrième degré de Darius. Le mariage entre oncle et nièce était probablement assez fréquent en Perse, comme, d'ailleurs, en Grèce ancienne (cf. Beauchet 1897: 163).[4]

I.4. *Le mariage entre frère et soeur.*

Pour la période qui nous intéresse, nous ne disposons que d'un exemple: Cambyse épousa Atossa, née des mêmes parents que lui, puis une autre de ses soeurs, plus jeune (Hérodote III 31). Dans la mesure où l'on pratique l'identification entre le Mage d'Hérodote et le Bardiya de Bisotun et des tablettes babyloniennes, on peut penser que Bardiya-Smerdis, une fois sur le trône de son frère, épousa lui-aussi Atossa, sa soeur.

Voyons quelques questions à propos de ces mariages:

— Hérodote, suivi en cela par Bucci (1978: 291-319)[5] affirme qu'avant Cambyse les Perses n'épousaient pas leurs soeurs; il est assez difficile de discuter cette affirmation, dans l'état de nos sources: si Xanthos le Lydien indique que les Mages épousaient leurs soeurs, leurs filles et leurs mères, cela

[4] Je remercie ici Madame C. Leduc de l'Université de Toulouse et D.M. Lewis de l'Université d'Oxford pour l'aide qu'ils ont bien voulu m'apporter concernant la parenté grecque; j'ai momentanément renoncé à établir des comparaisons systématiques, ce qu'il faudra faire par la suite.

[5] Ce même auteur, dont les travaux sont indispensables, pense également que le mariage consanguin est dû à une influence élamite; or tout le problème en Elam est obscur.

permet de penser que les Perses pouvaient ne pas connaître l'interdit de l'inceste, mais pas de l'affirmer.

— on se souvient qu'à l'occasion de ce mariage, Cambyse convoqua les juges royaux «comme ce qu'il avait idée de faire était chose insolite et il leur demanda s'il existait une loi autorisant qui le voulait à épouser sa soeur. ... (les juges royaux) lui dirent qu'ils ne trouvaient aucune loi autorisant un frère à épouser sa soeur, mais qu'ils en avaient trouvé une autre permettant au roi des Perses de faire ce qu'il voudrait» (Hérodote III 31). Il faut remarquer là que les juges royaux répondent qu'il y a un 'trou' dans la législation des Perses: pas de loi autorisant un frère à épouser sa soeur, pas de loi non plus l'interdisant. Il devient donc possible que l'interdit de l'inceste n'ait pas été une coutume fondamentale chez les Perses, sans pour autant que le mariage entre frère et soeur ait été particulièrement fréquent ou encore sacré.

— normalement, le roi se mariait comme les autres Perses, ainsi que l'implique le texte d'Hérodote, puisque Cambyse avait épousé Phaidymè, fille d'Otanès, sans convoquer les juges royaux, et donc en obéissant aux usages communs.

— plus intéressant me paraît être le fait que Cambyse épousa deux de ses soeurs, Atossa et, «au bout de peu de temps, il en prit aussi une autre» (Hérodote III 31). Si l'amour est invoqué comme la cause du premier mariage, le second se fait simplement dans la foulée du premier. Cela ressemble fort à une politique concertée où le mariage avec les *deux* soeurs signifie que l'on empêche les femmes achéménides de quitter par alliance le noyau familial qui détient la royauté.

En conclusion provisoire, je dirais que le mariage frère-soeur était possible chez les Perses, même avant le règne de Cambyse, mais qu'il était probablement rare; que par ailleurs ces mariages sont surtout remarquables en ce qu'ils impliquent la volonté de ne pas pratiquer l'échange des femmes: ils ont dû être contractés à un moment de conflit entre le roi et les nobles. Ce dernier point est commun aux mariages de Cambyse avec ses soeurs et aux mariages d'Artaxerxès II avec ses filles,[6] Atossa et Amestris, l'une puis l'autre d'abord promises à Tiribaze et ensuite épousées par leur père.

I.5. *Mariages dont les relations entre époux nous sont inconnues.*

— Darius Ier, lorsqu'il n'était qu'un simple particulier, épousa la fille de Gobryas (Hérodote VII 2), l'un des sept conjurés; ils eurent un fils, Artobazane, qui fut le concurrent de Xerxès lors de la succession au trône. Xénophon

[6] La question du mariage 'incestueux' est assez difficile; je l'ai un peu évitée ici, parce qu'elle a beaucoup retenu l'attention, en particulier chez les iranistes et chez les Parsis; vue par les anthropologues 'orthodoxes', l'inceste n'était pratiqué que dans les familles royales, ce qui n'est pas non plus certain. Il faut noter au passage que les Grecs de la République athénienne pratiquaient le mariage entre frère et soeurs consanguins (de même père) et non utérins, à ce qu'il semble à lire Beauchet 1897: 168.

(*Cyropédie* VIII 4,24-26) rapporte qu'Hystaspe, père de Darius, épousa la fille de Gobryas, ce qui me paraît peu crédible: soit son informateur aura confondu Hystaspe avec Darius, soit il s'agit d'une fiction s'intégrant assez habilement dans les 'scènes de genre' que Xénophon construit sur la vie des Perses au temps de Cyrus II.[7]

— Deux soeurs de Darius I épousèrent des nobles perses: l'une fut l'épouse légitime de Gobryas, et son fils Mardonius est bien connu (Hérodote VII 5), si bien que Darius était à la fois le beau-frère et le gendre de Gobryas; l'autre épousa un certain Téaspis, et leur fils Sataspès est porté au nombre des Achéménides (Hérodote IV 43), ce qui laisse penser que Téaspis lui-même était un Achéménide.

— Quatre des filles de Darius épousèrent sans doute des membres de la noblesse perse, connus pour avoir été des généraux du Grand Roi: Daurisès (mort pendant la révolte de l'Ionie), Hymaiès (actif pendant la même révolte), Otanès, sans doute le fils de Sisamnès, lui aussi général en Ionie sous Darius I, Artochmès, chef des Phrygiens et des Arméniens en 480 (Hérodote V 116 pour les trois premiers, VII 73 pour le dernier).

— Xerxès, fils de Darius, fut marié à Amestris, la fille d'Otanès (Hérodote VII 61); il est probable et non pas certain que cet Otanès soit le conjuré de 522, ou son fils; mais la famille des Otanès est pour le moins complexe et pour l'instant, le problème reste ouvert.[8]

Les unions entre les membres de la haute noblesse perse et les Achéménides sont détectables dès l'époque de Cyrus; elles eurent lieu tout au long de l'empire. Il est vrai que la classe dirigeante perse était quasiment endogame; au demeurant cette endogamie demanderait à être mieux décrite, ce que je tâcherai de faire plus loin.

II. *Remarques sur les mariages inventoriés.*

Les Perses semblent avoir pratiqué plusieurs types d'union, dans la courte période qui nous a retenue: avec la cousine croisée matrilatérale, avec la cousine parallèle patrilatérale, avec la nièce, fille du frère, avec les cousines — au deuxième, troisième ou quatrième degré — parallèles patrilatérales, avec la soeur utérine. Il convient d'abord de se demander si toutes ces unions avaient le même statut, autrement dit, y avait-il un mariage préférentiel?

Parmi les unions illustrées plus haut, le mariage avec la cousine croisée matrilatérale est attesté deux fois; si l'on rapproche ces exemples du texte de Xénophon où il est question du mariage de Cyrus, on peut penser que se trouve là le mariage préférentiel propre aux Perses, ou à une partie des Perses,

[7] Mais on verra plus loin (II) que ce mariage, même anhistorique, peut signifier un rapport d'alliance entre la lignée des descendants d'Arsamès et celle de Gobryas.

[8] Il me semble néanmoins probable qu'Amestris soit de la branche d'Otanès le conjuré, voir II.

ou à un moment de l'histoire perse (Xénophon, *Cyropédie* VII 5, 18-19; c'est Cyaxare, personnage sans doute anhistorique qui parle à Cyrus): «elle aussi je te la donne pour femme, elle qui est ma fille, à toi dont le père épousa la fille de mon père; celle-ci (la fille de Cyaxare)..., chaque fois qu'on lui demandait qui elle épouserait, elle répondait 'Cyrus'.»



Le personnage de Cyaxare est douteux, le mariage de Cyrus avec sa fille encore plus; mais ce n'est pas l'historicité des personnages qui nous intéresse ici: c'est l'exemple donné, du mariage de Cyrus II avec sa cousine croisée matrilatérale, exprimé par la bouche de la petite fiancée qui affirme l'évidence de la règle sociale. En quelque sorte, dans le 'Miroir du Prince', dont la Cyropédie est l'écho, le mariage de Cyrus ne pouvait qu'être exemplaire. Comme nous disposons, dans la liste ci-dessus, de deux mariages avec la cousine croisée matrilatérale, on peut penser que l'union de Cyrus le Grand avec la fille du fils d'Astyage a été transmise par un Perse à Xénophon, dans un cycle de littérature orale dont Cyrus était le héros et qui véhiculait toutes sortes de traits propres à la culture perse ancienne, dont le mariage préférentiel avec la cousine croisée matrilatérale. Tâchons de voir si cette conclusion hypothétique nous aide à démêler certains rapports de parenté chez les Perses à l'époque considérée.

Le mariage avec la cousine croisée matrilatérale est, dans les catégories de l'anthropologie sociale, le mariage typique de l'échange généralisé; si trois lignées A,B,C sont en situation d'alliance, la lignée A est donneuse de femmes à la lignée B — qui est donc preneuse de femmes chez A —, la lignée B est donneuse de femmes à C, les lignées se caractérisant par le rôle de donneuse ou de preneuse de femmes chez les autres.

Appelons A la lignée des Pharnaspides, B la lignée des Achéménides I, soit les descendants de Cyrus I — et non ceux d'Ariaramnès (appelé ici Achéménide II) — et voyons comment se faisait le mouvement des femmes, symbolisé par les flèches:



Il appert dans ce schéma que les Pharnaspides étaient donneurs de femmes aux Achéménides I; on ne sait pas du tout où ils prenaient des femmes, et la raison à ce manque dans notre information est assez évidente: comme ils devaient les prendre ailleurs que dans la lignée où ils les donnaient, ils les prenaient ailleurs que chez les Achéménides I et notre information est centrée sur la famille royale: avec les femmes que prenaient les Pharnaspides, on sort de l'entourage d'alliances immédiat des Achéménides. Nous ne savons pas à qui les Achéménides I donnaient des femmes, qui donc épousèrent les soeurs de Cyrus II. Entre les Achéménides II et les descendants de Gobryas, que nous appellerons Gobryades, les choses sont plus compliquées; il faut observer de près nos données et les classer chronologiquement:

— deux mariages certains: 1) Avant l'accession au trône de Darius, celui-ci épousa la fille de Gobryas (voir ci-dessus I.5); 2) Après l'accession au trône de Darius, Mardonius, fils de Gobryas et de la soeur de Darius épousa la fille de Darius, Artozostra (ci-dessus I.1).

— un mariage dont la date est incertaine: Gobryas épousa la soeur de Darius;

— un mariage dont l'historicité est incertaine: Hystaspe épousa la fille de Gobryas; mais ce mariage, même anhistorique, est forcément antérieur à l'accession au trône de Darius.

Ces faits permettent les schémas suivants:

Avant l'accession au trône:



Ce mariage certain atteste que les Gobryades étaient donneurs de femmes aux Achéménides II; c'est également ce que prétend le mariage 'anhistorique' d'Hystaspe:



Après l'accession au trône:



Ce mariage certain chronologiquement montre les Gobryades preneurs de femmes chez les Achéménides; c'est également ce que produit comme image le mariage incertain chronologiquement:



Les Achéménides II et les Gobryades étaient donc en constante relation d'alliance, mais le sens des alliances aurait changé avec l'avènement de Darius; avant l'accession au trône les Achémenides II étaient preneurs de femmes Gobryades, après cette date les Achéménides II devenant donneurs de femmes.

Or il se trouve que si l'on applique la date de l'accession au trône de Darius aux relations d'alliances entre les Achéménides II et les Pharnaspides, on observe les faits suivants:



A partir de l'accession au trône de Darius, les Achéménides II remplacent les Achéménides I dans leur rôle de preneurs de femmes pharnaspides, ceci portant sur le mariage de Darius avec Phaidymè et sur celui de Xerxès avec Amestris, dans la mesure où l'on voudra bien faire l'hypothèse que le père d'Amestris était soit Otanès le conjuré, soit son fils. Il devient donc logique qu'ils cessent par là même d'être preneurs de femmes gobryades: ils deviennent donneurs de femmes par rapport à cette lignée.

Mais il est évident que les relations de parenté et d'alliances ne se limitaient pas au système fondé sur le mariage avec la cousine croisée matrilatérale. Parallèlement à cette chaîne d'échanges existaient d'autres mariages — dont tous les mariages endogames vus plus en haut en I.2, I.3 et I.4 — et d'autres relations concernant le mouvement des femmes; on a vu que les filles de Darius furent mariées à divers généraux actifs au début du Vème siècle, sans que l'on sache qui étaient les pères de ces hommes: les Achéménides — désormais les seuls en lice, après l'avènement de Darius — furent donneurs de femmes à d'autres lignées qu'à celle des Gobryades. De même, nous ne connaissons pas les mariages contractés par les frères et les fils de Darius, hormis celui de Xerxès: les Achéménides ne prenaient sans doute pas toutes leurs épouses chez les Pharnaspides.

En clair, le système de la parenté perse ancienne n'est pas un système élémentaire, mais un système complexe; si je crois que la trame en était le mariage avec la cousine croisée matrilatérale, les unions endogames et d'autres relations d'échange étaient pratiqués sans qu'il y ait forcément de contradiction *en terme de parenté*; je veux dire par là que le choix de tel ou tel époux pour une fille du roi pouvait se faire selon plusieurs critères: celui de l'échange généralisé, celui des intérêts de la famille royale, celui des intérêts du pouvoir royal, ces derniers ne coincidant pas forcément toujours avec ce qui précède.

Le dernier problème que je voudrais évoquer ici est celui de la différencia-

tion en 'famille' ou en 'clans' d'une lignée ayant un ancêtre commun; du fait de nos sources il ne peut s'agir pour nous que des Achéménides. Il est clair d'après notre documentation que les Achéménides I et II sont distincts dans la chaîne de l'échange des femmes, tout en portant le même 'nom de famille': si l'on admet que Cyrus II et qu'Hystaspe étaient de la même génération, le groupe ACHEMENIDE avait éclaté en deux sous-groupes qui avaient un arrière grand'père commun en la personne de Téispès; par ailleurs nos sources montrent à l'évidence que les frères — Darius et Artabane, Xerxès et Masistès —, que les oncles-neveux — Pharnaka et Darius, Artabane et Xerxès — font partie du même sous-groupe; donc la différenciation se faisait soit au niveau des cousins au premier degré — ceux qui ont un grand'père commun — ce que je ne crois pas possible, au vu de la composition de l'armée de Xerxès,[9] soit au niveau des cousins issus de germains, ayant un arrière grand'père commun, comme c'est sans doute le cas entre Cyrus II et Hystaspe.

Si l'on applique cette hypothèse au cas des Pharnaspides, on doit partir de l'idée que Pharnaspe, de la même génération que Cambyse I (puisqu'il donne sa fille au fils de ce dernier) était son cousin issu de germain patrilatéral: ils avaient donc un arrière grand'père commun qui ne peut être qu'Achéménès lui-même, le grand'père de Pharnaspe étant le frère de Téispès et l'oncle de Cyrus I et d'Ariaramnès, dont le nom ne nous est pas parvenu. Au demeurant, pour amusante que soit cette recherche sur la parenté perse il faut reconnaître ses limites: de fait, nous ignorons le vocabulaire de la parenté, mis à part quelques termes comme 'père', 'fils', 'mère', 'grand'père', et en particulier nous ignorons comment se disait 'frère de la mère', 'fille du frère de la mère' etc., tous termes qui portent en eux la symbolique des relations d'alliance.

III. *Notes d'histoire achéménide considérée sous l'aspect de la parenté.*

III.1. *Cyrus et la dynastie des Déiocides.*

On a vu plus haut que l'on peut douter de l'historicité du mariage de Cyrus le Grand avec sa cousine croisée matrilatérale, la fille du frère de Mandane, ne serait-ce que ce personnage, Cyaxare, est inconnu d'Hérodote. Il est clair que ce doute peut s'appliquer également à la version donnée par Hérodote du rattachement familial de Cyrus aux Déiocides, où la mère de Cyrus est la propre fille d'Astyage. Xénophon reprit cette version en y ajoutant le mariage

[9] Dans son armée, on trouve Xerxès entouré de ses frères, de ses cousins germains patrilatéraux (mais il n'en avait des matrilatéraux, semble-t-il), de ses beaux-frères (les enfants d'Otanès, sans doute lui-même fils d'Otanès le conjuré); les cousins ayant donc un grand-père commun sont encore très proches. Le cas qui pourra nous éclairer à cet égard est celui de la descendance de Pharnaka, à qui échut le satrapat de Daskyleion.

vu plus haut. Ces deux auteurs repètent un *topos* des plus banaux et très attendu lors du remplacement d'une dynastie par une autre après conquête: la nouvelle dynastie proclame après coup sa légitimité en faisant valoir une ascendance fictive qui la rattache à la première.

«Ctésias» *scripsit* Photius, «commence par déclarer, à propos d'Astyage, que Cyrus n'avait pas le moindre lien de famille avec lui»; par la suite, après la défaite d'Astyage, «Cyrus... l'honore comme son père. Amytis, fille d'Astyage, reçut d'abord les honneurs qu'on rend à une mère; elle fut plus tard épousée par Cyrus quand Spitamas son mari eut été mis à mort pour avoir menti en déclarant ne rien savoir sur Astyage quand on l'avait interrogé» (Phot. 36a). Dans Ctésias, Cyrus ne descend pas d'Astyage, mais il devînt l'époux de sa fille, ce qui est invérifiable, mais plus vraisemblable. Les informateurs de Ctésias étaient sans nul doute plus au fait de la véritable généalogie de Cyrus que ceux d'Hérodote ou de Xénophon, ou du moins, s'ils ne connaissaient pas l'exacte vérité, ils étaient moins les jouets de la propagande royale.

Dans le cycle heroïque de Cyrus tel que nous le rapportent partiellement les auteurs grecs, nous ne ramassons guère d'informations certaines sur ses origines et sa formation, ces épisodes de sa vie étant définitivement rentrés dans le cadre de diverses légendes — je pense au rève maléfique d'Astyage, à l'exposition du bambin, au nom de la femme du bouvier. Mais, comme toujours, ces légendes — que d'autres appelleraient mythes — véhiculent des faits sociaux bruts ou symboliques dont nous pouvons faire notre bien: ici le mariage de légitimation, ailleurs celui avec la cousine croisée matrilatérale.

III.2. *Le cas d'Otanès le conjuré.*

On identifie en général[10] celui que Bisotun nomme *Utāna*, un Perse, le fils de *Θuxra*, avec le conjuré nommé Otanès chez Hérodote et dont le père serait Pharnaspe l'Achéménide (II 1 et III 2), la soeur Cassandanè, la fille Phaidymè. Cette identification n'est possible que si l'on suppose 1) soit qu'Hérodote donne une fausse généalogie, et dans ce cas toute recherche sur la famille coupe la branche sur laquelle elle repose, sans compter qu'une telle attitude ne tient pas compte du fait que certaines données d'Hérodote ont été corroborées par les tablettes élamites de Persépolis,[11] 2) soit que le *Θuxra* du texte de

[10] A peu près tous les chercheurs — que, au demeurant, le problème de la famille ne concernent pas — sauf Gschnitzer 1977: 3.

[11] On sait qu'il existe chez Hérodote un Préxaspe I contemporain de Cambyse (III 30; 34; 74), un Aspathinès contemporain de Darius (III 70 et sqq) et nommé dans Bisotun, enfin un Préxaspe II, fils de cet Aspathinès (VII 97): on en déduit, avec une raisonnable probabilité qu'Aspathinès était le fils de Préxaspe I, du fait du passage du nom de grand'père à petit-fils; là-dessus, une tablette du trésor de Persépolis donne *Aspasa(na) DUMU pirakaspina* où l'on peut voir «Aspathinès fils de Préxaspe»; cf. Dandamayev 1976: 158, n. 666, ceci malgré Mayrhofer 1973: 125 (entrée 8.1288).

Bisotun — nom qui signifie 'le clair' ou peut-être 'le rouge' — est un surnom, au même titre que dans la *Persica* de Ctésias Bardiya s'appelle Tanyoxarkès ou Tanaoxarès, dont l'équivalent perse signifierait 'le costaud'. C'est evidemment cette solution que je préfère.

Si l'on veut bien admettre la généalogie d'Hérodote concernant Otanès, on a vu que ce dernier est un Achéménide, se rattachant peut-être à Achéménès en ce que l'ancêtre éponyme était son arrière-grand'père. Si l'on observe le rôle d'Otanès dans la révolte des Perses nobles contre le 'Mage', il faut reconnaître qu'il occupe pratiquement la première place: c'est lui qui, le premier, soupçonne la supercherie du 'Mage', parce qu'il n'est pas convoqué au palais en sa présence, comme son rang l'impliquerait; lorsque sa fille Phaidymè, qu'il interroge pour en savoir plus long, lui répond qu'elle ne sait pas qui est l'homme auprès de qui elle vit, il la convie à demander à Atossa, etc. C'est donc lui qui mène l'enquête, en particulier à cause de ses relations de parenté avec le palais royal; c'est lui qui réunit les premiers conjurés, Aspathinès et Gobryas, et, à leur tour, ces trois hommes en choisissent trois autres. Dès que Darius se joint à eux, les discussions entre les conjurés ont deux pôles: Otanès et Darius, le premier manifestant de la patience, le second de la fougue. En bref, le récit d'Hérodote met tellement Otanès en valeur qu'on pourrait imaginer une fin logique où ce fût Otanès et non Darius qui devînt roi, l'un et l'autre pouvant y prétendre du fait de leur appartenance au clan royal.

Pourtant, une fois les Mages éliminés et après le fameux 'débat consitutionnel', on voit Otanès se retirer dès lors que la monarchie est retenue. Il me semble possible de voir dans le récit d'Hérodote la trace d'une rivalité entre Otanès et Darius; il y eut sans doute un parti favorable à Otanès contre Darius, à l'intérieur de la noblesse perse, ainsi d'ailleurs que l'indique Hérodote.[12] Ce fût le parti de Darius qui gagna, et, on s'en souvient, il devint roi à la faveur d'une hippomancie frauduleuse, dans la tradition de l'historien grec: à cet égard on peut penser que tous ses informateurs n'étaient pas des descendants d'inconditionnels de Darius.

Reste à savoir pourquoi Otanès est supposé de se retirer, ou bien pourquoi ce fut le parti de Darius qui l'emporta; nous ne connaîtrons jamais la réponse, bien évidemment, mais il n'est pas impossible qu'il y ait là-dessous une histoire de famille. En effet, si l'on reprend l'hypothèse vue plus haut sur le moment où une même lignée se divise en sous-groupe, qui tout en reconnaissant toujours leur communauté ancestrale, deviennent partenaires dans l'échange de femmes, on admettra qu'il faut voir en Pharnaspe, père d'Otanès, le petit-fils d'un frère de Téispès. Dans la lignée royale achéménide, Darius compte donc deux ancêtres qui furent effectivement rois, Achéménès et Téispès,[13] tandis

[12] «(les sept) se retirèrent à l'écart pour se consulter à nouveau: les uns, avec Otanès, demandaient instamment... , les autres, avec Darius, demandaient...» (III 76)

[13] On verra au paragraphe suivant qu'on peut penser que ce fut Téispès et non Achéménès le

qu'Otanès ne peut aligner qu'Achéménès. Ceci n'est qu'une très hypothétique suggestion.

III.3. *Les mariages de Darius Ier.*

On se souvient que les conjurés — y compris Otanès — se donnèrent pour règle «l'obligation pour le roi de ne pas choisir son épouse ailleurs que dans la famille de l'un des conjurés» (Hérodote III 84). La raison de cette clause est évidente: les conjurés désirent conserver par des alliances leur statut de haute noblesse tout en s'assurant un certain contrôle sur la famille achéménide. Mais un simple question se pose: on a vu que les différentes lignées de la noblesse perse s'alliaient entre elles avec l'accession au pouvoir de Darius; donc l'obligation du mariage du roi ne fait que renforcer un système d'échange de femmes qui existait déjà. Pourquoi ce renforcement, si l'on admet qu'Hérodote ne fait pas que relater une habitude ancienne chez les Perses, mais évoque un véritable contrat passé entre conjurés au moment de l'élimination du 'Mage'?

Si l'on cherche la cause de ce renforcement dans la parenté perse, il nous faut revoir les mariages des rois précédents, Cyrus et Cambyse. Cyrus épousa Cassandanè, fille de Pharnaspe; Cambyse épousa Phaidymè, la petite-fille de Pharnaspe; ces deux mariages semblent indiquer les mouvements des femmes et être tout à fait normaux, légaux, malgré le fait que Cyrus et Cassandanè soient cousins issus-issus de germains. Mais Cambyse épousa ses soeurs utérines et, par là même, rompit la chaîne du mouvement des femmes, la famille achéménide I en recevant et n'en donnant point; peut-être est-ce contre le mariage entre frère et soeur(s) que la clause du mariage obligatoire du roi a été énoncée; ce n'est pas l'inceste qui serait visé, mais la mise hors circuit des femmes achéménides.

Voyons donc les mariages de Darius: — ni lui-même, ni ses successeurs immédiats[14] — et sans nul doute la clause du mariage obligatoire du roi leur était également destinée — n'épousèrent à notre connaissance leurs soeurs, leurs filles ou leurs petites-filles;

— lors de son accession au trône, les mariages de Darius avec ses cousines au quatrième degré, Atossa et Artystonè, avec sa nièce fort lointaine Parmys, ne semblent pas avoir posé problème: rien dans les textes ne nous dit qu'ils furent conclus en désaccord avec la clause citée plus haut; c'est bien qu'ils étaient en

fondateur du pouvoir royal achéménide: il donna à sa dynastie le nom de son père; on sait que le fondateur de la dynastie sassanide ne fut point Sassân, mais Ardésir, qui passait pour son petit-fils: Sassân n'était qu'un ancêtre éponyme. Dans ce cas l'ancêtre d'Otanès aurait été le frère du roi fondateur: un collatéral de la famille (au sens étroit) regnante et non un descendant.

[14] Jusqu'à Darius II à qui son père fit épouser sa demi-soeur, née d'une concubine, comme lui-même, alors qu'il n'était pas roi, ni même prince héritier, mais satrape, Ctésias *ap.* Phot. 44.

accord avec elle, et que celle-ci ne visait pas les mariages entre parallèles patrilatéraux à un quelconque degré de parenté.
— de même pour le mariage, plus tardif, entre Darius et Phratagunè, sa nièce, fille de son frère.

Je retiendrai donc que la clause du mariage obligatoire du roi dans la maison de l'un des conjurés visait, entre autres choses à empêcher les mariages frère-soeur, père-fille etc., internes à la famille régnante, comme les Perses les avaient endurés de la part de Cambyse; on rétablissait donc par là même la mise en circuit des soeurs et des filles du roi; or il faut bien voir que les mariages au moins avec les filles du roi étaient les plus estimés chez les Perses, ainsi que le dit Hérodote (III 88): «Darius contracte aussi les mariages les plus honorables aux yeux des Perses». Il s'agit là des unions de Darius avec Atossa et Artystonè; Parmys, n'ayant pas ce statut (Parmys était petite-fille et non fille de roi), enfin Phaidymè, qui n'est pas nommée, vient au dernier rang.

Mais, hormis une défense contre d'eventuels mariages entre le roi et sa (ses) soeur(s) ou fille(s), la clause du mariage obligatoire du roi dans la maison de l'un des conjurés pouvait être une manoeuvre pour remplacer une part de la noblesse perse par une autre; ainsi, la lignée qui auparavant était preneuse de femmes chez les Achéménides I, et qui pouvait songer à conserver cette place même avec la venue au pouvoir des Achéménides II, se voyait remplacée dans cet honneur par une autre. Il est clair en effet que la noblesse perse ne se limitait pas aux Sept Familles illustres; Darius s'entoura de ceux qui lui étaient favorables et en mit d'autres sur la touche: la haute noblesse fut très probablement bouleversée par l'avènement de Darius et la clause du mariage obligatoire du roi en est la conséquence et la preuve.

Dans tout ce qui précède j'ai volontairement traité les mariages de Cyrus, Cambyse et Darius comme des mariages que l'on pouvait envisager sous l'angle de la parenté, même s'ils concernent la famille royale; en d'autres termes je ne vois pas pourquoi on traiterait à part les mariages des rois et de leurs enfants, même si on y trouve la pratique de l'inceste.

Il est néanmoins évident que les mariages de Darius nouvellement monté sur le trône — avec Atossa, Artystonè, Parmys et Phaidymè — sont particuliers: d'une part ils sont normaux selon les usages de la guerre, le vainqueur devenant maître des terres et des femmes, d'autre part ils furent contractés pour affirmer la continuité dynastique et la légitimité des princes à naître. C'est bien ainsi d'ailleurs qu'il faut lire la généalogie de Xerxès donnée par Hérodote en VII 11: «que je ne sois plus le fils de Darius, que je n'aie plus pour aïeux Hystaspe, Arsamès, Ariaramnès, Téispès, Cyrus, Cambyse, Téispès, Achéménès enfin, si je ne me venge pas...»; cette généalogie est énoncée 1) selon la lignée ascendante paternelle de Darius à Téispès, 2) selon la lignée ascendante maternelle à partir du pére de la mère, Cyrus, où s'est glissée une omission, car Cyrus I (père de Cambyse I, grand-père de Cyrus II, nommé

dans l'*Enquête* en I 111) manque: de Cyrus donc à Téispès, 3) avec le rappel de l'ancêtre éponyme, Achéménès.[15]

Bilan et perspective.

La recherche sur la parenté chez les Perses au temps des Achéménides doit sans nul doute être entreprise, tant parce qu'elle est intéressante en elle-même — et en particulier sur le plan de l'anthropologie — que parce qu'elle peut, à l'occasion, aider à la compréhension des rapports entre les rois et ses nobles.

Pour l'instant il est difficile de dresser un bilan: je n'en suis qu'au stade des hypothèses, ou plutôt qu'au cadre général que permet d'établir le texte d'Hérodote — avec quelques apports venant de Xénophon et de Ctésias; en résumé, la parenté perse est une parenté complexe, ce dont on pouvait se douter sans y aller voir de plus près, où de nombreux types de mariages sont pratiqués. Il me semble néanmoins que l'hypothèse selon laquelle le mariage avec la cousine croisée matrilatérale, instaurant l'échange généralisé, était le mariage préférentiel, vaut la peine d'être retenue; je ne crois pas qu'elle puisse jamais être complètement assurée, mais l'observation des faits indiens et des faits iraniens postérieurs devra rentrer en ligne de compte pour l'infirmer ou la consolider.

Là-dessus se greffaient toutes les alliances endogames, dont nous n'avons des exemples que pour la famille achéménide; mais il est très probable que certains mariages, comme celui avec la nièce, fille du frère, celui avec la cousine parallèle patrilatérale, étaient contractés ailleurs que dans la famille royale, les mêmes causes, entre autre la conservation des biens étant suivie des mêmes effets.[16] J'ose également penser que le mariage avec la soeur n'était pas propre aux rois.[17]

Dans la mesure du possible, on cherchera à voir dans quels cas, à quelles occasions étaient pratiqués les mariages endogames, et non l'échange des femmes; on se doute que le mariage d'Artaxerxès II avec ses filles est intéressant à ce propos. Une multitude de problèmes se greffent sur ce qu'on vient d'évoquer: la transmission des noms, de père à fils, de grand'père à petit-fils, et même d'oncle à neveu (fils du frère); l'existence apparente de surnoms; toute la question de la lignée maternelle; celle du statut de l'épouse principale; celle de la composition du 'clan' et des 'familles', donc de la formation de sous-groupes ayant une même origine patrilatérale, et des biens qui y sont attachés.

[15] Autant que je sache on a en général pris la répétition de Téispès dans la généalogie de Xerxès comme une erreur compensant l'absence de Cyrus I: j'y vois pour ma part le fait que c'est Téispès le véritable fondateur de la puissance achéménide, et que c'était à lui qu'il convenait de se rattacher par l'ascendance pour justifier de son rang royal.

[16] Le chapître 'Passage aux structures complexes' de l'ouvrage cité de Cl. Lévis-Strauss aiderait encore par bien des biais à comprendre la parenté perse.

[17] Ainsi que le donne à penser l'histoire de Tritantaichmès et de sa soeur Roxane, enfants d'un Idernès, contemporains de Artaxerxès II; Ctésias *ap.* Phot. 53-54.

XERXES' DESTRUCTION OF BABYLONIAN TEMPLES

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Introduction

References to Xerxes as 'destroyer of sanctuaries', whether successful or unsuccessful, abound in the narratives of Greek historians from Herodotus onwards. Darius I is also occasionally characterised in this way although he is credited at times with the intention rather than the achievement of a sacrilegious act e.g. Hdt. I 183, where Darius is described as planning the removal of a gold statue from Babylon but Xerxes as the one who realised the plan. Within Herodotus, of course, one may see the contrast drawn between Lydian 'tolerance' and Persian 'sacrilege' of Greek temples and cults as a deliberately developed motif related to Herodotus' intention to demonstrate how remote from the Greeks and alien to their practices the Persians were (Bornitz 1968: 164ff.; esp. 171ff.; Tozzi 1977: 18-32; cf. Cambyses who was accused of a number of sacrileges in Egypt which it is clear from the Egyptian material he never commited (Hdt. III 16; 27ff.; Bresciani 1969: 334ff.); Darius at Branchidae (Hdt. VI 19) after the Ionian revolt; Darius' destruction of temples at Chalcedon after the Scythian expedition (Ctesias *FGrH* 688 F13,21)). Yet the fact remains that as a result first, of the specific acts (or planned acts) of temple destruction/desecration connected with Xerxes' name on the occasion of the invasion of Greece, secondly of the emphasis placed on it throughout the next two centuries culminating in Alexander's 'vengeance' and thirdly, of the 'daiva-inscription' of Xerxes in which he claims to have destroyed a daiva-sanctuary (Kent 1953: 150-151, ll. 35-41) it is difficult actively to prove him innocent of any of the sacrilegious acts laid at his door (although cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980: 1-47 for strong arguments in favour of the basically ahistorical character of the daiva-inscription). Therefore, however hard one tries, Xerxes continues to occupy the position of the oriental despot suffering from overweening ambition and *hubris* which leads through sacrilege to his own downfall and the decadence of his royal line and imperial realm.

It is precisely this Greek-determined view that has influenced the evaluation of Xerxes' policy in relation to Babylonia. The assessment of Xerxes' reign in this satrapy runs (with variations and modifications) approximately as follows: 1. Greek authors tell us that Xerxes took away the statue of Bēl-Marduk and destroyed the temples of Babylon, especially Marduk's main sanctuary, Esagila. This was probably connected with a revolt mentioned by Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F13,25/Photius *Bibl.* 39a, 21-23), and was therefore intended as a

punishment for the rebellious country. (Alternatives: (1) the fortifications of Babylon were also destroyed cf. Olmstead 1948: 237; Cook 1983: 100; Ghirshman 1954: 191; (2) Xerxes was intolerant of other religions — as propagator of the official Persian religion it is implied he destroyed Babylonian temples cf. Ghirshman 1954: 193-4).

2. Babylonian dated documents supply evidence of two kings who ruled only briefly (Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 17) and must, on the basis of chronological and prosopographical considerations, be dated into the period of Xerxes' reign. They represent the leaders of the revolt which is referred to by classical writers (Ctesias *ibid.*; Plutarch *Moralia Apophth. Reg.* 173c; cf. Cameron 1941: 319-325) although it seems probable that they should be dated in different years and thus represent two separate attempts by the Babylonians to revolt (Böhl 1962: 110-114): one revolt was led by Bēl-Shimanni (autumn 484), the other by Šamaš-eriba (autumn 482).

3. After 482, Xerxes dropped the title 'king of Babylon' from his titulary and henceforth the remaining element 'king of lands' was the standard titulary for all Persian kings. Because the date when Xerxes ceased to use the title 'king of Babylon' coincides with the end of the second revolt in Babylonia, one should interpret this omission as significant for Xerxes' policy in relation to the country.

4. The significance can be explained by the fact that with Xerxes' removal of the Marduk statue (possibly accompanied by a destruction of the Esagila-temple (Arrian *Anab.* III 16; VII 17,1; Diod. XVII 112; Strabo XVI 1,5) it became impossible for the New Year Festival (*akītu, zagmukku*) to be celebrated in Babylon as it involved the king 'taking the hands of (the statue of) Marduk' during the festival. The legitimacy of any king of Babylonia depended on the enactment of this ritual (cf. Smith 1925: 62; 68ff; Meissner 1920: 64). With its automatic cessation in 482 Xerxes could thus no longer be designated as a king of Babylonia and his disregard for the old traditions of Mesopotamia and the special standing of Babylonia within the empire is expressed by this act and possibly also reflected in the division by him of the old satrapy of 'Babylon and Across the River' (Olmstead 1948: 237; Böhl 1962: 110) into two smaller units thus underlining the reduction in Babylonia's political status still further.

From this presentation of interlocking arguments it is evident that the main struts on which the case for Xerxes' hostile policy towards Babylonia rests are formed by Herodotus' report of the removal of the statue of Bēl-Marduk (interestingly not mentioned by Ctesias who also does not mention any destruction of Babylonian temples by him), the dating for the omission of the title 'king of Babylon' from Xerxes' titulary (*i.e.* 482) and the supposedly crucial role played by the New Year Festival in Babylon in determining the recognition of legitimate rulers of Babylonia; this festival celebrated by

Xerxes' predecessors was abolished by him after 482. Our aim in this paper will be to examine these three major elements in the argument and to demonstrate that:

a. Herodotus' mention of the removal of a statue from Esagila in I 183 by Xerxes does not refer to the statue of Marduk

b. The dating of the omission of the 'king of Babylon' element in Xerxes' titulary has been based on limited evidence. This has now been supplemented by further texts which make it clear that the title only changed gradually and cannot be regarded as reflecting a significant change of policy on Xerxes' part in relation to Babylonia as a result of the two revolts.

c. The Babylonian New Year Festival did not function to legitimize kings; non-participation by the king in the ritual and hence its curtailed performance did not result in him being considered a non-legitimate ruler of Babylonia.

A. Herodotus I 183

> In the temple of Babylon there is a second shrine lower down, in which is a great sitting figure (*agalma*) of Bel, all of gold on a golden throne, supported on a base of gold, with a golden table standing beside it. I was told by the Chaldaeans that, to make all this, more than twenty-two tons of gold were used. Outside the temple is a golden altar, and there is another one, not of gold, but of great size, on which sheep are sacrificed. The golden altar is reserved for the sacrifice of sucklings only. Again, on the larger altar the Chaldaeans offer something like two and a half tons of frankincense every year at the festival of Bel. In the time of Cyrus there was also in this sacred building a solid golden statue (*andrias*) of a man some fifteen feet high — I have this on the authority of the Chaldaeans, though I never saw it myself. Darius the son of Hystaspes had designs upon it, but he never carried it off because his courage failed him; Xerxes, however, did take it and killed the priest who tried to prevent the sacrilege. In addition to the adornments I have described there are also many private offerings in the temple.

There is surprising agreement and confidence in the assumption of modern historians that among punishments meted out by Xerxes to the rebellious Babylonians was the removal to Susa from Babylon of the cult-statue of Bēl-Marduk (Olmstead 1948: 237; Ghirshman 1954: 190-191; Meuleau 1969: 360-361; Bosworth 1980: 314; Cook 1983: 100), an act certain only to reinforce Babylonian discontent with Achaemenid rule. But Herodotus I 183, which is the *primary* evidence for Xerxes' supposed sacrilege in the temple of Marduk at Babylon, does not convict Xerxes of this particular charge. Herodotus begins the chapter by describing in the *present* tense the existence of a second temple in the sanctuary at Babylon where, he says, there is a great seated gold *agalma* (the word for a cult statue) of Zeus with a large gold table at its side (183,1). The pedestal and the throne, evidently of the statue, were also of gold. The gold of this group of artefacts was computed by the Chaldaeans at 800 talents. Herodotus then moved on to describe two altars outside the temple

and the character of the sacrifices ritually permitted on them. He then changes to the *aorist* tense to remark the former presence in the sanctuary of another solid gold statue, this time called *andrias*, 12 *pecheis* high. This statue, Herodotus stresses, he did not see. The implication of this remark, and his own description of the *agalma* indicate that the *agalma* was still in the temple. Darius, who seems to have 'cased' the sanctuary, had wanted to take the *andrias* but had not dared to. Xerxes did steal it, but killed a priest who had tried to prevent him. It is clear both from the changes in tense and from the use of different words for the statue — *agalma* for the cult statue (Nock 1930: 3ff.; 1972: 204ff.) of Bēl-Marduk, *andrias* for the missing statue (another deity? or a statue of an Assyrian or Babylonian king? cf. also Oppenheim 1985: 566 n.1) — that Herodotus is describing two separate statues. One, the statue still *in situ* was the cult statue of Bēl-Marduk (181,1). The other, which Herodotus calls an *andrias*, was the missing treasure, stolen by Xerxes according to what Herodotus describes as a Chaldaean *logos*, thus implying a temple source (Kuhrt 1982: 542-546). Whatever Xerxes was accused of stealing it was *not* the great cult image of Bēl-Marduk.

S.M. Sherwin-White

B. The date of the last use of the title 'king of Babylon'

Since 1907/8 a text recording the sale of a female slave (*VS* V 118, cf. *NRVU* 91) has been known which contains a broken regnal year of Xerxes: 6+x. There is space on the tablet for possibly another two signs and year 8 (=478) thus seems a likely reading. Xerxes' title in the text is 'king of Persia, Media, [Babyl]on and lands'. In 1941 Cameron (1941: 320f. nn.33, 40) proposed emending the regnal year to '2'. His arguments were partly based on the pecularity of the arrangements of the signs, on the intercalated month (Ululu II = month VI of the Babylonian calendar, *i.e.* a reduplicated month in this instance) appearing in the date, and most forcibly on the fact that this appeared to be the *only* text giving Xerxes the title 'king of Babylon' datable after his fourth regnal year (*i.e.* 482), so that there must be a mistake in the numeral. The Vorderasiatische Museum in Berlin collated the text for me in 1970 (I acknowledge Dr G. Meier's kind assistance in this) and confirmed that Ungnad's copy of the numerals on the tablet was absolutely correct. It seems a somewhat unlikely scribal error to write 8 instead of 2, but as the tablet remained an isolated example for over 70 years one could base little on its evidence except regard it as a reminder that Xerxes' change in titulary and the significance supposedly attached to it was perhaps not as clear-cut as it was generally presented after Cameron's article had appeared.

Fortunately new tablets dating to Xerxes have now been published which considerably amplify the text material available for this ruler: they occur

among the Late Babylonian texts in the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford published by McEwan 1984 (*OECT* 10, nos. 171; 174; 175; 180; 183 (also listed by Stolper, in press: n.38; 1985: 9 n.25). On the basis of the new material available the title 'king of Babylon' is included in Xerxes' titulary for years 5, 10, 10+x, 14 and 17. Further, two texts apparently dating to Artaxerxes I's reign also contain the element 'king of Babylon': McEwan 1984 no. 191 (regnal year 4) and no. 229 (date not preserved). A similar pattern has emerged from work being done by K. Kessler on economic texts from Uruk. Among the Uruk texts too, one (W 19164a) is dated to Artaxerxes I's twenty-fourth regnal year, giving him the title 'king of Babylon'. The titles that he bears are *šar Par-su-a-a šar Ma-da-a-a* [TIN] TIR.ki *šar mātāti* (Kessler 1984: 268 and 262). The material as it now stands would vindicate the isolated evidence of the Berlin text published in 1907/8 and completely undermines Cameron's persuasive hypothesis. Inasmuch as evidence on Achaemenid imperial policy may be deduced from the titulary employed (always in fact a poor guide to historical realities, cf. Weisberg 1980: xxii) it would now appear that the title 'king of lands' used alone became gradually the normative form of title applied to Persian kings in Babylonia. It was used intermittently for earlier rulers such as Cyrus (*YOS* VII.19), Cambyses (*Camb.* 30), Darius I (*NBD* 50) — these are simply examples and could all be multiplied — and Xerxes (*e.g.* Ungnad 1960 no.19) before 482 as well as after, although in Xerxes' reign the title 'king of lands' becomes more frequent. The last attestation of the 'king of Babylon' element in the titulature is now established as the twenty-fourth regnal year of Artaxerxes I (441 B.C.). It is only after this date that it seems to disappear completely. There is generally no particular significance to the use of the simple title 'king of lands' when applied to Xerxes' predecessors* and in the light of the newly available evidence no such significance should be attached to Xerxes' use of the simplified title either.

C. The New Year Festival in Babylon and the role of the king.

There can be no doubt that the New Year Festival in Babylon was an important one and that the king played a large part in its performance. Several chronicles (Grayson 1975a: nos.7, 15, 16, 17, 24) appear to be particularly concerned with recording whether or not it was performed and the Seleucid period 'Dynastic prophecy' (Grayson 1975b: 24-37) includes in its negative assessment of Nabonidus, the last ruler of the Neo-Babylonian empire, the charge that "he [cancelled] the festival of Esagila" (*ibid.*: col. ii l.14), by which almost certainly the New Year Festival at Babylon is meant.

* The only exception is texts dated to Cyrus, Year 1 where he is entitled 'king of lands', most of which reflect the fact that Cambyses as co-regent was given the title 'King of Babylon' at the same time, cf. San Nicolò 1941: 51-54.

The festival took place on 1.-12. Nisan (=first month of the Babylonian calendar) roughly coinciding with the vernal equinox. The Babylonian *akītu*-festival of the Neo-Babylonian period, in as far as it can be reconstructed which represents a problem in itself (cf. Labat 1939: 165-6), was certainly a major annual event which provided the king with an opportunity to display his wealth, celebrate his military triumphs and demonstrate his care for Babylon, the capital of his empire. Virtually all Neo-Babylonian kings at some time or other refer to the elaborate celebrations, the splendid decorations and repairs of chapels, gates, processional roads and cultic implements connected with the festival, the gifts made and the huge offerings presented to the gods (for detailed references cf. P.-R. Berger 1970: 155-9). Voigtlander (1963: 92-3) has also pointed out how careful Nebuchadnezzar II was in ensuring that he would be back from campaign in time for the festival.

In spite of the obvious importance of the festival to the Babylonians and the respect shown it by the kings, the question that has to be asked is: was a king who claimed to rule Babylonia obliged to take part in it and was this an essential element in his recognition as king? The Neo-Babylonian form of the festival, as has been most recently pointed out by Black (1981: 49-56), represented "a complex accretion over a long period of probably about six different elements from different cities and cults". The main constituent elements according to his analysis were a festival to celebrate or ensure the success of the spring harvest of barley, a local festival honouring the patron-god of the city of Babylon, Bēl-Marduk, a ceremony commemorating the elevation of Marduk within the Babylonian pantheon, another marking the calendrical aspect of the festival at the beginning of the new year, complex rituals involving the god Nabû of Borsippa who played a central role in the Babylonian *akītu* and rituals which specifically involved the king. The king's function during the festival was closely involved with the city-god by whom he had been entrusted with his kingship: he underwent a ritual confession and penitence during which he avowed that he had performed his royal duties in relation to the city of Babylon correctly. Following this the king was struck on the cheek by the chief priest; this was to make his tears flow which was considered a good omen — if they did Marduk had given his blessing to the king for that year. After the successful completion of this part of the ceremony the king 'took the hand of Marduk' in order to lead him out of his sanctuary to the 'shrine of destiny' where the other gods were assembled and thence led the statue in a huge procession outside the city to the *akītu*-house. It was during this procession that the king had the opportunity to display tribute and war-captives from his campaigns abroad (Langdon 1912: *Nab.* 8 col.ix ll.11-41).

First and most obviously this part of the festival could not take place if the king was not present, although a letter (ABL 667) from the Neo-Assyrian

empire (seventh century B.C.) suggests that a possible way round this, occasionally insuperable, problem was provided by the king being asked to send his robes as a substitute for himself. There is no evidence from the Neo-Babylonian or succeeding periods for such a practice and, in the absence of a royal archive, little likelihood of ever coming across a similar request. Whether this kind of substitution was a feasible possibility within the Babylonian context must thus remain unclear. There is evidence, however, that a limited number of ceremonies and offerings connected with the festival were carried out in the king's absence (Grayson 1975a: no.7 col.ii ll.5-8). Therefore, though less splendid, the festival could be performed in the absence of the king.

Secondly, it would seem extremely likely from the description of the king in leading out the statue for what was one of the high points of the full celebrations — *i.e.* 'taking the hand(s) of Marduk' for initiating the procession of the gods — that the phrase which has been interpreted by some as denoting a symbolic gesture whereby the god sanctioned and thus permitted the king to rule *i.e.* legitimized his rule, is almost certainly to be understood as a summary form of referring to the king's participation in the festival and has *no* other significance beyond this (Thureau-Dangin 1921: 146, n.3; Labat 1939: 175-6; Grayson 1970: 164-170).

Under the Old Persian rulers there is no one clearly attested case of the performance of the New Year Festival in Babylon with the king's participation. The supposed reference to a peformance of part of it by Cambyses in 538 (Grayson 1975a: col.iii, 25-6) cannot (*pace* Oppenheim 1974: 3497-3502) be taken as hard and fast evidence of a celebration of the festival: the day (4. Nisan) is the one on which the king would be away, fetching the statue of Nabû from Borsippa, and the sanctuary of Nabû mentioned in the text (Egidrikalammasumma) is not the one associated with his shrine within Esagila where Nabû went for the *akītu*-festival (*RLA* II 281 *s.v.* Ehad-kalammasum-(ma/u); Unger 1931: 149 cf. 172). This 'Cambyses incident' should be related to Cambyses' installation as 'king of Babylon' (cf. Langdon 1912 *Neb.* 15: iv 18-19; *Nab* 8: vi 23-30) and co-regent with Cyrus, a fact well-attested from dated Babylonian documents (San Nicolò 1941: 51-54). Apart from this, a text dating to Darius' first regnal year *may* refer to a division of offering-gifts that had been deposited before divine statues during the *akītu*-festival (Unger 1931: 150 n.1; *VS* IV 89 cf. *NRVU* 316); and Böhl (1962: 112-113) has suggested that a text dated to Šamaš-eriba, leader of the second revolt in Xerxes' reign (*VS* VI 173 cf. *NRVU* 615), implies the planned performance of the *akītu*-festival. Neither of these scraps of evidence provide any very clear proof of the continued performance of the *akītu*-festival although the interpretations are *possible*. What they certainly do *not* prove is the participation of the king in the festival — they could simply refer to curtailed ceremonies. With the sources virtually silent on this subject one is, in

fact, in no position to argue very convincingly either way. What is clear, however, is that one is extremely hard pushed to find *any* Persian king celebrating the *akītu* ever, yet all of them were fully acknowledged as rulers of Babylonia. Therefore a link between participating in the *akītu* and recognition as legitimate king simply did not exist (cf. Grayson 1970: 160-170).

Two further points need to be considered in this connection. First, on two occasions the city of Babylon was sacked by Assyrian kings, its temples destroyed and the statue of Marduk removed or smashed (Tukulti-Ninurta 1244-1208; Sennacherib 704-681). On both occasions the Babylonian chronographic material appears to have regarded these periods as 'kingless' (Tukulti-Ninurta does not appear in Babylonian king list A; cf. Brinkman 1968: 77 and n.398; for Sennacherib the Babylonian chronicle numbers the remaining years of his reign as 'year (x) of there not being a king in Babylon', cf. Grayson 1975a: no.1 iii l.28). In the case of Sennacherib the Babylonian tradition is reflected in the later Ptolemaic Canon, where the whole of Sennacherib's rule over Babylonia is simply listed as 'kingless' (cf. *e.g.* Burstein 1978: 180). Yet the Canon, which has been shown to base itself on reliable local Babylonian material, gives Xerxes his full twenty-one regnal years. This in itself would tend to argue against a destruction of Babylonian temples and removal of the Marduk statue by him.

Secondly, in the reign of Artaxerxes I (*VS* III 187, cf. *NRVU* no. 473 — in year x+3 = 13? or 23?) the temple of Esagila appears to control well-functioning estates as usual and have its normal complement of temple-staff (cf. further Stolper *forthcoming*, n.2). This has been taken by *e.g.* Oates (1979: 138) as indicating a restoration of the Marduk cult and Esagila by this king. This is based on the old mistaken assumption that there was a destruction and that the temple thus needed restoring, whereas this evidence should in fact be used to argue for continuity of cult at Babylon.

Conclusion

The picture that has emerged from this re-examination of evidence and the adducing of some new material is that Xerxes, while certainly having to contend with two revolts in Babylonia, did not avenge himself on this trouble-spot by deliberately destroying temples and/or removing the statue of Bēl-Marduk so that the New Year Festival could not be celebrated. Its celebration by Persian rulers is virtually unattested anyway. One would also imagine that it would have presented practical difficulties for them to take any active part regularly on this occasion given the extensive campaigning and conquests that all of them were engaged in, which would scarcely have made it possible to be often, let alone regularly, present. (Cambyses' conquest of Egypt and his subsequent prolonged stay there is an obvious example that springs to mind; cf. Cyrus' campaign against the Massagetae and Darius' Thracian expedition).

Yet all of them continued to be given the title 'king of Babylon' as, it now emerges, was Xerxes too, although the title was being used less and less.

The results of this re-examination make a reappraisal of Xerxes' reign desirable; thus, for example, Xerxes' titulary does present some other unusual features as he is sometimes called 'king of Persia, Media, (Babylon) and lands'. This has been dubbed a 'disquieting change' by Olmstead (1948: 236) who interprets it as indicating the increasingly repressive character of Persian imperialism associated with Xerxes (cf. Hdt. VII 7 who describes Egypt, after Xerxes' crushing of the revolt, as being in a condition of worse servitude than it had ever been previously). A more fruitful approach may be to see Xerxes' reign as representing a transitional and formative period of Achaemenid imperialism (cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980: 32-36; Graf 1985). With the tighter control imposed on the empire by Darius I (*i.e.* the various reforms associated with him, some of which do appear to have a reality cf. Stolper 1974: I 141-160 for a strong argument in favour of the creation of a census in Babylonia by Darius I for mustering and fiscal purposes), conquered territories were beginning to become administrative imperial districts rather than discrete 'national' areas loosely bound together in a form of 'Personalunion' under a Persian king. The Persian empire was developing an institutional character which began to transform the older political entities.

The story in Hdt. I 183 on which so much has been based provides somewhat different food for thought. Xerxes, in this instance, is accused of removing a valuable statue from the Esagila sanctuary and killing the priest in charge of it. Ruthless behaviour which could well be regarded as a desecration and motivated, perhaps, by greed. Its truth must remain unknowable. But the significant point of the story must surely be the phrase that Darius had *intended* to take it, but it was Xerxes who actually perpetrated the deed. Encapsulated in this anecdote is the 'Greek experience' of Darius I and of his son: Darius *planned* to invade Greece but was prevented by set-backs (Marathon, Athos) and death from carrying out this plan because it was against the will of the gods. Xerxes' misfortune lay in disregarding these divine warnings, blindly continuing with Darius' blasphemous plans and bringing them to fruition which could only result in total disaster.

It is into the continuation and development of this debate that Alexander's orders for rebuilding the temples at Babylon would appear to fit: the acts of Xerxes, the sacrilegious invader of Greece had to be reversed and put right by Alexander, the liberator and representative of those who had suffered at his hands. One should not, therefore, take the evidence of Arrian that the temples in Babylon to be rebuilt were those destroyed by Xerxes as hard and fast evidence for any real destruction by him but regard it as reflecting a specific Greek version of Persian behaviour, of which Xerxes was the prime example.

One final remark: in his recent book, Cook (1983: 99-100) states that

Xerxes deliberately removed the statue of Darius from Heliopolis as a punishment for its revolt. Quite apart from the fact that it is unknown whether the statue was ever in Egypt, let alone set up at Heliopolis (cf. Root 1979: 71-72), this statement is quite unsupported by any circumstantial evidence (there is no reference in, *e.g.*, Herodotus to any destroying of temples or pillaging of statues in Egypt by Xerxes). Presumably this idea is based on a parallel with Xerxes' supposed treatment of Babylon and possibly on the very uncertain, though frequently proposed, identification of the evil king of the satrap stele (set up in 311 B.C.) who confiscated temple-land with Xerxes (Lloyd 1982: 175ff.; 1983: 298).** In the light of the evidence discussed above any such parallel disappears and Cook's section should be mentally deleted. It simply serves to indicate how inextricably we have all been caught in the web of Greek historiography.

** It might be worth mentioning in this context the doubts that I feel about the generally assumed attribution of Grayson 1975a: no. 8 to Xerxes. As far as I have been able to determine this has been arrived at primarily on the basis of a *possible* reading in obv. l.7, '[son] of Darius', which is then for somewhat arbitrary reasons automatically assumed to be Xerxes. As the text also contains incomprehensible references to a 'festival' (which might well be the New Year Festival) such an identification could become significant. However, quite apart from the *extremely* fragmentary state of the text, and the great uncertainty of attribution, other features of the chronicle seem rather curious (I hope to present a discussion of this soon); it would be quite inadmissible to use the fragment as it stands to try and support the traditional view of Xerxes' activities in Babylon.

THE KING'S DINNER (Polyaenus IV 3,32)

D.M. Lewis - Oxford

This seminar has rightly laid stress on the independence of oriental evidence and on the importance of freeing its interpretation from presuppositions based on Greek evidence. I must admit, that much of my recent thinking has also gone in the other direction. Taking my start from what seemed to me to be the fact that Greeks were widely employed by Persians in a secretarial capacity (Lewis 1977: 12-15), I have argued in general terms that Herodotus could have had good evidence for his more documentary material and, more specifically, that there is reason to believe that Xerxes' army-list contains sound prosopographical information (Lewis 1984a: 597-602; 1984b). Despite the sweeping condemnation which fourth-century Greek writing about Persia has sometimes received (Momigliano 1975: 132-5), I think that there is some evidence to suggest that factual investigation of Persian institutions continued. I propose to discuss here the most substantial piece of evidence. Surprisingly, since it is preserved in mediaeval manuscripts, it has had virtually no discussion at all;[1] if it had been a new discovery on papyrus, it would have had a lengthy bibliography.

Polyaenus IV 3,32 gives us a list of commodities prepared for the King's dinner and supper read by Alexander in the Persian palace, written on a bronze pillar, where there are the other laws which Cyrus wrote. Three Teubner pages of straight document are then followed by a short anecdote, recounting how the other Macedonians regarded the list as a sign of the King's *eudaimonia* and Alexander treated it with contempt. The sources of Polyaenus are not always straightforward.[2] As one might expect, the Alexander anecdotes show some affinity with the vulgate tradition about him, and an ultimate origin for them in Cleitarchus is at least a possibility.

Two new discoveries make it desirable to reconsider this text. The first is the text describing how Ashurnaṣirpal II dedicated his palace at Nimrud with a ten-day feast for nearly 70,000 people (Wiseman 1952; *ANET*: 560; Grayson 1976: §682). Even without sophisticated lexicographical work, at least seventeen items on the menu overlap. Polyaenus is describing a quite plausible Near Eastern feast. Closer in date and relevance are the Persepolis Fortification

[1] An anonymous contribution to the *Classical Journal* 30 (1827): 370-4, condemned it as inauthentic. Thereafter it barely apppears in the literature until it served Peter Green (1974: 303) for a picturesque footnote.

[2] Nothing serious has been attempted since Melber (1885). It is very doubtful whether any useful result could be obtained by reconsideration, except in the case of individual passages.

Tablets. These also exhibit a range of foodstuffs which show a considerable affinity with those recorded in the document. It will be more convenient to relegate the detail to an appendix, and others are more capable than I am of doing the detailed work. I had at any rate convinced Hallock before he died that the text contains some very helpful and suggestive matter which offers the hope of solving some of the more intractable problems in the Elamite lexicography of foodstuffs. The further point, of course, is that the Persepolis texts make it clear that Achaemenid administration is likely to have contained such records laying down fixed ration scales for persons on every level; there is no reason to think that the King was excluded. To my mind the really suspicious feature is the bronze pillar, although some of the quantities are pretty frightening. There will be some temptation to wonder whether the record of a special occasion has been taken as normal.

We can have no certainty that the text derives from Cleitarchus and many of us doubt whether Cleitarchus can plausibly be credited with first-hand research in oriental sources. It seems more likely, as Lane Fox suggested to me, that whichever historian brought the documentary core into connection with Alexander had taken it over from a Greek source in which it had already appeared. Our knowledge of such sources, with further evidence that the King's household economy was discussed more seriously than appears in Polyaenus, virtually all comes from the *Zitatennest* at Athenaeus 145. After various unspecific quotations on Persian luxury, we get a very long piece from the fourth-century Heraclides of Cumae (*FGrH* 689 F2) with a full account of the King's dining procedure and some serious discussion. The King's dinner, he says, may sound imposing, but, if examined closely, it will turn out to be organised economically and accurately both for him and for other powerful Persians. He gives us an account of what is prepared for the King's dinner, more sketchy than the one in Polyaenus, and then says that much of this in effect goes on salaries for the diners and for the King's bodyguard. Mercenaries in Greece get paid in cash, but in Persia they get food as pay. The observation about food as pay is certainly sound, but it is by no means clear that Heraclides is quite right about large food allocations. In the initial stages of work on the Fortification Tablets Hallock had considered it possible that the very large rations given to Parnaka, the King's uncle, were for him to feed his staff, but he abandoned this later when a new tablet showed Parnaka's 300 boys getting normal meal rations alongside Parnaka's inflated scale (*PFT*: 23 with n.; 1978: PFa 4). It might be possible to save Heraclides' credit in part by supposing that the distributions were in fact only of meats, very rare at Persepolis for the rations of ordinary people, but he certainly contemplates the distribution of loaves after dinner as well, and there is surely some misunderstanding. Nevertheless, the passage is still quite impressive and is doubtless responsible for Meyer's belief, so different from that of Momigliano, that

Heraclides and Deinon operated "in durchaus wissenschaftlicher Weise" (Meyer 1921: 339).

There was yet another approach possible to the size of the King's dinners. After some Herodotean material on the King's dinner and its costs, Athenaeus quotes Ephippus (*FGrH* 126 F2) on the cost of Alexander's dinners and makes a guess at the number of consumers, followed by Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F39) and Deinon (*FGrH* 690 F24), evidently in agreement, on the numbers at Persian royal dinners and their cost. This figure is then reduced to *Italikon nomisma*, and it is thereby demonstrated that Alexander's dinners cost just as much per diner as the King's had done. I can offer no suggestion at all as to who may be Athenaeus' source for this calculation and conclusion.

In our Polyaenus text, there is no attempt to reduce these ration amounts to any cash equivalent, no explicit indication of how many people the rations described would feed. There are traces of some form of editing. Some notes may go back to the original document, for example, the totals and various notes that some commodities vary slightly according to where the King is. But there are also linguistic glosses for a Greek audience, the giving of equivalents for Persian measures in Attic terms, and one possible additional explanation of use; all these belong to the process of transmission.

It seems certain to me that we are dealing with a fourth-century Greek source. As far as we are concerned, there are three main possibilities: Ctesias, Heraclides and Deinon.[3] I am inclined to rule out Heraclides, since we have one general account of the King's dinner from him already, and neither the numbers for daily consumption of animals nor the animals themselves quite correspond. Deinon is more difficult. Of the three fragments in which he deals with the King's dinner, F24, as we have seen, is only about numbers and cost and has no bearing on our text, F12 begins with a quite different point about the variety of origins of the foodstuffs, a matter on which our text is virtually silent, and F4, though visibly from the same world as our text, seems to have a different context. On the whole, the case is the strongest for Ctesias. In his work *About the tributes in Asia* (*FGrH* 688 F53) he did list "everything which is prepared for the King at his dinner". All we know about that list is that it included neither pepper nor vinegar. Pepper is indeed absent from Polyaenus. It must be admitted that vinegar is there (D 10), but there is another escape-route besides the easy one of saying that Athenaeus or his source is being careless. It does not appear in the part of the list which the King consumes himself, but only among the commodities which he distributes.

No claim of Ctesias to have worked on administrative documents survives, and I am more than sceptical about his assertion (*FGrH* 688 F5) that he had

[3] Pierre Briant suggested that I had been too hasty in ruling out Chares of Mytilene, whose position as Alexander's major domo might have given him access to such a document. All I could say in reply was that he did not seem a very likely source for Polyaenus.

studied the royal parchments on which the Persians had collected ancient actions, according to some law. The pedigree of our document is hardly clear, but it does not seem to be a total invention. My conclusion remains that fourth-century Greek historiography continued to use at least some Persian documentation and that Heraclides, whether using documents or not, was at least capable of talking sensibly about Persian institutions.

APPENDIX

The text is by no means easy to organise, though certain groupings are clear. Ashurnaṣirpal's order is: meat, poultry and fish, bread, drink, condiments, vegetables and fruit.

a. = artaba(i). m. = maries. t. = talent. mn. = mnai. kap. = kapeties.

A.	1	Wheat-meal, pure	400 a.
	2	Wheat-meal, second class	300 a.
	3	Wheat-meal, third-class	300 a.
		Wheat-meal, total for dinner	1000 a.
	4	Barley-meal, very pure	200 a.
	5	Barley-meal, second class	400 a.
	[6	Barley-meal, third class	400 a.]
		Barley meal, total	1000 a.
	[7?	*Semidalis*	?]
	8	Groats made from *olyra*	200 a.
	9	Fine flour from *alphita*, for possets	10 a.
	10	Chopped cardamum, sifted fine	lost
	11	*Ptisane* (treated barley?)	10 a.
	12	Mustard-seed	$\frac{1}{3}$ a.

B.	1	*Probata*, male	400
	2	Cattle	100
	3	Horses	30
	4	Fatted geese	400
	5	Turtle-doves	300
	6	Various small birds	600
	7	Lambs	300
	8	Baby geese	100
	9	Gazelles	30

C.	1	Today's milk	10 m.
	2	Sweetened sour milk	10 m.
	3	Garlic	1 t.
	4	Onions, pungent	½ t.
	5	*Phyllon* (silphium-fruit?)	1 a.
	6	Silphium-juice	2 mn.
	7	Cummin	1 a.
	8	Silphium	1 t.
	9	Oil of sweet apples	¼ a.
	10	Posset from sour pomegranates	1 a.
	11	Oil of cummin	¼ a.
	12	Black raisins	3 t.
	13	Flower of anise	3 mn.
	14	Black cummin	⅓ a.
	15	Seed of *diarinon*	2 kap.
	16	Sesame, pure	10 a.
	17	*Gleukos* from wine	5 m.
	18	Cooked round radishes in brine	5 m.
	19	Capers in brine, from which they make sour sauce	5 m.
	20	Salt	10 a.
	21	Ethiopic cummin	6 kap.
	22	Dry anise	30 mn.
	23	Celery-seed	4 kap.
	24	Sesame oil	10 m.
	25	Oil 'from milk'	5 m.
	26	Terebinth oil	5 m.
	27	Acanthus oil	5 m.
	28	Oil from sweet almonds	3 m.
	29	Dried sweet almonds	3 a.
	30	Wine	500 m.

(When he is in Babylon or Susa, he has half his wine from palms, half from vines.)

31	Wood (*xyla*)	200 waggons
32	Wood (*hule*)	100 waggons
33	'Raining honey'	100 square cakes
(When he is in Media, he distributes *tauta*.)		weighing 10 mn. each
34	Safflower seed	3 a.
35	Saffron	2 mn.

(All this for drink and *ariston*)

He distributes:

D.	1	Wheat-meal, pure	500 a.
	2	Barley-meal, pure	1000 a.

3	Barley-meal, second class	1000 a.
4	*Semidalis*	500 a.
5	Groats made from *olyra*	500 m.
6	Barley for the animals	20000 a.
7	Chaff	10000 waggons
8	Straw	5000 waggons
9	Sesame oil	200 m.
10	Vinegar	100 m.
11	Chopped cardamum, fine	30 a.

All this he distributes to the soldiers (?)
This is what the King consumes in a day, including his *ariston*, his *deipnon* and what he distributes.

GENERAL: It would be hard to imagine a text more vulnerable to omissions and transpositions. A 6, absent in the mss., was an obvious omission picked up by the earliest editors and it would be reasonable to assume that there may be more omissions which are less obtrusive. I have ventured to add A 7, to improve parallelism with D 4; I see no reason to deny the King this delicacy (cf. Lewis 1977: 60). There are few obvious inconsistencies, but it seems unlikely that A 8 should be in dry, D 5 in liquid measure. In view of the inconsistency between the beginning, the note after Section C and the note after Section D, it may be that we have lost an explicit distinction between *deipnon* and *ariston* after Section B. The note after C 33 is ambiguous.

CEREALS (A 1-12, D 1-6): There is no doubt that the predominant cereal at Persepolis is barley. Hallock's translations conceal this fact (see *PFT*: 76) because of the occasional careless use of ŠE.BAR for totals which include other cerals. In this text it only appears unprocessed at D 6. 20000 artabai is a very large figure, a day's ration for 200000 ordinary horses or 300000 mules. Before we condemn the figure or the document out of hand, we have to consider what other baggage animals there were and what animals for food there might have been in the establishment which it was inconvenient to graze.

Human beings get meal (ZÍD.DA), not normally specified as to type or quality in Persepolis receipts. The most tempting parallel for our text might come from the Royal Provisions texts PF 699-700, and Hinz (1975: 81) has not hesitated to translate the three adjectives for meal given there as 'good', 'better', 'best'. I retain a doubt, since the categories are not counted separately. Other texts do distinguish quantitatively between *bašur* meal and *ramiyam* meal (both in PF 326), and in Driver 1965: VI Neḫtiḫur is to get two measures of *ḥwry* (white) meal, which seems to correspond to our text's 'pure' (*kathara*) and three of *rmy* meal. Hinz (1975: 40) has discussed the uses of *ramiyam* etc.

and concluded that it means "fein". But there seems to be an equal temptation to think that *bašur* is something special, which may be connected with its different uses in PF 302, 1854. My brief and inexpert search in Neo-Babylonian texts has found no parallel for grading meal with ordinal numbers: what comes to my mind is PT 85, with its distinction between white, second-class and third-class silver.

There are ample Elamite words to supply our range of cereals, with over twenty awaiting definition. I can only refer to Hallock *PFT* and Hinz 1975 for discussion, allowing myself merely to wonder whether ŠE.SA.A is anything to do with our A 11, since it certainly seems to arise from processing barley (PF 430).

At Persepolis, even Parnaka only gets 18 BAR = 6 artabai of meal a day; I have guessed (Lewis 1984a: 595) that Gobryas got 20 BAR. The King is certainly operating on a different order of magnitude altogether. As usual, it is tempting to think of his household as distinct from his soldiers, but this may be special pleading. As far as the soldiers are concerned, we are on firmer ground. D 1-4 add up to 3000 a. = 9000 BAR = 90000 QA. If we assume an average ration of 1 $\frac{1}{2}$. QA a day, that implies 60000 soldiers. Again, this seems high, but we may be underestimating the ration for elite troops.

ANIMALS (B 1-9). This is the passage closest to Heraclides, but different from him. He says that a thousand victims a day are butchered for the King. These include horses, camels, oxen, donkeys, deer and *ta pleista probata.* Many birds are consumed too, Arabian ostriches, geese and chickens. The birds are evidently not included in the thousand, so the comparable figure here, if there are no omissions, as there may be, is 860. The best parallel for the number is not the two sheep a day received by Parnaka as a regular ration, but the 100 sheep received by the lady Artystone, together with 200 m. of wine, apparently for a special feast (Cameron 1942; *PFT*: 52 n.48; Hinz 1971: 288). If we divide Ashurnaṣirpal's figures by ten for the ten days of his feast, the figures are fairly comparable, except that the exceptional nature of that occasion demanded a much larger provision of sheep and lambs.

I have left *probata* untranslated and assume that it contains both sheep and goats, a common Greek usage, paralleled by the similar use at Persepolis of UDU.NITÁ. No horses appear as foodstuffs at Persepolis, and it would be unsafe to assume that those which are fed there are used for anything except transport. Birds as royal provisions appear in PF 697-8, and there is ample evidence for their feeding (PF 1718-1756). *datmakaš*, interpreted by Gershevitch (1969: 169) as 'puffed up', seems a reasonable translation of *siteutoi* (B 11). (Consider also the uses of IN.lg and *kibatna.*) 'Various small birds' (B 9) translate readily into *kuktukka* fowls (*PFT*: 49). Ashurnaṣirpal's feast involved

500 gazelles; I do not see any at Persepolis, though *šukur* is a possibility (cf. *PFT*: 48); presumably it has no connection with *šukurum* (Hallock 1978: 112), since we would have to start thinking of an unicorn.

MISCELLANEOUS: There is no milk (C 1) at Persepolis, except perhaps in PF 417. Many items are easier to recognise at Ashurnaṣirpal's feast than at Persepolis, but some of them may lurk there. The most obvious point of contact is sesame (C 16) and its oil (C 24, D 9). Sesame is very common at Persepolis, and in fact there is no clear trace of oil except sesame-oil. Wherever Ì.lg or *mil* is further qualified or elucidated, we seem to have sesame (PF 431, 986, 1248). We still do not know the Elamite for 'salt'. Hallock (*PFT*: 25) suggested *madukka*, but this only appears in very small quantities, though often as royal provisions (PF 719-722). If Ezra (VII 22) could be given an unlimited quantity of salt, I doubt if receipts were issued at Persepolis for a quart. Hinz (1975: 83) preferred 'honey' for *madukka*; Hallock (*per epist.*) suggested 'coffee', without supporting it; is PF 298 a coffee-cake? While we are on honey, note that C 33 is explained by Diodorus XVII 75,6; Curtius VI 4,22. For C 26-27 at the royal table, cf. Amyntas and Ctesias ap. Ath. 68a. A 10, D 11: an article by M. Stol on cardamum, in *JEOL* 28, suggests to me that it should be Elamite *zali* = Bab. *saḫlû* vel sim.

DRINK: The absence of beer is surprising, and it may have dropped out. The quantity seems very moderate, given Artystone's 200 m. The distinction drawn between palm-wine and grape-wine is of the greatest importance. Hallock offered no translation for the frequent *sawur* wine, Hinz (1975: 83) came down for 'bitter' or 'herb' wine. I put it to Hallock that it might be 'date-wine', and he could see no objection, but perhaps we ought to think about vinegar.

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES: Apart from the shift over the *olyra* groats (A 8, D 5), the usage of dry measure, liquid measure and weights seems consistent and reasonable. It is less obvious why no category of foodstuff at Persepolis is weighed. The dry measure is the artaba. It is a good Persian measure, but only used at Persepolis in ways which await a full investigation (*PFT*: 72). An additional note defines the Median artaba as equal to an Attic medimnos, a very substantial overestimate. A smaller dry measure is the *kapetis*, defined as an Attic choinix, i.e. 1/48 of a medimnos; I know of no ancient oriental instance. As at Persepolis, the standard liquid measure is a maris, defined as 10 Attic choes, apparently another overestimate. The weight-measures, the talent and the mna, are always specified to be weights. It is easier to find estimates of capacity by waggon-loads in Greek (Xen. *Anab.* IV 7,10) than in oriental sources. However small the waggons, the chaff and straw (D 7-8) seem ridiculously large quantities.

ANNOTATIONS: That the equivalences of measures are editorial is clear enough, and, at the other extreme, the notes after C 30, 33, 35, D 11 seem to be part of the original. C 19 is problematic.

STILISTISCHE EVIDENZ FÜR DIE BENUTZUNG PERSISCHER QUELLEN DURCH GRIECHISCHE HISTORIKER

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In der Diskussion über die Möglichkeit, persische Quellen in den griechischen Zeugnisse zur Geschichte der Achämeniden nachzuweisen, haben in den letzten Jahrzehnten philologische Beobachtungen von iranistischer Seite besonderes Gewicht erhalten.[1] Eine hervorragende Stelle nahm und nimmt dabei die Beschäftigung mit dem inschriftlich erhaltenen Brief des Königs Darius an Gadatas,[2] seinen Beauftragten in Magnesia, ein. In seinem griechisch erhaltenen Text sind bekanntlich mehrfache persische Lehnübersetzungen und Formulierungen der achämenidischen Kanzleisprache entdeckt worden. Ähnliches gilt *mutatis mutandis* auch für die Themistokles-Briefe.[3] Ferner hat naturgemäss besonders die Namenforschung reiches Material für die Kenntnis der Griechen über das Achämenidenreich erbracht (Schmitt 1981: 47ff, §10).

Stilistische Vergleiche haben für die sogenannte Verfassungsdebatte bei Herodot (III 80-82) ergeben, dass man auch in den angeblich so sophistisch gefärbten Reden mit Elementen persischer Überlieferung zu rechnen hat (Gschnitzer 1977; Schmitt 1977: 244), die auch inhaltlich begründet sind. Denn etwa bei der Beurteilung der Argumentation des Otanes für die Demokratie sollte man nicht übersehen, dass auch im Achämenidenreich Formen der Volksvertretung der lokalen Autonomie und der Teilhabe an Wahlen bei einzelnen Stämmen und Institutionen existierten (vgl. Xen. *Cyr.* I 2,3-15; V 4,22; Platon *Leg.* 694ab; Arrian III 27,5; VI 22,2; Curtius Rufus IX 10,5; Max. Tyr. XXII 4). Dem Argument des Otanes, der König läufe als Alleinherrscher Gefahr, durch Selbstüberhebung verdorben zu werden, stehen entsprechende Warnungen in der iranischen Königsethik zur Seite (Hdt. III 80,3-4; Yasht 10,109 und 111, vgl. Lentz 1964: 119; Knauth 1975: 174f.). Möglicherweise ist in der Darius-Rede eine bisher nicht beachtete Formulierung aus iranischem Denken heraus zu verstehen: Darius fürchtet, dass, wenn

[1] Literaturbericht von Schmitt (1981: 1ff., bes. 25f.). Vgl. auch Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980.

[2] Lochner-Hüttenbach 1964: 91ff.; Boffo 1979: 267-303 (freundlicher Hinweis von M. Vickers, Oxford). Was den Namen Gadatas betrifft, so möchte ich gegen Ableitung aus dem Altpersischen (Schmitt 1981: 49) die alte These von Wellhausen (Lochner-Hüttenbach 1964: 93) unterstützen, der an einen theophoren Namen zu palmyren. *Gad* erinnerte, denn 'Gadates' ist als Name eines Syrers in dieser Form jetzt auch inschriftlich nachgewiesen (Tudor 1971:73 Taf.12,4). Darius lobt Gadatas, weil er Fruchtsorten aus Syrien nach Kleinasien verpflanzt hat. Er könnte also selbst sehr wohl ein Syrer sein.

[3] Nylander 1968: 119ff.; Schmitt 1983. Hier auch weitere Hinweise zum Gadatas-Brief.

das Volk herrscht, sich die Schlechten — der moralische Terminus hat soziale Bedeutung! — zusammenrotten (*ta koina poieusi*: Hdt. III 82,4). Mir scheint, dass das so beschriebene und gefürchtete gemeinsame Handeln der Unterschichten auch in dem altpersischen Wort der Bisutun-Inschrift des Darius für Aufrührer: *hamiçiya* (*hama-mithra*) — „zum gleichen Vertrag gehörig" (DB IV 9f.; Schmitt 1981: 32) ausgedrückt wird. Der übliche Begriff im Griechischen wäre *stasis* für Aufstand. In der herodoteischen Rede wird jedoch — achämenidischem Wortgebrauch entsprechend — das Gewicht auf dem Zusammenschluss, die *con-iuratio* = Verschwörung gelegt.

Dass die Kyroupädie Xenophons ohne persische Quellen nicht denkbar ist, wird immer wieder hervorgehoben (Knauth 1975: 28ff.; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980: 184ff.; Briant 1979: 1391), wenngleich auch jüngst wieder der Versuch gemacht wurde, möglichst hellenozentrisch, gleichsam werkimmanent aus ihr eine spezifisch xenophontische Herrscherideologie herauszulesen (Breebaart 1983: 117ff.). Auf der Suche nach persischen Quellen trifft man ziemlich bald auf die Ungereimtheiten, die sich ergeben, betrachtet man das Kyros-Bild bei Herodot und Ktesias (Cizek 1975: 530ff.). Offensichtlich muss es — schon die Auswahl der handelnden Personen und ihre gelegentlich wechselnden Namensformen legen das nahe — unterschiedliche iranische Parallelüberlieferungen gegeben haben. Bekanntlich postuliert man ein Kyros-Nameh, ein Epos also (Christensen 1936: 126ff.; Pizzagalli 1942: 40ff.; Breitenbach 1966: 1709 und 1719) das den Reichsgründer idealisierte. Daneben gab es aber auch eine archivalisch-aktenmässige Überlieferung, aus der griechische Autoren über die Vermittlung durch persische Gewährsleute schöpfen konnten (Metzler 1977: 279ff., bes. 292). Auf die Zuweisung bestimmter Teile der Kyroupädie an den einen oder anderen dieser persischen Traditionsstränge kann hier natürlich nicht generell eingegangen werden, wohl aber soll versucht werden, an einem mutmasslichen Beispiel die Problematik der Zuweisung zu epischer oder archivalischer Überlieferung aufzuzeigen.

In seiner Darstellung der Organisation des Reiches und seiner Verwaltung durch Kyros (Xen. *Cyr.* VIII 5,37 — VIII 6,23) geht Xenophon im 6. Kapitel des 8. Buches der Kyroupädie auch auf die Funktion der Satrapen ein. In dem berichtend-erzählenden Text, der die Massnahmen des Königs, ihre Wirkung zu seiner Zeit und ihr Weiterleben beschreibt, sind wörtliche Reden des Königs an die Satrapen eingefügt (Xen. *Cyr.* VIII 6,3-4; 11-13). Der fiktive Anlass ist eine Versammlung, zu der er seine zukünftigen Funktionäre zusammenruft, ihr Inhalt allgemein gehaltene Ermahnungen, aber auch spezielle Anweisungen für die Verwaltung und die Herrschaftsrepräsentation durch die zu Satrapen bestellten Freunde des Königs (Wiesehöfer 1980: 11ff.). Ich vermute, dass diese Reden des Königs zu einer im Alten Orient mehrfach belegten Literaturform gehören: zu den Dienstanweisungen an Untergebene. J.B. Pritchards *Ancient Near Eastern Texts relating to the Old Testament* bringen Beispiele aus

dem Hethiterreich und aus Ägypten (*ANET*: 207ff. und 212f.: Grabinschrift des Wezirs Rechmire). In beiden Bereichen sind diese Anweisungen mit Zitaten wörtlicher Rede des Herrschers durchsetzt. Naturgemäss ist ihr jeweiliger Inhalt auf konkrete, historisch jeweils besondere Aufgabenbereiche bezogen, vergleichbar sind sie dem xenophontischen Text jedoch in Form und Funktion.

Eindeutig iranisch ist andererseits in den Dienstanweisungen des Kyros die Pflicht zur *imitatio regis*.[4] Das heisst die Satrapen sind gehalten den Lebenswandel ihres Herrschers stets so nachzuahmen, dass sie ihrerseits einerseits Vorbild für ihre Untergebenen sein können und zum anderen die Allgegenwart des Königs stellvertretend manifestieren. In einem Falle, der Pagenerziehung bei Hofe, wird durch den orientalischen Ausdruck „an der Pforte" (des Palastes) deutlich auf eine iranische Quelle verwiesen (Xen. *Cyr.* VIII 6,10; Knauth 1975: 67). Wie eine Anspielung auf die von Kyros institutionalisierte Versorgung der Panzerreiter mit Grundstücken — in babylonischen Urkunden belegt (Dandamaev 1967: 41) — klingt es, wenn es bei Xenophon heisst, dass die bei der Eroberung im jeweiligen Lande installierten Besatzungstruppen keine anderen als militärische Aufgaben wahrnehmen dürfen (Xen. *Cyr.* VIII 6,3). Der griechische Ausdruck für diese Form der königlichen Anweisung — *prostagma* — ist auch der in der ptolemäischen Verwaltung übliche (Lenger 1964). Den ptolemäischen Königsbriefen gehen auch in Ägypten die entsprechenden achämenidischen Texte voraus.[5]

Diese Hinweise auf Verwaltungsurkunden legen nun zwar den Schluss nahe, dass Xenophon sich im hier behandelten Kontext auf eine archivalische Quelle stützen konnte, doch steht dem entgegen, dass das iranische Epos ebenfalls den Brief und die Ansprache des Königs als Einschub, um nicht zu sagen als Zitat, kennt — bei Firdousi mehrfach belegt (Knauth 1975: 63f., 84 und 188). Die Frage, ob Xenophon hier eine epische oder im engeren Sinne historische Quelle benutzte, bleibt also einstweilen offen. Auch über die Historizität des xenophontischen Kyrosbildes ist damit nichts gesagt, wohl aber über das iranische Kolorit dieses Bildes.

[4] Breebaart 1983: 130f.; Metzler 1983: 10. Auch in der Verwaltungspraxis übernimmt der Satrap Methoden des Königs, so etwa in der Führung einer Liste von Wohltätern und Tadelswerten (Metzler 1977: 292; Wiesehöfer 1980: 10f.), auf die sich auch die späte Satrapeninschrift von Aranda (Maier 1959: 256) und zwei Briefe des Arshama (Grelot 1972: 305 Nr.65,d; 314 Nr.68,j = Driver 1965: Nr. 4 und 7) beziehen.

[5] Neben den Arshama-Briefen vgl. Spiegelberg 1928: 604ff.; Gyles 1959 (*non vidi*).

HERODOTUS AND ORAL HISTORY*

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I

It is generally agreed that Herodotus gathered most of his information from oral traditions. Even those who doubt this accept that he sought to represent his sources as oral, whether he was inventing them (Fehling 1971, esp. 112ff.), or describing them as oral when in fact they were written: "throughout the Histories Herodotus maintains the fiction that his work is an oral account, even where we know or surmise it to be based on written sources" (Immerwahr 1966: 6). Since it seems to me that a generalised view that Herodotus sought to misrepresent the nature of his sources raises more difficult problems than it solves (see note 12), I propose to ignore such approaches, and confine myself to investigating the consequences of the generally accepted version of Herodotus' sources. One consequence of this consensus has been to direct research on Herodotus away from source criticism in general, and towards questions centred on Herodotus as an author, his conception of history, his aims, and his literary techniques.[1] Neglect of the general problems of Herodotus' sources was perhaps a virtue so long as the principles of *Quellenforschung*, suitable only to certain literary historians, were liable to be applied. But it appears somewhat odd in the present age, when the problems of oral history and the characteristics, general and individual, of oral traditions are so widely debated, both among contemporary local historians and various other groups for 'radical history' (a useful introduction to this in Thompson 1978; see also Henige 1982), and even more among anthropologists. Not surprisingly such historians and anthropologists have felt the need to evaluate the reliability of one of their main sources of information. For outsiders, until recently the difficulty has been that the insights gained were scattered in the specialist literature, and often not easily detachable from their precise context. But two

* The first draft of section I of this paper was written for a seminar given by myself and Professor Arnaldo Momigliano in Oxford in Hilary Term 1977; it has since been discussed with anthropologists and classical scholars on a number of occasions, before being presented at the Groningen Workshop. As it represents the theoretical underpinning of my *Early Greece* (1980) (see briefly pp. 27-32), it is perhaps time it was published. Part II was written in the light of the Groningen discussions. Thanks are due to my colleagues there, and to David Asheri and Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, who made valuable comments on the paper in its later stages.

[1] The neglect of oral history is well revealed by the (admittedly impressionistic) survey of Lachenaud 1985. I have found especially valuable in the present context Immerwahr 1966, Pembroke 1967, Hartog 1980, Lang 1984. I have not seen Evans 1980, but there are some excellent remarks in Evans 1982: ch. 10.

works of synthesis have made much easier the task I want to approach in this paper, that of comparing Herodotus' treatment of Greek oral traditions with the characteristics of other oral traditions, in the hope of being able to clarify both the nature of Greek oral traditions and the contribution of Herodotus himself. Before confronting the problems of Herodotus' accounts of non-Greek cultures, it seems to me important first to establish principles in the less uncertain area of Greek tradition; but the second part of my paper attempts to show how my results are directly relevant to Herodotus' means of acquiring information on such cultures, by taking as an example his account of Persia.

The two modern works from which my investigation begins both stem from experience of African oral tradition, but it does not seem to me that this limitation has affected their relevance to early Greece; in fact one recompense for the extensive use I have made of them and their sources may be in confirming that their modes of approach are indeed more generally valid. The first and most obviously relevant of these works does itself claim to offer universal rules, although its author's experience as an oral historian was at that time limited to the Congo; this is Jan Vansina's *Oral Tradition* (1961; Eng. trans. 1965[2]). It offers a highly theoretical account of the various types of oral tradition and the problems of writing history from them; perhaps it is a sufficient indication of both its strengths and its weaknesses, to say that it bears much the same relationship to the actual problems of oral history as Paul Maas's *Textual Criticism* does to the problems of editing a real text. The second book may be compared with Pasquali's response to Maas: it is Ruth Finnegan's *Oral Literature in Africa* (1970), a critical survey of the characteristics and types of African oral literature in general and the problems related to the understanding of this literature (see also Finnegan 1977). It is perhaps important to the historian that both these books are empirical in their method, and based on the work of field anthropologists: they neither demand interpretation within nor offer obvious support for more abstract anthropological theories. Of course, as with most firmly based empirical studies, much of what they say leads to conclusions which already seem obvious from study of the Greek evidence; but I hope that even the obvious and well known facts of early Greek tradition will appear different in this wider context.

The last systematic attempt to confront this aspect of Herodotus with anthropology was W. Aly's *Volksmärchen, Sage und Novelle bei Herodot und seinen Zeitgenossen*, 1921 (reprint with appendix 1969). As is natural in a work of that date, Aly was primarily concerned with the methods and compilations of the folklorists; and many of his conclusions are so extreme that, despite Ludwig Huber's claims for its central position in modern Herodotus research

[2] For this article I have used the Penguin edition (1973) with important new observations in the preface.

(in Aly, repr. 1969: 317-328), the work has in fact been generally rejected, or passed over as of specialist interest only: in Kurt von Fritz's *Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* (1967), for instance, it is referred to only in the notes and then only for folk motifs. Some of the conclusions of this paper in fact bear a considerable resemblance to ideas of Aly — for instance his distinction between *historiē* and *logos* is related to the two types of tradition I have postulated; and he too laid emphasis on the artistic continuity between Herodotus' source material and his own methods.

With some obvious exceptions (notably Arnaldo Momigliano in his various papers), more recent writers on classical historiography have been less than sympathetic to oral tradition. Moses Finley takes a truly Thucydidean stance, both in the generalities of his *Early Greece* (1970; 1981[2]) and in his paper on 'Myth, Memory and History', where he states:

> Wherever tradition can be studied among living people, the evidence is not only that it does not exist apart from a connection with a practice or a belief, but also that other kinds of memory, irrelevant memories, so to speak, are shortlived, going back to the third generation, and, with the rarest of exceptions, no further. That is true even of genealogies, unless they are recorded in writing. (Finley 1975:27)

At this point Finley cites the problems Homeric heroes have in remembering beyond their grandfathers; it might be more relevant to cite real not literary examples such as Hecataeus' sixteen generations to a god (see below, p. 98), or Herophytos of Chios' fourteen ancestors (see Wade-Gery 1952: 8f.), both of whom take us back into the tenth century.

Vansina's conclusions are rather different: talking of work since 1961, he says:

> The last decade has shown that oral traditions have been empirically very fruitful for all history since 1750 or 1800... Trustworthy traditions earlier than 1750 are uncommon and almost entirely limited to states, at least in Africa. (Vansina 1973: xiv)

Thus the experience of anthropologists suggests a limit to oral tradition twice as long as Finley's. Undoubtedly too the emergent *poleis* of early Greece qualify as 'states' in Vansina's sense, and their traditions might therefore extend even further; but in fact it is clear that his suggested time-span of 150-200 years is well supported by the example of Herodotus. Herodotus' information reaches back in reasonable form from 450 B.C. to the mid seventh century, the colonisation of Cyrene, the Cimmerian invasions and the Corinthian tyranny. The period before 650 B.C. is virtually unknown, a realm of conjecture and isolated stories which do not in fact correspond well to the realities of the late Dark Age. The worlds of Homer and Hesiod, and (more surprisingly) the first age of western colonisation are as shadowy to Herodotus

as they were to Thucydides, who had no conception of the existence of a dark age, and failed even to distinguish clearly the migrations of that period from the western colonisation. The time span of up to two centuries emerges from both modern and ancient evidence as an empirical fact, in sharp contrast to the theories both of those who attribute to oral cultures exceptional powers of recall and those who imagine primitive memories are as short as modern American ones. If we wish to seek a special explanation of this phenomenon in the Greek world apart from its general consonance with evidence from elsewhere, we should not invoke the introduction of the art of writing. This after all occurred about a hundred years before the date in question, and shows its influence on historiography only in the generation after Herodotus, with the use of local archives and dating systems. Herodotus is effectively unaware of such systems and of their usefulness for writing more general history, as demonstrated for instance in Thucydides' account of the colonisation of Sicily (see below, p. 98). The oral tradition of *logoi* to which Herodotus claims to belong does not present the types of information which writing could have helped to preserve. It is more plausible perhaps to suggest that the information span revealed by Herodotus reflects the development of the *polis* as an institution in the period from 750 B.C. to 650 B.C.; but that would require a whole other investigation. In classical scholarship this dividing line is already referred to in the idea of a transition from *spatium mythologicum* to *spatium historicum*; but these are concepts which possess more resonance than explanatory power (see Von Leyden 1949/50: 89-104, partially reprinted in Marg 1965: 169-181).

The fact that the Greek oral traditions on which Herodotus drew seem to operate within the same chronological limits as the traditions of other societies may already require some explanation in relation to the existence of a strong oral epic tradition in early Greece, which is certainly earlier in its origins than the late dark age. It might be thought that this should create special conditions which would make early Greece a special case. This question is I think linked to another general characteristic of the traditions recorded in Herodotus which also needs to be discussed: that is that in many important respects Herodotus' information about the earlier part of his period is only quantitatively, not qualitatively, different from his information about the later part. It might be assumed that, as he approached his own day, his information would naturally get better; but though it gets more detailed, it is not really true to say that it gets better. Thus Herodotus had spent much of his youth on Samos only some sixty years after the death of Polycrates, and must have spoken to many who had known him; yet his account of the career of Polycrates is not intrinsically more or less historical than the story of Cypselus and Periander, at the limit of his knowledge.[3] And many of the characteristics of earlier parts of his history

[3] This problem is not considered in Mitchell 1975; for an analysis of Herodotus' Samian information as three separate *logoi* see Immerwahr 1957.

recur in his narrative of for instance the Ionian revolt, and even the Persian Wars themselves.[4]

It is usually claimed that the basic explanation for the comparative homogeneity of Herodotus' narrative lies in his literary personality;[5] this is partly true, though I shall argue later that his literary personality in turn is a product of the Greek oral tradition. But it is important to realise that such homogeneity is in itself a characteristic of oral traditions. As Vansina somewhat schematically presents it, oral tradition consists of a 'chain of testimonies', whose reliability is primarily affected, not by the length of the chain, but by the mode of transmission: "with regard to reliability, there is no doubt that the method of transmission is of far greater importance than the length of time a tradition has lasted" (Vansina 1973: 53). And the same mode of transmission affects the character of a story in the same way, whether it has been preserved for fifty or one hundred and fifty years.

It is this emphasis on the method of transmission in Vansina and elsewhere which seems to me most interesting in its consequences for the study of early Greek history and of Herodotus. The phrase of course refers to two separate but related areas: firstly the literary and linguistic forms in which traditions may be preserved, and secondly the social setting in which that preservation takes place.

One theoretical distinction employed by Vansina (and presupposed by Ruth Finnegan in her discussion) concerns us only because it clarifies certain absences in early Greece. It is obvious that the characteristics of verbally fixed traditions will be different from free traditions, where the exact wording varies from telling to telling; in the category of fixed texts Vansina includes poetry, other metrical texts, religious, legal and other formulae, lists, genealogies and so on. The Greeks possessed a form of linguistically fixed tradition in the heroic epic (though a tradition that was as much creative as repetitive); but this tradition was non-historical in the sense that for the early Greeks it was not located in time. The Homeric cycle concentrated on one generation with only oblique reference to its immediate forerunners and successors, and did not apparently locate them in a larger historical framework — in marked contrast for instance to Jewish tradition or most northern European heroic epic. The creators and preservers of this poetry seem indeed to have been unaware of their own chronological relationship with the age of heroes, except as a world earlier and wholly separated from their own 'age of iron'; it was not until the age of Hecataeus that such links began to be forged. There was no true historical epic in Greece and no praise poetry concerned with the contemporary world or the immediate past of the type so common in Africa;

[4] For the Ionian Revolt, see my forthcoming chapter in the new edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History* 4.

[5] This is the assumption behind most of the works cited in note 1.

the society which invented the *epinikion* for athletes had nothing similar for political figures before the fourth century. And, in contrast to for instance the Romans, other formulaically fixed traditions in religious ritual or law were non-existent or unimportant. The loss of Hecataeus' *Genealogies* makes it difficult for us to judge how many people could equal his own tour de force, or how far any class in Greece shared the genealogical interests of cultures such as Israel and Rome.[6] But there is little sign that Herodotus could draw on such information except in the special instance of kings (Sparta: VII 204; VIII 131; Macedon: VIII 139 and the eastern monarchies[7]). This comparative absence of genealogies is one of the characteristics of Greek tradition which is obviously relevant to the question of aristocratic traditions. Of other lists, the few that survived in city archives (such as the Athenian archon list) and temple shrines (the Olympic victor list, the priestesses of Hera at Argos, or the shrine of Apollo Archagetas at Sicilian Naxos from which I believe Thucydides' Sicilian foundation dates ultimately derive) all postdate the introduction of writing, and were anyway not widely disseminated until the generation after Herodotus.[8]

Herodotus' oral tradition belongs firmly in the category of free not fixed texts: except for oracles and very few references to poetry, it shows no sign of being constructed around memorised or fixed verbal formulae. There are a few possible examples of aetiological stories attached to proverbs (for instance most explicitly 'Hippocleides doesn't care', VI 127-9); and the use of proverbial sayings as part of the narrative technique of Herodotus is rightly emphasised by Mabel Lang (1984: 58-67). But in general the traditions used by Herodotus do not seem to have included those based on the proverb or collection of sayings, although these are known to have existed.[9] Here we might contrast for instance the oral tradition behind the Gospels.[10] The attention of Herodotus was perhaps focussed away from such popular story types towards what he regarded as more authoritative traditions.

[6] The widespread use by the Greeks of generation counting in order to measure time does not of course imply the existence of a genealogical interest.

[7] On the eastern monarchs see below p. 112. The second Spartan king list is of course a partial exception — how partial depends on whether one follows the manuscript text of Herodotus or emends it to reconcile it with Pausanias III 7,2.

[8] See Dionysius of Halicarnassus *On Thucydides* 5; for Thucydides' Sicilian dates see my forthcoming article, 'Thucydides and local history'. Stephanie West reminds me that the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women* is relevant to this discussion: indeed I have not discussed the poetic catalogue in general, one form of list which undoubtedly did have oral origins in early Greece, though it does not seem to have influenced Herodotus.

[9] The most striking as preserving directly historical information is the proverb 'the cavalry are away', Suidas under *chōris hippeis* X 444 Adler. The aphoristic tradition is of course well represented in pre-Socratic philosophy, and the existence of collections of aphorisms can be traced back as far as the legend of the Seven Wise Men. On oracle based traditions see below p. 105-6.

[10] See especially the work of the Form-critics, notably M. Dibelius and R. Bultmann: a brief exposition in English is in Bultmann & Kundsin 1934: 39-63.

Both Vansina and Ruth Finnegan argued that it is useful to subdivide this category of free (that is essentially prose) texts only in so far as the society itself does so: to attempt to impose such distinctions as those between true and false stories, or between myth, legend and historical narratives, is misleading, whether we want to investigate the reliability of oral traditions or their literary character. *Our* perception of the type of tradition can only impede understanding of the forces moulding it, which are the type to which it is held to belong by the society concerned, and the social purpose which its preservation and performance fulfill. Thus Vansina discusses all prose narratives under the general non-committal heading of 'tales', and treats them as basically subject to the same tendencies, while Ruth Finnegan points out that unless we know the context and spirit in which a story is told, we cannot know whether it functions in that society in ways analogous to our categories of myth, history or legend. Many societies have no obvious distinction between various types of tale; others distinguish in some way between 'heavy' material (perhaps religious myth and quasi-historical accounts) and 'light' (narrative for entertainment). There are more complex distinctions, as that of the Dogon, between 'true', 'impossible true' and 'impossible false': the same story can be regarded as falling under different categories according to the occasion on which it is told. The Kimbundu classify stories as roughly fictions, didactic, and historical narratives: the last are state secrets transmitted through headmen and elders (Finnegan 1970: 363-4). Clearly accounts which are considered particularly important to a society or a group within that society, regardless of whether they are true, are more likely to be preserved accurately. In other words the objective truth or falsehood of a tradition is of no importance in judging the accuracy of its transmission, compared with the particular category to which the story is believed to belong and such factors as the relationship between artistic principles, accuracy of preservation, the seriousness with which it is regarded, and the mode and purpose of its preservation.

What type of categories did the Greeks possess? Despite the learned discussion that has centred on the question of the move 'vom Mythos zum Logos' and the attempts made to distinguish these two concepts in early Greek thought,[11] it seems to me that the scepticism engendered by these comparative examples is still in place. Herodotus himself makes no explicit contrast between *logos*, *historiē* and *mythos*; though the words clearly have different connotations for him, he was not aware of our problems. His own interest is centred on the activity of recording *logoi*, for the results of which the (new?) word *historiē*, implying a degree of system, is also appropriate. He uses the word *logos* to refer to the whole (I 5; 95 etc.) or larger or smaller parts of his

[11] From W. Nestle's book of this title (*Vom Mythos zum Logos*, 1940) to the modern discussion of the consequences of literacy in early Greece. Excellent remarks in Hampl 1975.

work (II 38; V 36), and to individual stories within it. It is hard to resist the conclusion that he would have described himself as a *logopoios*, like Hecataeus (II 143; V 36; 125) and Aesop (II 134). From these two examples it seems likely that the connotations of *logos* can cover both fiction and factual narrative. Nor is it easy to see any very clear distinction between Herodotus' use of *logos* and his use of other concepts. *Mythos* is only used twice, and in both cases designates *logoi* which Herodotus believes to be ridiculous as well as false (II 23; 45); but this is a category which he usually seems to have ignored. It seems that the oral traditions which Herodotus reflects did not in fact make any rigid distinction between different accounts, whether of the gods, or historical events or of the world around them. This does not of course imply that Herodotus and his informants had no interest in the historical truth or falsehood of these accounts. Herodotus' own claims, the preface of Hecataeus' work and the condemnation of Thucydides I 21 all make it clear that accuracy in representing the tradition and the question of its truth were both considered to be important characteristics relevant to the new activity of describing the past. But Herodotus' own selection of *logoi* can perhaps best be understood in relation to a distinction between serious and authoritative *logoi* and frivolous ones, rather than between true and false. Herodotus aims in the first instance to record what he believes to be important or interesting among the *logoi* of various societies, rather than *logoi* which he thinks to be true or which concern particular categories of event.

Perhaps the most obvious and fundamental characteristic of oral tradition is the importance of the group which preserves it. The old romantic belief in the accuracy or at least the symbolic significance of folk memory has been replaced by the realisation that "accurate transmission is more likely if a tradition is not public property but forms the esoteric knowledge of a special group" (Vansina 1973: 31). Group memory is more accurate because it is more continuous and more cohesive than the general recollections of the past. Of course in this context the question of accuracy must be distinguished from the question of truth. We are here only entitled to assert that the group memory ensures accuracy of transmission: it does not ensure truth, for a fiction or false story is just as capable of being transmitted accurately or inaccurately as a true story.

In contrast to many other societies, ancient and modern, the Greeks do not seem to have possessed a class of professional remembrancers: once again their interest in the past was scarcely more than average. The occasional evidence of professional keepers of records, like the Pythioi at Sparta, the Kerykes perhaps at Athens, or the hereditary Cretan *poinikastai* who presumably had possessed a similar function and privileges before the introduction of 'Phoenician' writing to the city records (Jeffery & Morpurgo-Davies 1970: 118-154; compare the remarks of Evans 1982: 149f. on *mnamones* and

hieromnamones), serve only to demonstrate how limited and random such potential sources of tradition must have been. Jacoby's refutation of Wilamowitz's account of the origins of Greek and Attic historiography must stand, and the *exegetai* will never regain their former prominence (Jacoby 1949).

Herodotus recognises the presence of such a professional tradition when he meets it; and he also recognises in the same context the difference just mentioned between accuracy of transmission and truth. The Egyptians "who live in the cultivated parts practise *mnēmē* and are by far the *logiōtatoi* that I have put to the test" (II 77). But such a tradition has limitations: for he is anxious to distinguish that part of his account which is corroborated by Greek informants or depends on his own observation from that part for which he has relied on the Egyptian priests alone (II 99; 142); and the consequence of the arrival of Greeks in Egypt is that from this point "we know all subsequent events accurately (*atrekeōs*)" (II 154). The exact significance of this last assertion is not clear, but it refers to the fact that for the Saite period Herodotus could claim the *agreement* of Egyptian and Greek traditions, as well as his own *opsis* (II 147).

This limitation to Herodotus' respect for *logioi andres* should not obscure the fact that in general his work is explicitly founded on the testimony of such men. And though they do not normally constitute a professional class one of whose chief duties is the preservation of tradition, the narrative of Herodotus shows that in each case they are chosen by him because they seem likely to possess an authoritative version of the past.

It is characteristic of Herodotus, and fortunate for us, that he at least appears to represent each tradition separately: he does not seem to seek systematically to contaminate or to rationalise his sources. Instead he gives one account from each place: when variants occur, they are normally derived from different localities. In this he approaches the ideal of the modern observer, who is expected to record each tradition separately. In principle we must assume that Herodotus wishes us to believe that each account is drawn from those whom he regards as *logioi andres*. The model is impeccable, however faulty the execution.[12]

The group memory is not only longer lasting than folk tradition; it is also likely to be more limited and more liable to bias, for it reflects the interests of the group rather than those of the society as a whole. It often seems to be thought that this question in Herodotus and for early Greek tradition in general can be answered fairly simply by describing Greek oral tradition as generically 'aristocratic'. Thus for instance Moses Finley asserts:

[12] To postulate deliberate and wholescale deception (with Fehling 1971), rather than faulty execution, requires an answer to the question, who invented the model which Herodotus is thought to have abused? It implies a proto-Herodotus before Herodotus.

> In my judgment for the post-heroic period well into the fifth century, the survival of the sort of tradition I have been discussing must be credited largely to the noble families in the various communities, including royal families where they existed, and, what amounts to the same thing in a special variation, to the priests of such shrines as Delphi, Eleusis and Delos (Finley 1975: 297)

And other scholars are fond of asserting in detail that the weaknesses of Herodotus' account of particular episodes, for instance Polycrates or Cleomenes, or Solon, are due to his reliance on an often undifferentiated 'aristocratic tradition'. It seems to me on the contrary that the analysis of the structure of Herodotus' *logoi* suggests strongly that, so far from his sources being as homogeneous as this account supposes, for different cities and different areas they have markedly different characteristics and interests. And more specifically it seems to me that the importance of an aristocratic tradition for the narrative of Herodotus has been much exaggerated: with the somewhat surprising exception of Athenian history there are very few of the typical signs of an aristocratic or family tradition in Herodotus.

As Vansina says "every testimony and every tradition has a purpose and fulfils a function. It is because of this that they exist at all. For if a testimony had no purpose, and did not fulfil any function, it would be meaningless for anyone to pass it on, and no-one would pass it on" (1973: 77). It is the investigation of the purpose of the *logoi* in Herodotus which reveals the milieu or group within which each of them was preserved and repeated, and the purpose reveals itself in the process of selection and reorganisation which the *logos* has undergone. In this discussion I would prefer to avoid using words which suggest deliberate intent to mislead or deceive; this may of course be present; but often the factors which have caused a particular tradition to take on a particular shape are not reasons of self-interest or conscious political distortions, but aesthetic or moral considerations. Words like bias, *Tendenz* or prejudice have the wrong connotations; we need a more neutral word, covering both conscious and unconscious selfinterested distortion and literary or aesthetic distortion, as they operate over time within a tradition. The word I would offer is 'deformation'.

Conscious political deformation of course exists. One of the best non-aristocratic examples is the tradition of the Greeks in Egypt. A balanced account of their presence would have drawn on two sources, from the merchants at Naucratis, and from the descendants of the Greek and Carian mercenaries, whose continued presence is known from Herodotus himself (II 61: Carians at the festival of Isis slashing their faces with knives, thus proving that they are foreigners and not Egyptians), from Hellenistic evidence, and from archaeological finds of the Persian period.[13] But there is no sign that

[13] Simon Hornblower pointed out to me the significance of the Herodotus passage; other new evidence in Austin 1970: 18-19, Braun 1982: 43-8.

Herodotus met a mercenary, though he visited their deserted *stratopeda*: his information about their activities and their way of life is general and imprecise. His Greek sources for Egyptian history lay in Naucratis, and surely within a particular group in that town. Modern writers have commented on the peculiar nature of his account of Naucratis, and the way it ignores the early history of the town. One passage seems to reveal why: Herodotus describes the largest temple, the Hellenion, and lists the nine city groups who control it. He continues, "the shrine belongs to these people, and these cities are the ones who appoint the *prostatai tou emporiou*; and any other cities that lay a claim to do so, claim falsely" (II 178). The city groups thus excluded consist of the three largest and oldest trading communities of Naucratis, those of Aegina, Samos and Miletus, whose independent sanctuaries are shown by archaeological evidence to be earlier than the Hellenion and to antedate the reign of Amasis. The history of Naucratis as told by Herodotus has been shaped by the claim of one political group, that centred on the Hellenion, to control the city magistracy: it is not surprising that such a tradition records nothing before the reign of Amasis, when this group seems first to have achieved separate status in the town (see Murray 1980: 215-7).

This is a tradition of a merchant class with political pretensions; it is scarcely aristocratic in any normal sense, if what is meant by 'aristocratic tradition' is the persistence within particular important families of a set of traditions concerning members of the family. We might (as Vansina and others do) prefer to call them family traditions; but with the proviso that any such tradition which survives to impose itself on a wider public is likely to come from an important family. Such aristocratic or family traditions have particular characteristics. They concern primarily one family and its exploits; their purpose is through the justification and repetition of these exploits to enhance the present standing of the group. Their deformation tends therefore towards political apologia and exaggeration through biography; and they are essentially rationalistic, for they lack any religious or moral purpose. Unlike Finley, I think with most anthropologists that it is in fact useful to distinguish such aristocratic family traditions from a type of tradition in many ways similar, royal family traditions. For royal traditions concern the status not just of a particular family, but of an institution and often of the people as a whole. The Macedonian royal tradition of the activities of Alexander during the Persian wars and his claim not just to be philhellene but hellene in every respect, are perhaps so clearly represented in Herodotus because they concern not one family, but the Macedonian people as a whole.

The fact that the evidence for the existence of family tradition in Herodotus seems to be strongest in the case of democratic Athens may lead us to speculate on the special status of the Athenian aristocracy. The Alcmeonid tradition in Herodotus is the obvious example, because we know of a number

of episodes in which this version of events differed rightly or wrongly from that which seems to have been more generally current in Athens. Another example is perhaps the influence of Philaid tradition on the account of the career of Miltiades. And the importance of family tradition in Athens can be used to explain certain gaps in Herodotus' Athenian history. Thus the weakness of his account of the Peisistratid tyranny, in contrast to that found in Thucydides, the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* and Plutarch, is no doubt partly due to the disappearance of a Peisistratid family tradition, and to the deliberate silence of their allies the Alcmeonids on this aspect of the past. Similarly the flight of Themistocles and the disappearance from Athens of any family tradition related to him is perhaps responsible for the peculiar character of the tradition about him, from which he emerges as a culture hero of a particular type,[14] associated with many different popular rather than aristocratic traditions, the Trickster, well represented in most cultures and exemplified in Greek heroic myth by Odysseus (Evans-Pritchard 1967; Detienne & Vernant 1974).

If the importance of aristocratic tradition in Athens is clear, elsewhere it is less obvious. Spartan tradition, even in so far as it relates to the kings, seems to be unconnected with families, but rather to give an official *polis* view of the past which it would be easier to attribute to a group aware of the need for social cohesion. The presentation of the tradition about the Corinthian tyranny in Herodotus is so oblique that it would be difficult to draw any conclusions about its direct or ultimate sources; for though the story of Cypselus is a genuine orientalising myth of the exposure of the hero, of the type analysed in G. Binder's *Die Aussetzung des Königskindes* (below, p. 110), it is very probable that Delphi is responsible for the main lines of this tradition. But at least again here there is no sign of family tradition being important.

Thus alongside family tradition, the Greek mainland seems to offer a type of political tradition which lacks any family orientation, but sees the past as a succession of demonstrations of the rightness of present cultural values, in which the individual is subordinate to the ethos of the *polis*; these traditions belong to a society where the hoplite class is dominant. Though this type of memory is in some respects the antithesis of family tradition, both share the characteristics of being fundamentally rationalist and political in their orientation and showing comparatively little interest in the moral patterns of history or the relation between history and the religious world order.

It seems that many of the traditions of mainland Greece were preserved in a political milieu by certain families or classes. This type of tradition can be

[14] A different type of tradition was available to Plutarch in his life of Themistocles, drawing on local historians in Magnesia, cf. Asheri 1983: 52f.

regarded as the origin of our western style of history, with its rationalism, its emphasis on action in politics and war, and its obsessions with decision making and human causation. But one of our problems with Herodotus as 'father of history' is that, though he uses such traditions, they do not seem to explain his conception of history: they provide only material, they are not central to the way he approaches his task. That is why we so often find ourselves dissatisfied with him, because we misunderstand his aims. The mainland political tradition is in fact more relevant to Thucydides than to Herodotus.

There is another group of mainland traditions, which appears closely related to the shrine of Delphi. These traditions can initially be rcognised by their use of (and often dependence on) oracles, by their purpose in explaining monuments at Delphi, or their emphasis on Delphic intervention. The priests of Delphi were of course capable of 'political' deformation in so far as their shrine was involved in political affairs: only those oracles which turned out to be true may be permitted to be remembered, together with the explanations which validate them: we may expect some (but not too much) invention of oracles;[15] in particular the priests had to explain the ambivalent attitude of the shrine towards Persia throughout the Persian Wars, and the fact that Delphi was the only temple complex not burned by the Persians — for Apollo "has spoken all truth for the Persians" (Meiggs & Lewis 1969: no.12): naturally it was Apollo who intervened to drive the Persian invaders away from Delphi.

But beyond this the Delphic tradition is not so much political as moralising and professional. Stories have heroes, figures of importance in the benefactions to the sanctuary like the kings of Lydia; they contain strong elements of folk-tale motifs, that is motifs suitable for use in different stories which (like the formulae of the Homeric bard) provide transitions between episodes, and which point to the skills of a group of professional or semi-professional story-tellers. But more importantly the Delphic tradition seeks to impart a moral dimension to the past. Events are presented in a framework in which the hero moves from prosperity to over-confidence, and finally to a divinely sanctioned reversal of fortune. There is normally no question of sin and retribution involved, unlike some views of the nature of contemporary Attic tragedy; if a crime or an act of *hybris* is committed in the course of the rise to fortune, it is not usually emphasised as the reason for the fall. That rests in the nature of human affairs; cities and empires will rise and fall according to the whims of the gods: in the words of Artabanus,

[15] Fontenrose 1978 takes a sceptical view of all oracles which serve as a basis for moralising historical narratives; but that is often to invert the relationship between fixed text (oracle) and flexible reality: it is the event which is 'quasi-historical', not the oracle.

> You see how the god strikes with this thunderbolt the tall, and will not allow them to display themselves, while small beings do not vex him; you see how the lightning throws down always the greatest buildings and the finest trees (VII 10).

Prosperity causes the envy of the gods, regardless of the hero's moral status. Such an epic is religious or moral, not aristocratic, and fits well with the priests of a shrine which proclaimed "know yourself" and "nothing too much". It relates of course in certain respects to the hoplite political ethic revealed by traditions elsewhere (for instance at Sparta), notably in its emphasis on the dangers of excellence; but in origin and in effect it is quite different.

The important fact about this moral and aesthetic patterning is that it does not seem to be confined to accounts derived from Delphi: the whole historical tradition of East Greece as recorded in Herodotus shows similar characteristics. It seems as if there was no political tradition of the mainland type in Ionia: there are no signs of political deformation in the interests of particular groups. Instead even recent history shows heavy use of folk-tale motifs, recurrent patterns and deformation for moral ends. It is perhaps for this reason that the account of Polycrates is so unhistorical and has such similarities with the stories of the Cypselid age, despite its relative closeness to the lifetime of Herodotus. Similarly we may contrast the biography of Histiaeus in the Ionian Revolt (the only Greek example of a biography in Herodotus)[16] with the way that the great contemporary figures of the mainland, Cleisthenes, Cleomenes or Themistocles are only dimly and fragmentarily perceived.

If I am right in detecting such a fundamental difference between East Greek and mainland traditions, we are led to speculate on the causes of this difference. It might be possible to claim that the Ionian cities were socially different, more homogeneous in respect of wealth for instance. I doubt whether one factor often invoked is relevant, the alleged eastern influence on Ionian literary traditions; for such influences would certainly not seem confined to Ionia, and in fact appeared earlier and rather more strongly on the mainland, as can be seen for instance in the Cypselus legend or in the case of Hesiod; moreover the notion of eastern influences obscures the very real differences apparent in the styles and themes of the various eastern traditions. Further (to anticipate) there are important differences between Herodotus' eastern stories and the Greek moralising tradition which concerns us here. I would however suggest that the absence of political traditions might well be related to the destruction of political elites in the Persian Period and the Ionian Revolt.

[16] See my forthcoming chapter in *CAH* 4. This *logos* has been strangely neglected in the discussion on the origins of Greek biography from Homeyer 1962 onwards.

But that is a negative point: on the positive side I suspect that Aly was right to claim, alongside the Homeric tradition, the existence of a tradition of prose storytelling in Ionia, absent from mainland Greece except Delphi (see esp. Aly 1969: 208ff.). For the moralising concerns of so many Ionian *logoi* seem to be related to Herodotus' own conception of history and to his narrative techniques. The general pattern of his work indeed mirrors the pattern visible in many of the Delphic and East Greek traditions; it also uses many of the techniques of the professional storytellers. It is a moral story of Persian pride, symbolised in the arrogance of Xerxes and humbled by the Greeks: the gods punish those who pass beyond the limits of human propriety. The main story of the Persian War abounds in devices like dreams, portents, forewarnings. Xerxes is deliberately drawn into the conflict by false dreams; the figure of the wise adviser disregarded (Demaratus, Artabanus) is central to the creation of suspense and foreboding in such a type of storytelling where the pattern is already known (Bischoff 1932).

This overall pattern to the story of the Persian Wars is Herodotus' own creation. It does not derive from attitudes in mainland Greece to the meaning of the past; we can sometimes detect the tensions as the protagonists of the war, Corinth, Sparta, Athens, see it in narrower *polis* and political terms of city honour. This pattern did not therefore come to Herodotus from his material. But to one brought up in the traditions of storytelling in Ionia it was the obvious way to present the Great Event. It is in fact this moralising East Greek tradition which created Herodotus as an historian, and which moulded his attitudes towards the patterns in history, the narrative techniques of his art, and the roles of creativity, accuracy and invention. For we must recognise that ultimately truth in Herodotus is a question of aesthetics and morality, as much as of fact.

We may, if we wish, go further, and suggest that behind the preservation of the past in Ionia, and therefore behind the invention of history, there lies a moralising tradition of storytelling such as we find in Delphi. Just as the Homeric epic is the creation of an oral tradition of professional Homeric bards revealed and transcended by the greatest of them all, and thereby preserved in writing only in its final stage (genius and the need to preserve together destroying the oral tradition), so Herodotus too perhaps is the heir to a tradition of *logopoioi*, storytellers, who transcended his forerunners by moulding into a unity the traditional tales of his art, and ensured its disappearance by collecting and writing them down in relation to a new and greater theme — the last and greatest of the *logopoioi* by virtue of being a *logographos*. The parallel with Homer is merely a restatement of Herodotus' own perceptions; for Herodotus was well aware that in his Histories he was following the example of Homer, in recording a Great War and singing of a new generation of heroes (on Homer and Herodotus, see esp. Norden 1909:

40; Jacoby 1913: 502-4; Aly 1969: 263-77; Huber 1965: 29-52). Truth is subordinate to this aim of history.

II

Twenty years ago Arnaldo Momigliano considered the impact of the Persian Empire on Jewish and Greek historical writing in a famous paper which also offers the best starting point for a discussion of the sources available to Herodotus for his account of Persian history (Momigliano 1965; see also *RTP*: 491-506; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1985). Within the general framework of a heightened national selfconsciousness among both Jews and Greeks as a result of their contacts with the Persian Empire, he noted three main areas of possible eastern influence on Greek historiography: there were obvious signs of "elements of eastern and particularly Persian storytelling"; oriental or Graeco-oriental biographical tales (like those of Zopyrus and Democedes) might have affected the development of a Greek tradition of writing biographical accounts of politicians; finally, although Jewish historians were clearly influenced by Persian governmental practice in their use of documents, the possible extent and limitations of Greek use of such documents were still obscure. How far has the picture changed in the meantime, and in what directions is further research likely to prove fruitful?

The earlier analysis of Greek traditions will have made some points clear. Firstly the investigation should not start from the historical reliability of the traditions available to Herodotus, let alone from truth or falsehood of single statements or episodes: these are secondary questions, which can only be considered after the types of tradition have been established. This is of course a fundamental principle of all forms of source criticism, not one peculiar to oral traditions, though it tends to be forgotten more often in the oral context. Secondly, on the model proposed above, we should think especially in terms of the preservation of tradition and of channels of information: what types of *logioi andres* were available and recognisable to the more or less conscientious Greek enquirer?

I begin with a negative proposition: it is important to remember what was not available to or not used by Herodotus. There is no sign that Herodotus had access to a priestly tradition, oral or written. It is not possible to analyse the Persian *logoi* in the way that has become accepted for his account of Egypt (see most systematically Lloyd 1975, esp. *Introduction*); Herodotus' lack of understanding of Persian religion and superficial account of the Magi are enough to demonstrate that he had no direct contact with a Persian priestly class who may well have possessed an oral tradition of some interest.[17] One type of tradition is thus ruled out for Persia as for Mesopotamia.

[17] See most explicitly the claim of Strabo about the Magi, XV 3,18. If such a tradition existed, it

The question of Mesopotamian traditions raises a wider question about Herodotus' contacts: the most important groups of *logioi andres* in the Near East belonged essentially to a literate culture, some at least of whose main literary forms are known to us through written records. One of the most obvious characteristics of Herodotus' accounts of eastern societies is that they show no sign of any influence from the known literary or historical genres preserved in writing, such as royal inscriptions, priestly chronicles, law codes or sacred texts: in this he contrasts very strongly with the Jewish historical tradition both before and after the exile. This suggests, not only that Herodotus' historical methods and literary techniques are independent of eastern written traditions, but also that he did not even have extensive access to the guardians of those traditions as oral witnesses; for their modes of thought would surely have been marked by the influence of their status and their skills as a literate caste. Herodotus' accounts of eastern events are not patterned in the same way as his account of Egyptian history, by the influence (however mediated) of a priesthood whose skills as storytellers reflect their activities as guardians of a written tradition.

We must admit one significant exception. There is no doubt that documentary models lie behind three of the most famous Persian passages in Herodotus, the satrapy list (III 89-97), the description of the Persian royal road (V 52-3), and the Persian army and navy lists (VII 61-98). That is not of course to say that these passages rest on documents: the notion of an army list left behind in the Persian camp after the battle of (say) Plataea is even less plausible than the theory that Herodotus lifted this or that entire passage from Hecataeus of Miletus. These are not documents either in our modern sense or even in the contemporary Jewish sense. They are lists created under the influence of documentary models. Literacy, as Jack Goody (1977 esp. ch. 4 and 5) has demonstrated encourages certain mental forms, the most common of which, the table and the list, belong especially to bureaucratic practices.[18] In the case of the two main passages of Herodotus, the problems involved in detailed analysis of the information, and the uncertainty about a possible date or function for the alleged underlying 'documents' suggest that we should emphasise the aspects of orality and written model. But however that may be, clearly involved in their transmission or their creation is a documentary mentality which is not usual to Herodotus. It is this phenomenon of documen-

could of course have influenced indirectly Herodotus' *logoi*: for this possibility see esp. Helm 1981. I am not, however, clear, when Helm talks of 'Iranian popular saga' and 'independent heroic sagas' as a source for Median and Persian history, whether he is seeking to revive the theory of A. Christensen of the existence of fixed texts in the form of heroic poetry, or whether he is merely postulating free prose tales.

[18] Armayor 1978 criticises the passages as if they were documents, and inevitably finds them unsatisfactory; better Briant *RTP*: 495-500.

tary orality which attracts me to the hypothesis of David Lewis, that one source for Herodotus' information on Persia was the Greek element in the Persian imperial bureaucracy (Lewis 1985: 101-17 and this volume p. 79). Belonging to at least the fringes of a highly specialised literate culture, their organisation of material would naturally follow the scribal mental forms of the table and the list: asked for information, they would reply, not with a *logos*, but with an ordered 'documentary form'. To consider Momigliano's comparison, this is one step short of the Jewish historian's practice of actually quoting 'documents', since in that case the historian himself takes on elements from the scribal culture, but it can involve much the same potential danger of misleading us by suggesting the existence of an independent document behind what is in fact a form more or less consciously created or manipulated by the historian; yet both traditions rest on an acceptance of scribal practice and the scribal mentality. The attractions of this hypothesis as a way forward are obvious: it enables us to relate our two main bodies of evidence, the Persian documentary archives, both those surviving at Persepolis and those to be supposed elsewhere, and the Greek literary tradition; and it postulates a type of tradition which is likely to possess a relatively high level of detailed factual accuracy.

This hypothesis serves to highlight a quite different type of patterning in Herodotus' Persian account, which, if it is related to less reliable types of information, is nevertheless more dominant. The main Persian narrative of Herodotus is organised in two great blocks. The first gives a description of the fall of the Median Empire and the rise of Cyrus, centred on the figure of Harpagus the Mede (I 73-4, 95-130). The account uses a number of stories of different origins, most notably the narrative of the birth and upbringing of Cyrus, which is a Mesopotamian foundation legend going back to Sumerian times, adapted to become part of the official Achaemenid dynastic myth.[19] But despite its use of disparate elements, the narrative possesses a unity and a number of recurrent explanatory motifs (such as the eating of human flesh, I 73; 119),[20] which suggest a single non-Greek reworking of more varied traditions; and, given the Median slant to the story, it is likely enough that its basic form represents a Median aristocratic version of events. The further theory that it came to Herodotus from the family tradition of Harpagus himself is less likely, given the way he is characterised (if only in a speech) at the end of the story, as "at once the silliest and the most unjust of men: the

[19] We are fortunate in knowing something about both myth and ritual: see A. Alföldi 1951; Binder 1964 with my review 1967. Drews 1974 has some interesting observations on the version of the Cyrus legend derived from Ctesias, which suggest that it is closer to the Sargon story, and therefore perhaps a 'Mesopotamian' version rather than a Persian one.

[20] Not in itself of course unknown to the Greeks, but treated by them rather differently; compare Thyestes. For this theme see Burkert 1972; Detienne 1977: ch. 3. In connection with p. 114, I note that the motif is transferred to Lydia by Xanthus *FGrH* 765 F18.

silliest, if when it was in his power to put the crown on his own head... he had placed it on the head of another; the most unjust, if on account of that supper he had brought slavery on the Medes" (I 129).[21]

The second great block of Persian narrative describes the episode of the Magian usurpation and the revolution by which Darius came to power, again from a distinctive viewpoint (III 30; 61-88). The official version of these events was of course at least potentially widely available in the Persian Empire, since Darius had ordered it to be circulated and published in the various languages of the Empire (DB IV §§60-1 and 70, see Kent 1953: 131-2), though it may be doubted whether these would have included Greek. But while Herodotus' account corresponds closely with this version, it is not derived from it: it is rather a telling or retelling of the alleged events from the point of view of the small group of Persian conspirators who included Darius not as a leader but merely as one of their number. Here the combination of a close relationship to the official royal version promulgated by Darius with the non-royal viewpoint makes it very likely that we are dealing with an account derived from oral tradition within one of the great families involved; and J. Wells long ago identified the most likely source for this, as for the account of the siege of Babylon (III 153-60), in the family traditions of Zopyrus, great-grandson of the conspirator, who deserted to Athens in the lifetime of Herodotus.[22]

These generally accepted conclusions establish two blocks of historical narrative, one Median, the other more strictly Persian, which are perhaps as close as we are ever likely to get to what might be called a Persian historiography. It is worth therefore considering their characteristics and limitations.

In both cases the narrative is concerned with high politics and events that shaped world history; in both cases it is closely related to an official version of those events. But despite that relationship, in both cases we are offered not the official version itself, but a variant of it, related to the interests of a more or less precisely identifiable non-royal ruling group. Thus Herodotus had access, not to an official royal version of Persian history, but to variants of it current in the high aristocracy: paradoxically it was always easier for Greeks to make contact with the ruling classes in the Persian Empire than with the imperial bureaucracy. Here then were men well qualified to stand among the normal types of Herodotus' *logioi andres*.

[21] The Median origin is generally accepted, e.g. Cook 1985: 203-4; the family tradition of Harpagus is an idea that goes back into the nineteenth century: see the refs. in Prášek 1904: 199-200. But there must have been some Greek reworking of the story. The H in Harpagos seems to refer to popular etymology and can only have been attached to the Iranian name Arbaka in Greek surroundings; cf. Schmitt 1967: 133 n.103; Mayrhofer 1973: 154' (letter from H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg).

[22] Wells 1923: 95-111. I agree with Lewis 1984b: 105f., that Zopyrus is not likely to have been a source both for this (highly tendentious and unreliable) account, *and* for the more 'documentary' elements discussed earlier.

The accounts that these groups could offer fall short of being historical in important respects. Firstly they seem to be episodic, rather than continuous or biographical.[23] We are not offered a coherent narrative or biography of any eastern king; rather Herodotus relates within a regnal framework a series of isolated but detailed stories. Secondly the narrative itself and the elements of which it is composed seem to be fundamentally oral in form: it is patterned as a succession of stories independent of each other and often without obvious connections; the resonances and repetitions give the impression of being folk-tale motifs, traditionally accepted devices to explain motivation or actions. This is what we would expect from an aristocratic society which, for all its use of a literate bureaucracy, remained functionally illiterate.

Two points may make us hesitate. First whence the regnal framework, which covers in formulaic phrases both the Median and the Persian royal houses: "having reigned three and fifty years Deioces was at his death succeeded by his son Phraortes" (I 102); "Cyrus himself fell after reigning nine and twenty years" (I 214)? But since this characteristic formula is also used by Herodotus in relation to Lydian and Egyptian kings it is scarcely possible to claim it as a sign of the influence of Mesopotamian royal chronicles; it may be borrowed from these other cultures but it is anyway independent of the main Median-Persian narrative, with which it does not entirely fit (Strassburger 1962: 688-736; Drews 1969: 1-11). Whatever its origin, it should not I think mislead us into claiming the existence of a continuous Persian account of each king, either biographical or in chronicle form.

The second question we may ask is whether it is fortuitous that both our blocks of narrative centre on a particular type of episode, the foundation of a dynasty, on origins and accessions. This at least might seem a genuine Persian trait that has had a continuing impact on world literature from Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* onwards. It looks as if the royal preoccupation with legitimacy and the validation of power had a significant effect in the process of selecting earlier Mesopotamian motifs and moulding the oral traditions of Persia, by providing a narrative framework which came to dominate them. Again this scarcely suggests that there existed any specifically Persian form of royal chronicle: the references that we have to such chronicles surely refer to non-Persian records kept in one or more of the languages of the imperial bureaucracy, in "the usual impersonal style of eastern annalistic writing" (Momigliano 1977: 28).

By comparison with Greek and other oral traditions we can say that these Persian traditions are not as clearly aristocratic as one might expect, given that they were preserved in an aristocratic milieu. The account of Darius' accession,

[23] It is for this reason that I do not discuss the question of biography raised by Momigliano (above p. 108).

it is true, shows a typical interest in the rights and privileges of a particular group of families (III 84); but in general the stories are marked by recourse to the folk-tale motifs and repetitive use of stock situations that is more often thought characteristic of popular traditions. It should not perhaps surprise us if the Persian aristocracy is seen to submerge itself here as elsewhere in the existing cultural forms of the Empire; but Karl Reinhardt was surely right to recognise differences between the general traditions of the Greek *logos* and eastern story-telling. These Persian stories lack the moral or religious dimension of their Greek counterparts; in Reinhardt's formulation, the Persian *Novelle* is a pure form, "a story capable of being told as a unity with beginning and end, without regard to how perfectly or imperfectly it corresponds to an alleged 'historical' reality which may lie behind it" (Reinhardt 1960: 138).[24]

In terms of content the Persian stories in Herodotus are also composed of typical elements, and deal in stock situations absent or rare in his Greek stories. They are court-novels, of palace-plots, of cruel punishments and even crueller vengeance, of faithful viziers and treachery, of harem intrigue and bedroom scenes, where women have equal power with men to decide history. This is particularly obvious in the two blocks of narrative under discussion, where we see two great historical events of different nature, the rise of Persia and the usurpation of Darius, retold within the framework of the *Palastgeschichte*; in each case we know that these same events could be and were described differently, even within the Persian tradition — as instances of divine protection of the king and the triumph of righteousness. Instead the account of Cyrus' divinely ordained rise to power is transformed by being subordinated to a story of revenge and the faithless vizier; while the accession of Darius by the favour of Ahuramazda is played out in the bedchamber and the harem.

We should not ignore the importance of this interpretation of Persian history; it may derive many of its elements from popular sources; but, if it represents the considered response of the Persian aristocracy to their world, it can hardly fail to have reinforced the style of court life which it purported to describe. What is of course significant about this tradition is that it is identical with that which must lie behind the narratives of those later Greek historians who may be thought to have had direct knowledge of Persia, notably Ctesias and (to a lesser extent) Xenophon. It could well be argued that the history of Ctesias with all its unsatisfactory elements, its lack of chronological framework and arbitrary reinterpretations of events "breathing seraglio and eunuch perfumes, mixed with the foul stench of blood" (Eduard Meyer), is in fact truly Persian history — not the invention of a Greek doctor, but an account of

[24] Compare the remarks of Trenkner 1958: 24f. on the moral seriousness of Herodotus' *Novellen* in contrast to those of other writers.

Persian court life as the Persian aristocracy saw it. The absence of a Persian history is after all a Persian failure, not a Greek one. But I am not yet proposing the rehabilitation of Ctesias as the leading exponent of a lost Persian historiography;[25] I am however happy to welcome studies that take seriously as oral tradition the oriental *Novelle* in both its Greek and its Jewish dress: it may not be reducible to our sort of history, but it is a genuine expression of Persian traditions about the past (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980).

It does not worry me, as it did not worry Reinhardt, that one of the most striking examples of the type of patterning that we have been interpreting is provided by the story of Gyges, king of Lydia, in its Herodotean version (I 7-12). The Greek perception of Persia was derivative on the Greek perception of Lydia. It was Lydian culture and the Mermnad dynasty which gave the Greeks their model of an eastern society and of oriental despotism. Equally we know that there existed in Asia Minor of the fifth century a unified Lydian-Persian aristocratic culture, whose traditions must have fused together, allowing attitudes to Persian monarchy to be transferred to the Lydian monarchy. The Gyges story is in any event an exception within the Lydian *logos*: the various stories connected with Croesus are quite different in character and clearly Greek in origin. It was not until Xanthus of Lydia that Lydian history became fully assimilated to the Persian model.[26]

More problematic is the difficulty referred to by Momigliano in his ironical remark, "even a scholar with as fine an ear as K. Reinhardt was hardly able to distinguish between authentic Persian tales and tales attributed to the Persians by Greeks" (Momigliano 1975: 131). It is of course true that the eastern court-novel has sufficient similarities with story-types in the Greek tradition for it to be easy for the Greeks to take over and even create court-novels in their own style. It has always been hard to refute those who follow the simple way out of refusing to make generic distinctions and claiming that all story-types are the same, just as it is hard to refute those who attribute nothing to Herodotus' power of observation and everything to his imagination. In replying to the sceptics we must proceed on various levels. Firstly we must try to delineate carefully the general characteristics which seem to differentiate stories told in an eastern context from those told in a Greek context in the spirit of Reinhardt. Secondly we can point to detailed evidence which implies a basic Persian narrative; we are lucky that it is possible to demonstrate this for both our main Persian stories in Herodotus, in respect of general story line and also in many significant details which lie behind attempts at Greek rationalisation;

[25] Such a rehabilitation is already under way among Iranists and Assyriologists: see König 1972; Nagel 1982. But see Jacoby 1922; Momigliano 1969; Drews 1973.

[26] This tendency is abundantly clear from the fragments of Xanthus, *FGrH* 765; cf. n.20 above. He also wrote *Magika* on Persia, F31-2. An up-to-date bibliography on the Lydian *logos* of Herodotus in Talamo 1985.

to take one example, the story of Darius' mare (III 84-7) attests a practice of horse-divination non-existent in Greece, but still practised in Persia as late as the Sassanian period (Agathias 4,25; references to modern discussions in Dandamayev 1976: 166 n.714).

Finally we should be willing to admit cross-cultural influences. We have seen the fusion of Lydian and Persian kingship; orientalism is at least as old as the fifth century (Said 1985: 56; this is of course a main theme of Momigliano 1975, ch. 6). By then, as Alföldi (1955: 15-55) saw, the oriental monarch and the Greek tyrant had also fused in popular imagination, and Reinhardt was happy to show how the Persian Wars narrative of Herodotus itself combined elements of the Persian court-novel with Greek story-telling to construct a plausible Persian version of events, which must surely rest on Herodotus' own historical imagination. But no-one should be afraid of imagination in history*.

**Additional note:* It will be obvious that this paper was completed before the publication of Jan Vansina's *Oral Tradition as History* (London 1985). This new work raises a whole range of new questions which need discussion in relation to Herodotus; but I believe such discussion will deepen the analysis, rather than altering the structure that I have proposed. It is also worth saying that I hope the study of Vansina's earlier elegant simplicities will not be wholly superceded by these more mature reflections; for they had the advantage of forcing us to address the methodological problems more directly.

THE FIFTH ORIENTAL MONARCHY AND HELLENOCENTRISM:

CYROPAEDIA VIII VIII AND ITS INFLUENCE.

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"...for Orientals [they were] farsighted". The quotation is from Henry Rawlinson's *Fifth Oriental Monarchy* (London 1871: 166) and the Orientals in question are the Persians of the Achaemenid period. They are first and foremost Orientals and as such differ only in minor details from both ancient and modern Orientals. No elaborate explanations are given of what Orientals might be, it is clearly implied that everybody more or less knows what is meant by the term. It does indeed evoke a mysterious world, full of sweet perfumes, enchanting sounds, a world of sultans and harem-ladies, of intrigues and plots, of heavy jewelry, fine materials and sophisticated food: the world of Sheherazade and 1001 nights. A world living both by night and day in closed-off interiors, and turned away from light, clarity and lucidity. This Orient is thus full of secrets and magic, it lacks rationality and openness. It is essentially a sensual and feminine world, in clear contrast to our own culture where rational thinking and acting, fairness and honesty are central values. This complex of connotations of the word Orient can easily be extended. It says, however, probably less about the world it pretends to describe than it reveals about our own culture. "The Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience" says Said in the introduction to his monograph *Orientalism* (1978: 1f.). The concept of the Orient is the end result of a long process of ethnocentric thinking in which one's own culture is regarded as the norm and everything outside it as deviating from or complementary to it. The Orient is for Europe "one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other" (Said 1978: 1). The Orient seen as a mainly weak world with predominantly feminine characteristics is a creation of the male western world. Important values of western culture, the virtues — or *virtutes* — are strength, force and virility. In polar opposition to this there is the Orient, irrational instead of rational, weak instead of forceful, sensual instead of controlled.

All this imagery is used to describe one's own culture not in its own terms but by indicating the contrast with the world outside it: "European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self" (Said 1978: 3). The stereotype, of course, presents some resemblence to the reality it purports to depict: there were large harems, immense wealth and the leisurely enjoyment of it. The

perfumes, the music and the colours could enchant a Western observer and lure him with its magic. But these characteristics are, and that is the most important point, neither general, nor eternal. The labelling of the Orient as a world full of mysteries prevents an analysis of the real relations and interactions within those societies. It does, however, define our perceptions of it and since it is most common to see what one is taught to see, it expands to take on a virtually permanent existence. It is not so much the Orient that has eternally similar characteristics, it is rather the Western vision of it that remains the same and hardly ever changes in important respects.

The Persian empire is often dealt with as an Oriental Monarchy: a state and society ruled less by rational actions than by the whims and caprices of its king and court. The use of a concept such as 'Orient' has a number of disadvantages that profoundly affect research: the associations and connotations attached to it influence the analysis of the relevant data. It results in pronouncing a value-judgment before the investigation has taken place and thus mystifies more than it clarifies. It is therefore important to have a closer look at how this concept has developed throughout the historiography on the Persian empire. This constitutes an especially interesting case as there is hardly another example to be found where such a Europe-centered perception can be followed for a period of more than 2500 years. It is, in fact, even older than historiography. The concept Orient as applied to Persia is to be traced back directly to the Greek sources on Persian history. The first example quoted by Said (1978: 56) comes from Aeschylus' *Persae*, some forty years before Herodotus wrote his *Histories*. It is precisely the use of these Greek sources that results in a continued application of the concept in modern scholarship, implicitly as well as *expressis verbis*. In Greek fifth-, but still more in fourth-century, literature we find the earliest instances where Persia is depicted as the exact opposite of the Greek world. It is obvious that for a history of the Achaemenid period the Greek evidence cannot be discarded: the result would be a history without backbone. But that very fact makes it even more crucial to see how the Greek *perception* of the Persians was formed and how it still affects even the most recent literature. Strangely enough the sources that are usually regarded as of inferior quality (e.g. Ctesias and Xenophon) seem to have exerted an influence that far exceeds their historiographical merits.

In this paper I shall argue that the Persia described by Xenophon[1] in the last chapters of his *Cyropaedia*, apparently the Persia of his own time, is more a literary product than the fruit of unprejudiced observations and that therefore its influence upon modern research is unwarranted. The discussion about the use of the *Cyropaedia* as a source has recently been revived.[2]

[1] Or by an anonymous Greek commentator, cf. below. 120.

[2] For the most recent discussion see Hirsch 1985: 61ff.. Breitenbach 1966: 1742; Anderson

Although scepticism on the historiographical character of the work is generally prevalent, it is nevertheless often used to recreate the atmosphere of the Persian world on the assumption that Xenophon should know. "Xenophon, as a high officer of that remarkable Ten Thousand who fought their way to Hellas from the heart of the Persian Empire, had firsthand acquaintance with the competence of the Persian official class. He accused them of debauchery, cowardice, and physical weakness." (Eddy 1961: 5). The argument that an *autoptes* should be knowledgeable for the very reason that he has been on the spot is an intrinsically weak one as I have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1987). Without entering here on a discussion of the eventual merits of the *Cyropaedia* and the information it might contain about Persian history, it should be said that neither *a priori* rejections of Xenophon's longest work (cf. Cook 1983: 21) nor indiscriminate use of the 'facts' it supplies is very helpful. Only a full analysis of the whole work can indicate to what extent the *Cyropaedia* contains authentic Iranian information and to what extent it is affected by Greek elaboration and the function it was intended to fulfil as a literary work produced for a Greek readership. Such a complete analysis of the whole work obviously goes beyond the limits of this paper. The present discussion, however, should also be seen as part of a more detailed investigation of the *Cyropaedia* as a whole.

It can also be shown that the Greek historiography of the first period, i.e. Herodotus, is much less responsible for depicting the Persian world as an Oriental one. On the contrary, much of what has been neutrally stated by Herodotus is often interpreted in modern historiography in the light of what later Greek authors on Persia say or suggest.[3] Xenophon and Ctesias, although generally considered to be less perspicacious historians, have exerted an influence in this respect that is quite out of proportion with their qualities.[4] This will be demonstrated by a few examples from 19th and 20th century modern historiography in which the main features that transform the described Persians into Orientals are taken over from precisely these sources.

The last chapter of the Cyropaedia

The description of Cyrus' life in the *Cyropaedia* constitutes an ideal and obviously idealised picture of archaic Persia. This favourable impression is

1974: 152 n.1; Higgins 1977: 158 n.70; Nickel 1979: 57; 89 (following Delebecque 1957: 405ff.) have accepted its authorship by Xenophon.

[3] This can be demonstrated clearly for the case of Cyrus, cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1985: 464f. and for Xerxes, cf. Kuhrt & SherwinWhite, this volume.

[4] Again the case of Cyrus is highly instructive in this respect: the Cyrus in much early modern European historiography is the Cyrus of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and the Kores of Deutero-Isaiah, cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980b. For a reappraisal of Cyrus and a restoration of the perspective, see Kuhrt (1983: 83ff.) and Van der Spek (1983: 26).

totally offset by the last chapter (VIII viii) in which a grim verdict is given on contemporary Perian customs and institutions. It has often been doubted whether the last chapter was from the same hand as the rest of the work. W. Miller, in the Loeb edition of the *Cyropaedia* dismisses it as "a bit of historical criticism in a review accompanying the book reviewed" and would have left it out if it were not for the fact that it was included in all the manuscripts and traditions (1914 (II): 438-9). This last addition, according to Miller, spoils the unity of Xenophon's work. Even if it is indeed a later addition, the chapter cannot have been appended to the book much later than Xenophon's own time. On stylistic grounds it has to be dated approximately to the fourth century B.C. (Breitenbach 1966: 1741-42). One may therefore indeed question whether it represents Xenophon's ideas on the Persia of his own time, but it cannot be denied that it reflects contemporary Greek attitudes towards the Achaemenid empire in the fourth century. Recently it has been argued by Hirsch, and on good grounds, that authorship by Xenophon of *Cyropaedia* VIII viii is unlikely.[5] For our present discussion it does not make much difference if Xenophon himself, or merely one of his contemporaries, wrote the epilogue to the *Cyropaedia.* Until the 19th century the last chapters were always seen as an integral part of the work and even after doubt had been cast upon the authenticity of Xenophon's authorship of it, it still continued to be regarded as a contemporary, and therefore in the main reliable, source. Especially the pattern of decline of the Persian Empire that nowhere else in Greek literature is so coherently depicted, has been accepted and taken over by most modern literature on the subject (Frye 1984: 128, 130; Cook 1983: 218 to quote only the most recent examples, cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1987). The impression of disintegration and deterioration in Persian society, Persians "yielding to their national inclination" (Rawlinson 1871: 169) is created by a careful arrangement of data of quite different orders of magnitude and of varying nature.

It is therefore the structure of this chapter and the *reliability of the picture as a whole* that have to be examined here. I will argue that, even if some of

[5] Against Delebecque (1957: 405-8) who saw no problems in the inconsistencies between the concluding chapters and the main part of the work and based much of his argument on the analogy between *The Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* which ends with a negative judgment of contemporary affairs as well. Hirsch points out that in the Cyropaedia itself Xenophon announces a number of times that certain conditions obtain even in his own time (*eti kai nun*). Some of these announcements are "flagrantly contradicted" by the contents of the epilogue. Hirsch's arguments against Delebecque on the question of style are less convincing. Even if it is true that the tone of the epilogue is sarcastic and undignified (Hirsch 1985: 94) there is no way of proving that such a tone is beyond Xenophon or that this presumably dignified author could not have, for once, indulged in a somewhat vehement harangue. The whole argument obviously needs more research and stylometric comparisons between the last chapter and the rest of the work might be one way (cf. Hirsch 1985: 181 n.105): even if it does not settle the problem, it would help to avoid discussions based on impressions of Xenophon's character.

the facts mentioned in *Cyropaedia* VIII viii are confirmed by other sources including sometimes Persian evidence, the texture of the chapter, the framework into which the data has been inserted, seriously affects the trustworthiness of the description as a whole and the evaluation of the current situation in Persia contained in it. The structure of chapter VIII viii is as follows: in most of the paragraphs an initial statement about earlier good conditions or previously honoured institutions is counterbalanced by remarks on the present situation. While most of the mentions about the past clearly refer to a *prescriptive* code of behaviour, and thus not to an actual historical situation, similarly the comments on the contemporary situation are often generalizations of incidental cases or evaluations of Persian behaviour against Greek parameters. Although the epilogue to the *Cyropaedia* undeniably contains reliable historical information, it says more about the Greek vision of, than the situation prevailing in, the Achaemenid empire in the fourth century.

The epilogue opens with a glorifying statement on Cyrus' capabilities (VIII viii 1): he had conquered an enormous empire and kept it together by the sheer force of his personality. He was a father to his subjects who served him willingly and obediently. Throughout the Greek tradition Cyrus enjoyed this favourable reputation. From Aeschylus on, and even if Herodotus at times is slightly critical (cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1985: 465), Cyrus represented the good monarch 'par excellence': as he still does in much modern literature. Only quite recently have some doubts been cast upon the trustworthiness of this reputation as a testimony to his personal conduct and rule (Kuhrt 1983). It is a well known phenomenon that founders of empires tend to receive much praise from later generations that might not have been granted them by their contemporaries.[6] Already in fifth century Greek literature the sequence of the good Cyrus, the harsh Cambyses, the organizing Darius and the weakling Xerxes is well established. The Greek view of Cyrus, seemingly confirmed by sixth century sources from the East (the Cyrus Cylinder and Deutero-Isaiah) has usually been taken as confirmation of the benignity of his rule. It is essential, however, to remember that if the Greek view is originally based on Iranian oral traditions (cf. Hdt. I 93 and *Cyrop.* I ii 1) it is especially these oral traditions which will have had a tendency to ascribe glorious deeds to the founding father of the empire. Later on these favourable tales were used in Greek surroundings to demonstrate the moral implications of the corrupting effects of the riches brought by conquest, as one finds it clearly formulated in Plato (*Laws* 695E). In other words, the presumed state of welfare of early Persia is largely due to two factors that reinforce each other: glorifying Persian tales about the founder of the empire and Greek interpretations of Persian

[6] Cf. examples from African oral history in Miller 1980: 16 and cf. Henige 1974: 36, 68.

history that served to explain how a mighty state had not been able to conquer an, at least seemingly weaker enemy. In both types of sources through simple comparison with the present situation, the past tends to appear as golden. The opening sentence of the epilogue to the *Cyropaedia*, intended to bridge the gap between the utopian picture that preceded it and the cynical accusations that are to follow, obviously reflects more of common Greek knowledge in the fourth century than of the actual situation in Persia in the sixth century.

VIII viii 2: As soon as Cyrus died there came an end to peace and prosperity, his children started to fight each other and the conquered nations tried to revolt: *panta d'epi to cheiron etrepeto*. Problems with the succession and troubles soon after the death of Cyrus are well known from other sources (for a reference to revolts upon the accession of Cambyses see Hdt.III 88). It is not the statement in itself that is misleading but rather the moral of the story. Revolts and problematic successions are to be expected in an empire that has only recently been formed; former interest groups, former social and cultural units have not yet merged into a larger whole and consequently tend to cause friction at opportune moments, such as the death of a monarch (cf. Claessen and Skalnik 1978: 609). Fission, to use the anthropological term for this kind of dissension, does not betray a worsening of the political situation, as long as the central state is capable of preventing the constituents from regaining their former independent state. For the author of the epilogue, however, these revolts demonstrated the absence of the consent of the ruled and thus showed an undesirable development in comparison to the earlier period. Now, consent of the governed in Cyrus' reign is quite clearly a Greek illusion inspired by the flattering epithet given to Cyrus. An idealised past is here compared with a negatively perceived later situation. The same applies to the following remark (VIII viii 3): formerly the Persians used to abide by the oaths they had made while nowadays they are no longer trusted by anybody. Here again the two elements of the comparison are not equivalent. "I know (*oida*) that in earlier times... " says the author of VIII viii. How does he know? His knowledge must mostly be based on often orally transmitted tales from the past that by their very nature had acquired legendary characteristics, such as the story of Masistes' daughter, Artaynte.[7] The remark about the present situation is inspired exclusively by the treatment of the Greek commanders after Cunaxa (Xen. *Anab.* II 6,1; cf. Hirsch 1985: 24ff. for a discussion of Persian *pistis*). If the Greek generals on that occasion demonstrated such unwarranted trust in the Persian king, one can only say that they should have had a better look at their history-books: rebellion against the King had always been punished by the death-sentence and at this particular moment of the expedition no-one was unaware of the true nature of the campaign. The primary breach of truce in

[7] cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980 ch. 2 on the literary character of stories such as that of Masistes.

this case was the actual rebellion: Cyrus the Younger and his troops had engaged in what the Behistun-inscription calls *drauga*, the telling of lies, implying disloyalty and high-treason (for a discussion of the political implications of *drauga* cf. Orlin 1976: 261ff.). The mutual telling of lies by Greeks and Persians on this occasion[8] is clearly subordinate to this much more elevated aim. The case of Inarus, whose life was spared for five years, but who eventually did not escape execution (*FGrH* 688 F14,36), would have been highly instructive.

VIII viii 4 first reports the Persian custom of receiving royal reward for the performance of memorable services. The custom is not only amply demonstrated throughout Greek reports on Persia (cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980: ch. 5; Wiesehöfer 1980: 17f.) it is also clearly phrased by Darius (DNb) and Xerxes (XPl). It is obviously still in vigour in later times, as becomes clear from the two examples given here. It is suggested that in earlier times the royal rewards were normally given for noble and honourable deeds, while at the time of the author's writing only ignominious acts were honoured by the king. This is a clever piece of rhetoric: between the first part of the statement and the second one, the perspective changes. The acts of Mitridates and Reomitres undoubtedly brought advantages to the king and from his point of view were clearly meritorious. They are in that respect not dissimilar to the activities by which men like Histiaeus of Miletus or Pausanias of Sparta or Themistocles of Athens earned the king's favour and obtained the title of *euergetes* or royal *philos* (see Wiesehöfer 1980: 17). Those Greeks could be said to have performed something *kalon kai agathon* for the king, but were unlikely to be regarded in the same way by their countrymen. The impression that such an in itself highly commendable practice is now being abused is created here by contrasting a general rule, exemplified by non-specific instances, with two cases where the 'good' done to the king is counterbalanced by harm done to the families of these royal 'benefactors'. By this shift of perspective the suggestion is created that morality in Persia is in decline: rewards are no longer given for good deeds, but only for acts that however base intrinsically, are still useful (*sumpheron*) to the king. This conclusion is once more underlined by the next paragraph: since the kings have turned to injustice it is not surprising that their subjects have started behaving in the same way and the whole of Asia has more than ever before turned to lawlessness.[9]

[8] cf. Hirsch 1985: 25 "It (deceit) is clearly a vice which crosses ethnic lines".

[9] This paragraph seems to contradict Hirsch's argument that if the author of this chapter had been Xenophon himself, one might have expected that the decline of contemporary Persia would be attributed to the personal failings of the king himself (Hirsch 1985:, 94). Here it is clearly the king's bad example that is mainly responsible for the moral decline. The institution itself has not changed.

VIII viii 6-7: there is, unfortunately, no independent evidence to corroborate or deny these accusations of extortion of the rich. Not that these charges do not sound plausible: it is quite likely that royal and satrapal tax-collecting proceeded in a rough and harsh way. So did much tax-collecting in antiquity. Specific instances may well have been known in the Greek world.

VIII viii 8-14: the next six paragraphs investigate what is left of the traditional educational values of the Persians as mentioned in I ii 2-15. No one in contemporary Persia cares any more for physical strength. The Persians do not bother themselves with work in order to sweat off the superfluous moisture of their bodies; they still eat, as in former times, once a day, but their meals stretch out over the whole day, from early morning till late at night. At the end of these dinners because of excessive drinking they are carried out since they are no longer able to walk out. They still do not eat and drink on their marches, but marches have become so short that abstinence from food can hardly be a problem to anyone. Hunting is no longer practised: jealousy prevailing among courtiers would prevent anyone from demonstrating his excellence in this field. In education the incentive of competition is lacking which has led to the disappearance of physical exercise among the youth. Young Persians all too quickly notice the advantages of bribery and consequently the teaching of justice has lost its sense. Lastly, the knowledge of natural products is only employed in the practice of poisoning and the like.

In each of these cases a part of the traditional educational system is measured against existing practice and the implication is clear: the situation has considerably deteriorated. It is important to see, however, how this conclusion is reached. Are the data adduced by the author of these paragraphs really comparable? Only in that case could the conclusion be regarded as justified. There is every reason to doubt the validity of the comparisons given. Where the second parts of the given parallels may well reflect actual observations, although in a Greek perspective and probably somewhat distorted by this perception and subsequent generalization, the first parts are of an entirely different nature. We here find the elements that have been used in the first chapters of the Cyropaedia (I ii 2-15) to describe the educational system and that are moreover well known from the description of Persian customs by Herodotus (I 136) and Strabo (XV 3,18-20). Reworking of the data by Xenophon in his description of Persian education is generally admitted, although there is no consensus as to how far this reworking has influenced the historical reliability of the description (cf. Hirsch 1985: 85ff). But the passages dedicated to it by Herodotus and Strabo are commonly regarded as trustworthy sources for the Persian educational system.[10] There is no reason

[10] The dependence of (part of) Strabo on the same source as Herodotus used (in this case Hecataeus is more than a probability, cf. Lasserre 1976: 71) should be analysed more carefully. In

to deny the validity of both reports, it only should be realised that they reflect a *code of behaviour* which, according to observations by anthropologists may considerably deviate from actual conduct. It has been noted that in some instances the normal practice would only in 30 % of the cases be in agreement with the overtly stated and frequently repeated rule for what should be done. It is clear that the deviation from the official codes depends very much on the phenomena under consideration: marriage-practices in this respect are less likely to reflect the standard than for instance daily behaviour like table-manners, which does not depend so much on conscious choices and considerations of alternatives, but is the result of deeply ingrained training in youth. Moral conduct is, again, something entirely different. We all agree, as a matter of principle, that one should not lie. We also agree that there are cases where truth is not the best option and diplomacy, tact and similar requirements should prevail over telling the truth. Still a large number of lies are told without any of the accepted motives for deviating from this 'code'. Why then should the ancient Persians be taken to task for telling lies?

Another important feature in these passages is the explanation of the function of the ancient custom. In any culture there exist habits for which no rational motivation is available and similar habits may have different meanings in various societies. Making noises when eating is regarded as appreciation of the food in some cultures, as a sign of uneducated behaviour in other cultures. In all the cases of former sober behaviour listed in these paragraphs, the interpretation of the use of this custom is Greek. All rules are taken to have been intended to encourage physical strength, a paramount Greek ideal. In fact, neither Herodotus nor Strabo in their catalogues of Persian mores indicate purpose and function of these rules. In most cases the original context of the custom is lost and we can only guess as to what its function may have been. But in some cases, as e.g. hunting and the gathering of roots, it seems far more likely that a religious or ritual purpose was intended rather than mere sportive exercise and physical training. The author of the Epilogue to the *Cyropaedia* inserts these mores into his demonstration of physical deterioration amongst the Persians by giving his *own* interpretation of what these habits were intended for (*dèlon de hoti... enomisan*, VIII viii 8; *dèlon hoti nomizontes*, VIII viii 10). By this rhetorical device incongruous elements of evidence, i.e. prescriptive codes for social behaviour that are attested in earlier literature on the one hand and phenomena of — in all probability — actually witnessed practices on the other hand, are moulded into a demonstration of decline in morality. It should be remembered that there is no evidence for what life in actual practice was like among the

no way can Strabo here be regarded as an entirely independent authority and his remarks should not be used to corroborate and confirm Herodotus' description.

Persians of the time of Cyrus. There is no real way of knowing if sober living and hard work prevailed over luxurious enjoyment in those days. The palaces of Pasargadae, however, are not exactly indicators of severe austerity. The sheer fact that the most ancient Persians in Greek literature have Greek-like characteristics (such as soberness, toughness, abstinence and hard work, cf. Hdt. I 126; IX 122) should put us on our guard in using these sources as evidence for the early Persian period.

VIII viii 15: Similar things can be said for the contrast between Medes and Persians referred to in paragraph 15. The Medes were wealthy and luxurious, the Persians disciplined and austere. Indicative of this change in life-style is the Median garb: it stands for the disappearance of old-fashioned rigour and for an easy-going life. For the nearly proverbial luxury of the Medes there is no other evidence than what the Greek sources tell us. Archaeology thus far has not confirmed this picture. References in the Assyrian sources to the exchange of products with the Medes or tribute extracted from their lands indicate rather a predominantly pastoral society with trade contacts in the East through which lapis lazuli reached Mesopotamia (Briant 1984: 20f.). In fact the spectacular wealth of the Medes and its concomitant harsh despotism and moral decline forms part of the fall and rise story that also features the continuing enmity between Persians and Medes for which likewise no confirmation can be found in the Persian written documents.[11]

VIII viii 16-19 give a catalogue of Persian weaknesses and preference for a soft life. Upholstered beds, soft carpets, refined dishes, warm clothes in winter and parasols in summer make life comfortable and pleasant. Here too the implicit opposite against which these characteristics are measured is Hellenic austerity. Luxury and the ostentatious display of it creates inequality and establishes status (cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980: 174). To a Greek observer this point was obviously lost.

VIII viii 20: Generals are no longer recruited from the landed gentry but chosen from among the courtiers: cooks, bakers and cupbearers and the like are leading the Persian armies. This is an important statement that contains valuable information, if we are interested in the analysis of the development of Persian institutions. It is quite probable that the factual information contained in this paragraph is true and provides a clue to increasing bureaucracy and the formation of a large class of honorary officials in the Persian empire. The landlords who in earlier times had furnished their own armies for state purposes cannot have been anything but an ever present potential danger to the king. By giving them honorary functions and obligations at court some of these perils could be avoided. This phenomenon occurs quite normally in the

[11] The 'decline' of Media and the subsequent rise of Persia would merit a more thorough investigation of the development of this pattern in Greek historiography, cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1979: 221 n.37 and n.38.

developmental processes of states. The creation of a large court is one way to keep potential enemies in sight and under control and to forestall tendencies to independent behaviour amongst the more important members of the nobility. In case of war the King had to turn to these same high functionaries to recruit his commanders, but they were rather generals turned into honorary bakers, than bakers and the like turned into generals.

VIII viii 21- 26. In conclusion it can be said that the military potential of the Persian Empire has greatly decreased as compared to the glorious times of Cyrus. Again an imagined past is contrasted with some observations of contemporary Persia and as a result a verdict of decline is given: without Greek help the Persians would not even be able to defend their own Empire. As to the military tactics of Persian armies in the time of Cyrus no real evidence exists, unless we consider the *Cyropaedia* as such.[12] It may be sufficient here to say that ravaging the Persian country-side was not as easy as the author of the Epilogue suggests and which is, as Hirsch remarks (1985: 182 n.109), a statement that would hardly have been made by the survivor of the Anabasis. Not even for Alexander did the Persian Empire turn out to be a complete walk-over.

VIII viii 27. The scope the author has set himself is fulfilled.[13] It has been demonstrated how much contemporary Persian society is in decline. Whoever doubts the veracity of this description is incited by the author to look for himself and to examine Persian practices. The author is convinced that anyone doing this will be convinced of the truth of his statements. Here certainly the author of these paragraphs was right: for more than two millennia his opinion has gone virtually unchallenged. Unfortunately there is very little evidence that any modern investigator of the situation obtaining in fourth-century Persia can use in order to reach an independent conclusion. The only way in which we can arrive at less biased conclusions as to the state of affairs in the Achaemenid Empire is by analysis of the range and nature of the given data and of the framework that forms the structure of this description. In the above I hope to have demonstrated that, although there are incidental pieces of factual information in the Epilogue, as a whole it is constructed out of idealising notions on former times and superficial generalisations of negatively judged behaviour of contemporary Persians. The systematic juxtaposition of

[12] As does Regourd 1974: 101-108. Hirsch 1985: 87 argues that much of Xenophon's discussions on military tactics throughout the *Cyropaedia* are based on his experience in Persian service and therefore reflect contemporary practice, interwoven with fragments of Greek military scientific thinking.

[13] This statement would be another indication that the Epilogue is not by Xenophon. The contents of the task here mentioned are given in the next phrase as: proof that contemporary Persian society is less religious, less dutiful to relatives, less just and less brave than the Persians of former times. If the epilogue were by Xenophon, one would have expected this last phrase to refer to the whole work. Formulated as it is, it only describes the contents of VIII viii.

these elements is responsible for the image of moral decline and social decomposition of fourth-century Persia that so powerfully emerges from these chapters. The implicit parameter is in all cases Greek society and Greek standards. Persia is portrayed as the negative mirror-image of Greece: a well constructed example of Orientalism. These features can be followed in modern European historiography on the Achaemenid period.

The Fifth Oriental Monarchy: Rawlinson and Cook.

'The Fifth Oriental Monarchy' is the famous title of Rawlinson's description of ancient Persia. It was first published in 1867, shortly after the publication of the decipherment of the Behistun inscription by his brother, Colonel Henry Rawlinson. The monograph on Achaemenid Persia was one in a series of five describing successively the empires of the Chaldaeans, the Assyrians, the Medes and the Babylonians. Oriental Monarchies Six and Seven, the realms of the Parthians and the Sassanians, were to be published separately. It was one of the first occasions on which, together with the well known Greek sources, evidence from Iran itself could be taken into account, not only the recently translated royal inscriptions, but archaeological evidence as well. Ample use was also made of traveller's descriptions of the Iranian landscape, flora and fauna.

Rawlinson's *Fifth Oriental Monarchy* presents an elaborate picture of the history of ancient Persia, as full as possible at the time of writing. It also displays a very serious fault that is, often less clearly, visible in many subsequent discussions of the Persian period: the new Iranian material was only used to supplement the data of the Greek sources, it was hardly ever taken on its own merits and evaluated as primary evidence. Little advantage was taken of the situation that for the first time written sources from within Iran, that could be used to correct the Greek material, had become available. At some points Rawlinson gives preference to the Iranian evidence and discards Greek information, but the story he tells remains a Greek story, a tale of rise and decline, constructed around the *characters* of individual kings. Thus it becomes easy first to fit the autochthonous data into the already existing synthesis and secondly to continue to judge the behaviour of these Persians against the moral verdicts delivered about them by their Greek 'contemporaries'. Rawlinson's work was by no means the last phase of this kind of historiography.[14]

[14] E.g. the discussions of the fact whether Darius in his Behistun inscription was 'a liar' or not (Cook 1983: 52) are only explicable in this general context. If it were not for Herodotus' famous remark on the truth-speaking of the Persians (see Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980: 222ff. for a different explanation of *aletheuein* in Hdt. I 136), the issue of Darius' personal behaviour in these circumstances would probably never have been raised. His words are the words of a king and as such should be regarded first of all on the basis of their ideological implications, not on the

The Greek sources thus dominate Rawlinson's description of the Persian Empire; the newly discovered inscriptions and archaeological evidence mostly help to fill in the gaps. Together with the factual information the Greek perceptions and biases are taken over as well. The influence of the *Cyropaedia* is clearly visible: in their earlier days the Persians had been sober living, while later on they indulged in luxury ("In respect of eating and drinking, the Persians, even of the better sort, were in the earlier times noted for their temperance and sobriety. ... But these abstemious habits were soon laid aside, and replaced by luxury and self-indulgence, when the success of their arms had put it in their power to have the full and free gratification of all their desires and propensities" Rawlinson 1871: 235f.). In a long list of virtues and vices in the national character Rawlinson repeatedly draws on the last chapters of the *Cyropaedia* and the markedly contrasting images presented by Herodotus, Strabo and Xenophon himself: "With the general advance of luxury under Xerxes and his successors ... . there were introduced into the Empire a number of customs of an effeminate and demoralising character" (Rawlinson 1871: 243); "Their furniture increased, not merely in splendour but in softness", "they would not mount a horse until he was so caparisoned that the seat on his back was softer even than their couches" etc. (*Ibid*: 243f.). The conclusion is obvious: already in antiquity the Persians were true Orientals ("A love of finesse and intrigue is congenital to Orientals; and, in the later period of their sway, the Persians appear to have yielded to this natural inclination..." (*ibid*: 169), only in minor points dissimilar to other Orientals throughout history: "The Persians seem, certainly, to have been quick and lively, keen-witted, capable of repartee, ingenious, and, for Orientals, farsighted" (*ibid*: 166). There runs a clear line through the whole chapter: in the course of their history the Persians became ever more Oriental.

It would be too simplistic to trace the whole framework on which the Fifth Oriental Monarchy is constructed to Rawlinson's use of Greek sources. Even if no date was attached to the book, it would not be hard to conclude that it must represent the age of British imperialism at the summit of its power. For Rawlinson and his contemporaries, the Oriental was a living phenomenon, a type of being that had very definite characteristics and had maintained these characteristics with only slight modifications throughout history: an immutable category against which temporarily defined variations could be measured. "For Orientals they (scil. the Persians) were...." and it is tacitly assumed that the primary feature of Orientals consists in their being *unlike* Europeans. They were not inclined to philosophy, science or literature ("we cannot justly ascribe to them any high degree of intellectual excellence" *ibid*:

implications of the veracity of the contents for what it says about the character of the king (cf. Diakonoff 1970 for the ideological bias behind these discussions of Darius' honesty).

166; "A want of seriousness, a want of reality, and, again, a want of depth, characterize the poetry of Iran, whose bards do not touch the chords which rouse what is noblest and highest in our nature" *ibid.*: 167; "Of intellectual education they had but little" *ibid.*: 239); they did not show moderation and soberness (cf. examples given above). This type of 'Oriental' is not confined to Persia. Its occurrence in various descriptions of other parts of the 'Oriental' world has been demonstrated with an abundance of examples by E. Said, who shows clearly that Rawlinson's use of this concept is not in itself due to the use of Greek historiographical sources. It is rather a case where two tendencies, the undefined but implicit 'Orientalism' of the fourth century Greek literature and the prevalent mental attitudes of Europe-centrism in the 19th century mutually reinforce each other.

One may rightly ask if it still makes sense to criticise Rawlinson's methods as, except for antiquarian reasons, the book is hardly used anymore for scholarly purposes. Still, its influence seems to have outlived the usefulness of its results. The Orientals that appear everywhere on Rawlinson's pages still haunt one of the most recent monographs on Achaemenid Persia: Cook's *The Persian Empire* (London 1983). Cook seems to do so on purpose. In his epilogue he concludes that our indebtedness to the Greek sources for most of our information on the Achaemenid period has the disadvantage that the Greeks judged the Persians by comparison with themselves " and historians in modern times have tended to follow them, with the result that too little attention has been paid to comparisons with other oriental empires which have faced similar problems through the ages" (Cook 1983: 231). This last phrase seems to suggest that there is an immutable strain in Iranian history. This then, can only be caused by the problems deriving from the one unchanging feature in the past 2500 years: the geographical background and the ecological conditions. Even in this attempt to stand back from the Greek sources Cook, apparently unaware of what he is suggesting, echoes statements first made in the Greek world: Asia produces Asiatic characteristics and Europe brings forth a European character (Hippocr. *On Airs, Waters, Places* 16). Intellect apparently breeds better on European soil: "they (the Persians) were not a people that we should call intellectual. They do not themselves seem to have had an inclination towards literature, medicine, or philosophical and scientific speculation" (Cook 1983: 230). There is a remarkable similarity to the statements by Rawlinson (see above 129-30)[15] and both reflect a preoccupation with national characteristics that was current in 19th century historiography but is inadequate and outdated in the later part of the 20th century.

[15] There is also a surprising similarity between the descriptions of the characters of various kings in Rawlinson's work and in Cook's monograph, cf. e.g. Darius: Rawlinson 1871: 445, Cook 1983: 75.

It is a tragic story: for Rawlinson as for Cook as for the probably nameless author of the epilogue to the *Cyropaedia* the Orient and the Orientals already existed: the outlines were given and needed merely to be filled in by facts. It is not so much the facts that distort historical reality as the outlines into which they are fitted. The frequently repeated statement as to the bias of the Greek sources should therefore not be followed by an attempt to check the Greek information against Iranian evidence that is so often deficient, but by an analysis of the literary and intellectual mould into which these data were inserted. This seems the only way to dehellenise and decolonialise Persian history.

THE TREATY OF BOIOTIOS

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Seven years ago D.M. Lewis argued that the Spartan-Persian treaty of summer 411 (Thuc. VIII 58), which declared that all the King's land in Asia belonged to the King, rapidly became a dead letter and that a new agreement was negotiated in 408/7 by Boiotios and his colleagues (Xen. *Hell.* I 4,2) under which Darius granted autonomy to the Greek cities of Asia Minor while demanding that they pay tribute to Persia. Alongside this international treaty Lewis also postulated an independent arrangement by which Darius made over the Greeks' tribute to Cyrus as a personal income, something akin (on a larger scale) to Artaxerxes' grants of revenue from Asiatic cities to Themistocles. After the temporary disgrace of Cyrus in 404 the tribute was given to Tissaphernes instead; and it was Tissaphernes' attempt to recover this personal income which provoked Spartan military operations in Asia Minor in the 390s (Lewis 1977: 119f.). This view has been welcomed in some quarters (Hornblower 1982: 34; Bigwood 1978: 344; Lotze 1980: 178) and doubted in others (Woodhead 1979: 444; Seager 1980: 144; Cartledge 1979: 266; Westlake 1979: 195), and a substantial reconsideration of the argument seems in order. Lewis' thesis depends on evidence from three successive periods, 407-404, 404-400 and 400-395, and I propose to deal with each of these in turn.

I. 407-404: i.e. the period from Cyrus' first arrival in W. Asia Minor until his departure for Media in 405 and beyond that until the end of the Peloponnesian War.

I.A. Xenophon and Cyrus' phoroi.

I.A.1 In 407 Cyrus promised Lysander money from three sources (to be used successively) (Xen. *Hell.* I 5,3): 500 talents brought specially for the war; his *idia* given him by his father; the gold and silver of his throne. In 405 he reported that the 'money from the king' was spent but that he had other ready cash, some of which he handed over (*ibid.* II 1,11); and subsequently he gave Lysander the remnants of this ready cash (*ta peritta chrēmata*) and granted him "all the *phoroi* from the cities which (i.e the *phoroi*) were his personally (*idioi*)" (*ibid.* II 1,14). By the end of summer 404 (over a year later) Lysander had 470 talents left from "the *phoroi* which Cyrus granted him for the war (*ibid.* II 3,8).

I.A.2. There is a clear distinction here between the 500 talents from the King and Cyrus' *idia*. An exactly similar distinction appears in Thucydides VIII 45,6

and *Hellenica Oxyrrhynchia* 19(14),2, where the satraps charged with the conduct of a war get inadequate funds from the King and face the unwelcome necessity of using their *idia*, money which *ceteris paribus* they would expect to keep as their own. In Cyrus' case the *idioi phoroi* are, of course, part of the *idia* (only *part*, since Cyrus has other money to give Lysander in 405 besides the *phoroi*) and they are certainly his: he can dispose of them to Lysander and the statement that they are *autōi idioi* follows straight on one that "both the King and he himself had plenty of money"— which obviously invites us to count the *phoroi* as part of the money belonging to Cyrus.

I.A.3. Specific evidence about satrapal *idia* is fairly rare. A satrap did, of course, have 'income' in the form of ration allowances,[1] which went *inter alia* to support his quasi-royal 'court' (cf. Xen. *Cyr.* VIII 6,10f.; *Anab.* I 8,25) and is hardly immediately relevant to the sources for paying Spartan fleets. In Babylonia, at least, the *ex officio* income included silver as well (Hdt. I 192), and it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that a newly-appointed satrap might be granted revenue-producing estates in his satrapy.[2] In any case he was in a good position to acquire such things for himself[3] and if "the individual communities in each satrapy were assessed... and the amount so fixed was paid by the satrap out of whatever taxes he found it appropriate to levy" (Murray 1966: 151) there will doubtless have been opportunities for personal profit. Cyrus' *idia* were "given to me by my father", i.e. grants at the time of his appointment; but the other evidence produces nothing quite like his *idioi phoroi* — at least if one accepts that the *phoroi are* the cities' royal tribute (Lewis 1977: 122) and not other forms of revenue (Murray 1966: 154), and the size of the surplus in 404 certainly inclines one to that view.[4]

I.A.4. Granted that the *phoroi* are royal tribute contributions and that some or all of the satrapal military establishment was ordinarily a charge upon the *dasmos*,[5] an obvious explanation of the situation is that Darius gave Cyrus direct control of the cities' *dasmos* contributions for the duration of the war (i.e. permitted Cyrus to deduct a significant portion of the Lydian satrapy's tribute for local use) and that nothing unusual is implied about the status of those cities within the empire. Lewis (1977: 119) rejects this because (i)

[1] Specifically attested for Cyrus, as it happens (Plut. *Artax* 4), and cf. the 40 shekels *per diem* allowance waived by Nehemiah (Neh. V 14f.)

[2] cf. perhaps (some of) Arsames' Egyptian domains (Driver 1965: *passim*). Xen. *Oec.* 4,8 envisages land-grants as rewards for good satraps.

[3] cf. Nehemiah's boast that he did *not* acquire land in Judea (Neh. V 14f.).

[4] One should perhaps register the possibility that Xen. *Hell.* II 3,8 is slightly inaccurate and that the 470 talents were left not only from the *phoroi* but also the unquantified *peritta chrēmata* which Lysander received at the same time.

[5] A reasonable inference from Xen. *Cyr.* VIII 6,3; *Oec.* IV 5,11 at least as regards the *phrouroi*, if not also the cavalry and infantry of Xen. *Cyr.* VIII 6,20f.; *Oec.* IV 5.

Xenophon speaks only of *phoroi* not of cities being Cyrus' personal property and (ii) the Ephoran view (Diod. XIII 104,4; Plut. *Lys.* 9) that Cyrus gave Lysander his *archē* or *epistasia* over the cities (apparently implying their lack of autonomy vis-à-vis Cyrus) is worthless. This is less than cogent. (i) Only money is really in question, and in any case the cities could no more be called Cyrus' *idiai* if they were actually part of the King's land (i.e. not autonomous) than if they were autonomous, so that Xenophon's phrasing is equally consistent with Lewis' thesis and with the alternative just suggested. (ii) The Ephoran version may not actually have implied that the cities were subject. For Cyrus must in any case have conferred upon Lysander at least as much executive authority as was required to collect the *phoroi* and might not have conferred more than that minimum even if the cities were subject parts of the empire. The statements in Plutarch and Diodorus could actually be referring to such executive authority, in which case the Ephoran view can be consistent with any interpretation of Cyrus' *phoroi*. But if they are taken at face value then Lewis, at least, who holds that "the silences of Xenophon can never prove that what he does not recount did not happen" (1977: 109, cf. Cawkwell 1973: 57) should provide some independent reason for rejecting them. As things stand, therefore, what I have called the obvious explanation of Cyrus' *phoroi* remains tenable.[6]

I.B. Kallikratidas

I.B.1. Lysander's direction of the Spartan war effort in co-operation with Cyrus was interrupted by the navarchy of Kallikratidas, who notoriously expostulated against Spartan dependence on Persian money. His remarks are, however, surprisingly uninformative about the formal relations between Sparta and Persia and their bearing on the Greek cities. For he neither complains that Persian assistance involved the abandonment of the cities to Persian control — a silence which Lewis (1977: 117) notes but hesitates to press — nor refers to payments of tribute to Cyrus by 'autonomous' cities, a matter which would surely be germane to his denunciation of Cyrus' arrogant dilatoriness in producing cash and to his subsequent demand that the Milesians should pay money direct to him for the conduct of the war.

I.B.2. There is one passage in Kallikratidas' speech at Miletus (not noted by Lewis) which does attract attention. "Men of Miletus, I (*emoi men*) must obey

[6] In Xen. *Anab.* I 9,8 (*kai gar oun episteuon men autōi hai poleis epitrepomenai episteuon d'hoi andres*) *epitrepomenai* (middle: 'entrusting themselves to him') need not be given sufficient weight to make it imply that the cities were properly speaking independent of Cyrus. It is merely a rhetorical underlining of *episteuon* with no particular significance. (The interpretation 'the cities which were entrusted to him', favoured by some translators would, of course, more or less guarantee that Cyrus controlled them *qua* satrap — cf. Hdt. I 153,3; 155,3; VII 7,1; 62,1; 78,1; VIII 127,1; IX 36, 116 — but it would require *hai poleis hai epitrepomenai*).

the Spartan authorities; but you (*humas de*) I expect to be very keen for the war since you live among barbarians and have already suffered much evil at their hands" (Xen. *Hell.* I 6,8). The latter part of this may appear to presuppose that victory over Athens will mean Milesian liberation from Persia, which would certainly be inconsistent with any current valid treaty ceding them to Persian control. If so, what Kallikratidas says about himself does not mean "I do not approve of this war and am only fighting it because I have to"[7] (for he would hardly tell the Milesians that he did not care about their liberation) but "my personal attitude is strictly immaterial since I am merely the servant of the Spartan state" (an observation addressed at hostile pro-Lysandrians). But in that case it becomes psychologically possible that his personal attitude is not actually quite irrelevant to the train of thought. Since the speech is delivered against the background of his anger at Cyrus' behaviour and argues for a demonstration of independence of barbarian help in an immediately forthcoming campaign, Kallikratidas may be saying that the Milesian's history of suffering *kaka* at Persian hands should give them a particular stimulus, just as a single episode of Persian mistreatment has made him keen to teach Cyrus a lesson: i.e. the real train of thought is "of course my personal feelings are immaterial since I am under orders. [But having suffered indignity at Cyrus' hands I want to punish him.] And I expect that you should be keen to do the same... " The comment about Miletus is merely a projection of Kallikratidas' wounded *amour propre* and should not be pressed to reveal anything about the city's present or future status vis-à-vis Persia.

I.C. The Greek Cities' Attitude to the War

Lewis (1977: 115-7) argues that the Greek cities displayed an enthusiasm for the war in 407-404 which is on the face of it incompatible with their having been handed over to Persia, and this incompatibility is not to be explained by reference to Lysander's personal supporters in those cities.

I.C.1. Objective criteria for assessing Greek enthusiasm are not numerous. The vague references to 'cities' or 'allies' in e.g. Xenophon *Hellenica* I 6,3; 6,4; 6,8; II 1,6; Diodorus XIII 100,7; Plutarch *Lysander* 7 — passages which only name Chios and Rhodes (irrelevant because not on the mainland) and Miletus and Ephesus (Spartan bases whose reasonably active involvement is not in question) — are unhelpful. All one can usefully examine is evidence for provision of naval forces by Asiatic cities.[8] (a) In the period covered by

[7] The meaning which suggests itself at first, given the close textual juxtaposition to his (private) remarks about negotiating peace with Athens: Xen. *Hell.* I 6,7.

[8] Milesian infantry appear at Thuc. VIII 79,4; Xen. *Hell.* I 2,2; there is not much else after 412: cf. Westlake 1979: 33.

Thucydides we hear of one Milesian and one Anaian (exiled Samian) ship in 411; and there is a possibility of small-scale local levying in winter 412/11 and summer 411 (Andrewes 1981: 30).[9] (b) Between autumn 411 and 407 one notes only (i) the fleet collected by Pasippidas "from the allies" (Xen. *Hell.* I 1,3), which may be the 25 ships Kratesippidas has at Chios in Diodorus XIII 61 and could consist at least partly of Chiot ships; and (ii) the possibility of additions to Mindarus' fleet between Cynossema and Cyzicus.[10] In neither case need there be many units from mainland cities. (c) After 407 there is more to report. Between leaving Sparta and meeting Cyrus in 407 Lysander acquires 40 additional ships (Xen. *Hell.* I 4,11; 5,1) from the Chios squadron (?25 ships), levies in Rhodes (Xen. *Hell.* I 5,1) and (hardly a large group) "the ships in Ephesus and Miletus" (Diod. XIII 70). By the battle of Notion he has a further 20, source undisclosed (Xen. *Hell.* I 5,10). Kallikratidas then raises 50 further ships from Chios, Rhodes and "elsewhere among the allies" (*ibid.* I 6,3), and in Xenophon's figures, but not Diodorus', another 30 have appeared before the operations at Mytilene and Arginusae.[11] However, the presence of Boeotian and Euboean ships at Arginusae (Diod. XIII 99,6) shows that some of the unidentified additions are from mainland, non-Peloponnesian allies. When Lysander returns in 405 he assembles existing ships and builds new ones at Antandros (Xen. *Hell.* II 1,10); the increase in the Spartan naval establishment between the aftermath of Arginusae and the aftermath of Aegospotami is around 100 ships (Xen. *Hell.* I 6,26; 6,34; II 2,5; Diod. XIII 97,3; 100,3; 107,2), of which 35 came with Lysander from the Peloponnese (Diod. XIII 104,3) and some might have been raised in the Hellespont after Aegospotami. It is therefore much easier to believe in Asiatic Greek 'enthusiasm' after 407, especially in 405. Yet it is precisely here that other doubts intrude. For out of 29 admirals commemorated at Delphi (Paus. X 9,95f.; Meiggs and Lewis 1969: no.95) only three or four are from Asia Minor, two (predictably) from Miletus and Ephesus[12] and one each from Cnidus (a Spartan colony) and (perhaps) Erythrae. The Navarchs' Monument surely included representatives of all contingents in the Aegospotami fleet, so the

[9] Diodorus' totals for Mindarus' fleet at XIII 38,5; 39,3 imply an addition of 8 somewhere between Miletus and Cynossema in 411; but they might be Chiot (cf. 38,7), and Thucydides' figures, which require no additions at this stage, are likely to command more respect.

[10] The figures at Thuc. VIII 104,2; 106,3; 107,2 and Xen. *Hell.* I 1,2; 1,7; 1,11; 1,16 are consistent without new additions. In Diodorus Mindarus has 70 ships after Cynossema (XIII 39,3, 40,5) and collects another 14 allied ships from all over (45,1; cf. 39,3; 40,5; 45,6) before the battle of Abydus. There is then a further call for reinforcement from Greece (47,2) and by spring 410 ships have come from Peloponnese and 'from the other allies' (?E. Aegean ones); but Diodorus' figures, 87 after Abydus (45,7; 46,4) and 80 at Cyzicus (50,2) hardly seem to match what his narrative claims.

[11] Xen. *Hell.* I 6,16; 6,26; contrast Diod. XIII 76,3; 97,3. Xenophon's narrative has nothing to explain this; Kallikratidas' speech at Miletus does not envisage further building or levying of ships.

[12] Equally predictably the only E. Aegean islanders are Chiots and Rhodians.

virtual absence of Asiatic cities must be telling: the vast majority provided no ships at all. This conclusion can only be evaded by supposing that either by error or textual corruption Pausanias' list in X 9,9f. omits some navarchs. This is doubtless possible (a Chalcidian attested epigraphically is absent[13]); but the monument should certainly not be lightly quoted (as by Lewis 1977: 115) as evidence for the Asiatic Greeks being in general enthusiastic supporters of the war; and we may feel inclined to concentrate such enthusiasm as there was in Ephesus and Miletus, places under direct Spartan (and, in Ephesus, Persian) influence. Dangerous as Xenophon's silences are, it is striking that his Kallikratidas demands money from the Milesians, telling them to "give a lead to the other allies" (I 6,9), but makes no attempt to get it anywhere else except Chios (*ibid.* 6,12) and shortly afterwards accepts subsidies fom Cyrus (*ibid.* 6,18).

I.C.2. There is no doubt that Lysander bought considerable personal support in Ephesus, Miletus and elsewhere by giving individual honours and commands, helping them in acts of oppression and greed (Plut. *Lys.* 5; cf. Diod. XIII 76) and holding out the prospect of oligarchic revolution (e.g. Diod. XIII 70,4; Plut. *Lys.* 5,18; 13; Xen. *Hell.* I 6,4; 6,12; III 4,2; 5,13; Nep. *Lys.* I 5). Lewis (1977: 115f.) doubts that this following could have ensured the cities' support for the war if current treaties surrendered them to Persia. His grounds concern the willingness of the Lysandrians to acquiesce in Persian suzerainty (though he can provide no positive grounds for doubting such willingness)[14] but one might also wonder about their capacity to override their fellow-citizens' better judgment in the formulation of policy decisions — while noting that Ephorus considered Lysander's political machinations to have helped the war effort (Diod. XIII 70,4) and that his partisans were able to engineer a call for his reappointment in 405 (Xen. *Hell.* II 1,6-7). But in the absence of clear evidence for widespread enthusiasm for the war, the question is of limited significance. The only major sources of active participation to be accounted for are Ephesus and Miletus: and Ephesus was Lysander's own base (and had originally been lost to Athens by falling to the Persians, cf. Andrewes 1981: 39; 45), while Miletus may have produced no new ships for him until after the oligarchic revolution of 405 (Diod. XIII 104,5; Plut. *Lys.* 8; Polyaen. I 45,1) and is described by Xenophon as raising money for Kallikratidas in a state of fear (*Hell.* I 6,12).

[13] Meiggs & Lewis 1969: 95(j). All that survives is *]lkideu[*.

[14] It is not clear whether the alleged lack of a clear class basis for the decarchies is meant to constitute such a reason. In any case, the facts that Plutarch (*Lys.* 13) says that the decarchs were not chosen *aristindēn* or *ploutindēn* and that Miletus contained rich men who were in favour of democracy (Diod. XIII 104,5) do not seem to preclude the view that Lysander was appealing to the oligarchic aspirations of at least a section of the wealthy class — after all, the beneficiaries of the decarchies were not going to be just the ten rulers.

I.C.3. The real question is whether a new treaty in 407 which still ceded Asia to the King ought to have provoked not just indifferent enthusiasm but actual counterreaction, so that its absence implies that the Asiatic Greeks were not surrendered and any lack of enthusiasm merely reflects unhappiness at the tribute requirement. But the treaty of 411 did not produce such counter-reaction: some or all of Abydus, Lampsacus, Cyzicus and Chalcedon (at same time as Byzantium?)[15] revolted from Athens in its immediate aftermath; and Thucydides represents anti-Persian sentiment in Miletus as deriving from dissatisfaction with Tissaphernes' performance of his treaty obligations not with the city's surrender to Persia, about which no complaints are recorded (VIII 84-5; 87); and it seems relatively easy to believe that resigned quiescence appeared the most prudent course even in cities whose political processes were not under the control of Lysandrian partisans and which were not under current Spartan military occupation or pressure. Since the Athenians made no strenuous efforts to regain the loyalty of mainland cities (though they defended friendly Clazomenae against its exiles, and collected booty from mainland 'enemy land': Diod. XIII 71; Xen. *Hell.* I 5,20) there was little encouragement for any pro-Athenian Asiatic Greeks to show themselves; and those individuals chiefly implicated in the original rebellions, to which their cities had often been committed before any formal surrender to Persia had occurred, may well have felt that any future *status quo*, even subjection to Persia, was better than falling back into Athenian hands.

I.D. Darius' Motives

Why should Darius have decided to abandon the demand for possession of Asia Minor? The Spartans could hardly insist that he should do so, despite the alarming run of Athenian successes since late 411. Experience showed that Athens would not make peace with Sparta as things stood (Diod. XIII 52ff.; Androt. *FGrH.* 324 F44), so the Spartans could not plausibly threaten joint Athenian-Spartan resistance to Darius' appropriation of Asia Minor; and it was the prospect of actual defat that had driven Boiotios and his colleagues to Darius in the first place, so they could not affect disinterest and say "either you help us on *our* terms or you will find Athens victorious and Asia Minor totally denied to you again". Moreover, the Athenians at Chalcedon had already been "feeling their way to a position by which Athens would admit the King's rights in Asia in return for some financial support" (Lewis 1977: 129). The relevant Athenian embassy never reached Darius, but Pharnabazus will

[15] Abydus/Lampsacus: Thuc. VIII 62. Cyzicus: Thuc. VIII 107; Diod. XIII 40,6. Chalcedon (at the same time as Byzantium?), cf. Xen. *Hell.* I 1,22, 26; Diod. XIII 64.

surely have sent advance information of what was afoot and this will not have encouraged Darius to concede much to Boiotios.

We are left therefore with Lewis' argument that Darius felt under pressure because of disturbances in part of his empire other than the Anatolian seaboard and was prepared to let the Spartans have their way about the Asiatic Greeks for the sake of untroubled progress towards the destruction of Athens, while he (or his agents) concentrated their attention on more important matters. Three areas of trouble are adduced, (i) Egypt, (ii) Media and Cadusia, (iii) barbarian Asia Minor.

(i) An Aramaic document from Elephantine mentions the Jewish community's loyalty when Egyptian army detachments revolted at some date before summer 410 (Cowley 1923: no.27), and other documents published by Driver refer to Egyptian revolt or rebellion (1965: nos 5, 7, 8). The Jews need not be referring to a very recent event and the other documents are only dated to c. 410 on the assumption that Arsames left Egypt just once during his lengthy governorship, but it is obviously tempting to associate their evidence with Tissaphernes' explanation of the non-appearance of the Phoenician fleet in 411 as due to reports of Egyptian and Arabian plots against Phoenicia (Diod. XIII 46,9: his failure to say explicitly "there is an Egyptian rebellion going on" will have to be due to poor Diodoran epitomization).[16] But since Arsames was prepared to leave Egypt by mid-410 (Cowley 1923: no.27; Driver 1965: no.7), the whole affair is, as Lewis admits, hardly relevant to decisions in 408/7.

(ii) A Median revolt was suppressed in 408/7, and the notice in Xenophon *Hellenica* I 2,19 can legitimately be read to imply that it had started in the same year — a short-lived affair, therefore (Cook 1983: 130). One is tempted to feel that with Media in revolt Darius ought not to have been taking any major decisions about western Anatolia; and that if he was nonetheless prepared to embark upon a new initiative there it can only be because the Median revolt had already been suppressed or (justifiably in view of its short duration) was never regarded as of particular importance. Either way it should not have impelled Darius to make concessions about the Asiatic Greeks. Of the Cadusian revolt all we know is that it was going on in 405 and finished before 401 (Xen. *Hell.* II 1,13; Plut. *Artox.* 9,14). Was it likely to affect policy decisions about Anatolia? The Cadusians were not a major element of the imperial structure (they do not appear in Herodotus' tribute and army lists); they were also persistently troublesome, for further wars were necessary in the late 380s, late 370s and under Artaxerxes III.[17] For all we know this history of

[16] For the association, cf. Lewis 1958.

[17] 380s: Diod. XV 8,5; 10,1; Nep. *Dat.* I,2; Trog. *Prol.* 10. 370s.; Plut. *Artax* 24-5 (placed after the Egyptian failure of Iphicrates and Pharnabazus; some would understand the connection to be topical not chronological and refer the passage to the late 380s). Artaxerxes III: Justin X 3,3f.;

disturbance stretched back into the earlier fifth century. The best argument for regarding a Cadusian rebellion as important is probably that Darius (and later Artaxerxes II) campaigned in person, but I am uncertain of its weight and rather think that Cadusian troubles could have been considered almost 'routine'. In any case, we cannot prove that the disaffection of 405 went back to 408/7 or was a continuation of the Median revolt — and even then the same arguments would apply to it as to the Median revolt.

(iii) Barbarian Asia Minor is perhaps the key part of Lewis' case, for he argues that unease about that area can be seen in Cyrus' accumulation of satrapies (Phrygia and Cappadocia as well as Lydia): his mission was to suppress barbarian disorder while paying Sparta to suppress Athens—an exercise for which it was worth conceding the postulated Treaty of Boiotios. But how much and what sort of disorder was there? Lewis draws attention to Mysia, Pisidia, Lycaonia, Cilicia, Paphlagonia and Bithynia.

Syennesis' two-faced behaviour in 401 (Xen. *Anab.* I 2,12ff.; 4,4; Diod. XIV 20,3) and even the slender possibility that he had not yet entered Artaxerxes' allegiance (cf. Diod. XIV 19,6; Lewis 1977: 56 n.44) cannot establish that there was serious disruption in Cilicia in 408/7. Similarly Xenophon's observation that Bithynia often caused Pharnabazus trouble (*Hell.* III 2,2: 398 B.C.) must be set against the apparently co-operative attitude in 408 and 401 (*ibid.* I 3,2; *Anab.* VI 4,24; 5,7f.). Evidence for Paphlagonian insubordination starts with Korylas' refusal of military assistance to Artaxerxes in (presumably) 401 (Xen. *Anab.* V 6,8), which may be connected with the presence of 1000 Paphlagonians in Cyrus' army (*ibid.* I 8,5) — itself not necessarily a sign of rebelliousness, for they could have been sent in response to a request from what was taken at the time to be a loyal viceroy.

Cyrus' only recorded campaigns were against Mysians (*ibid.* I 6,7; 9,14) and Pisidians (*ibid.* I 1,11; 2,1; 9,14; Diod. XIV 19,6). Now parts of Mysia and all of Pisidia had (like Lycaonia) probably never really been part of the empire.[18] A Persian king could, of course, decide at any time to rectify this state of affairs, and Darius may have instructed Cyrus to do so (cf. the installation of *archontes* in conquered territory in 407-5 (Xen. *Anab.* I 9,14), but contrast Cyrus' statement (*ibid.* I 2,1) that he [merely] wanted once and for all to drive the Pisidians out of his *chōra*). But we should need very particular evidence to conclude that the matter was sufficiently pressing to bear upon negotiations

Diod. XVII 6,1. There were, however, Cadusians in Darius' army at Gaugamela (Arr. *Anab.* III 8,5; 11,3; 19,3; Curt. IV 12,12; 14,3; Diod. XVII 59).

[18] Mysia appears as a Persian subject in Hdt. III 90,1; VII 74,12; IX 32,1; but contrast *Hell. Oxy.* 21(16); Xen. *Hell.* III 1,13; *Anab.* III 2,23; *Mem.* III 5,26, showing the independence of the mountainous hinterland. Pisidia and Lycaonia are absent in Herodotus' tribute and army lists; and cf. Diod. XI 61,4; Ephor. *FGrH* 70 F91;94f.; Xen. *Mem.* III 5,26; *Hell.* III 1,13; *Anab.* I 2,19; III 2,23; Nep. *Dat.* IV 4; Polyaen VII 27,1.

with Sparta. As for Cyrus' accumulation of satrapies, might this not be due simply to his being the King's son?[19]

The truth is that if Darius did concede Greek autonomy this must chiefly reflect considerations which directly involved Sparta and those cities. Since there is little reason to suppose that intelligence reports represented the whole Anatolian littoral as on the point of re-embracing Athenian 'protection', the most obvious possibility is that the Spartans promised greater Greek co-operation if autonomy was granted. The evidence enjoins doubts as to the justification of such a promise but it might nonetheless have been made and believed. At any rate, this seems the best way to explain a concession of autonomy if direct evidence should require us to postulate one in the first place. The evidence examined so far does not seem to do so.

II. 405/4-400: the period from the end of the war until Tissaphernes' return to the west after the defeat of Cyrus' rebellion.

II.A. The Evidence of Xenophon's Anabasis I 1,6-8.

The following facts emerge about the Greek cities in 404-401. 1) They were Tissaphernes' cities. 2) They were given him *ek basileōs* and Cyrus subsequently demanded that they should be given to him instead.[20] 3) They were at one stage 'ruled' (*archein*) by Tissaphernes. 4) Cyrus received taxes (*dasmoi*) from them when he controlled them after their revolt from Tissaphernes and transmitted those *dasmoi* to Artaxerxes. Do these facts justify belief in a grant of autonomy on condition of payment of tribute (which was then gifted to Tissaphernes)?

II.A.1. Description of the cities as Tissaphernes' may as well be compared with references to Pharnabazus' or Tissaphernes' *chōra* (*Hell. Oxy.* 21,5; Xen. *Hell.* II 5,11; III 1,9; 4,26; IV 1,33) or Pharnabazus' Aeolis (*ibid.* III 1,10) or Phrygia (*ibid.* IV 1,1) — i.e. satrapal possessions — as with Tissaphernes' *oikos* (*ibid.* III 2,12) or Tithraustes' *chōra* (*FGrH* 105 F4 — if that *is* a local fief) or Memnon's *chōra* (Arr. *Anab.* I 17).

II.A.2. Many references to places 'given' by the King do concern what became personal (or collective) landed property for residence and/or as a

[19] cf. perhaps the satrapies of Tanaoxares, son of Cyrus II, variously reported as Media, Armenia and Cadusia (Xen. *Cyr.* VIII 6,7) or Bactria, Chorasmia, Parthia and Carmania (Ctes. *FGrH* 688 F9(8)).

[20] The gift to Tissaphernes must date from Artaxerxes' accession, despite the fact that in Xenophon *to archaion* normally refers to a situation in the distant past and/or lasting a long time up to the present (*Hell.* III 2,22; V 1,31; 2,7) — but doubtless it could be used to mean merely 'previously', without implying a great lapse of time (cf. the adjective *archaios* in Xen. *Hell.* IV 2,23; *Anab.* IV 5,14).

source of revenue.[21] But why should satraps not be said to be 'given' that which makes up all or part of their province? This was no less a matter of King's gift than anything else. Sources do not often refer to the circumstances of a satrap's appointment. But Pharnabazus gives a satrapy to Mania (Xen. *Hell.* III 1,10), Darius gives Pissouthnes' satrapy to Tissaphernes (*FGrH* 688 F15,53), Tritantaichmes held Babylon *ek basileōs* (the same phrase found in Xen. *Anab* I 1,6 and in connection with two personal grants mentioned in n.21) — which hardly differs from saying that he had been given it. Here, of course, it is the office, not the place, which is said to be given, but it does not seem a significant step from 'giving the Babylonian *nomos*' to 'giving Babylon', and one might also adduce Herodotus IX 107,3, Xenagoras *ērxe pasēs Kilikias (?Lukias) dontos basileōs*: although *archē* can co-exist with grants of fiefdom (see below) this surely refers to governorship and the implied object of *dontos* may as well be *Kilikian* as *to archein Kilikias*. At any rate, one cannot draw a clear line between royal gifts of a personal or non-administrative nature and royal administrative appointments.

II.A.3. Lewis (1977: 122 n.100) seeks to mitigate the apparent implications of Tissaphernes' *archē* over Ionian cities by (i) saying that it is "as if [he] were like Themistocles at Magnesia" (Thuc. I 138,5) and (ii) suggesting that the reference is just to (presumably illegitimate) 'physical control'. As to (i): Themistocles was in some substantial sense the ruler of Magnesia, to judge most notably by the presence of his name on the city's coins (notice that Thucydides uses *archein* only of Magnesia, not of all cities given to Themistocles); and exactly the same is true of the Demaratids in Pergamum, Teuthrania and Halisarne, another case where land is given *ek basileōs* and the recipients exercise *archē* (Xen. *Hell.* III 1,6). These cases do not serve to 'devalue' the *archē* of Tissaphernes. As to (ii): when Cyrus requested Artaxerxes to give him the cities he certainly had physical control of them (except Miletus, still held by Tissaphernes). But the point at issue is the *archē* of Tissaphernes against which most of the cities had revolted. That *archē* arose somehow from Artaxerxes' gift to Tissaphernes, and we can only avoid the assumption that Artaxerxes had conferred *archē* of the cities on Tissaphernes if we understand Cyrus to be saying "you gave the revenue of autonomous cities to Tissaphernes, but he is actually trying to rule them: give them to me

[21] Blaundos given *ek basileōs* to Amyntas *nemesthai* (Hdt. VIII 136); Pergamum, Teuthrania, Halisarne given *ek basileōs* to Demaratus (Xen. *Hell.* III 1,6; cf. *Anab.* VII 8,18); Gambrion, Palaigambrion, Myrine, Gryneion given to Gongylos (Xen. *Hell.* III 1,6; cf. *Anab.* VII 8,18; Magnesia, Myous, Lampsacus given to Themistocles (Thuc. I 138); Anatolian towns given to Egyptians by Cyrus (Xen. *Cyr.* VII 1,15; Xen. *Hell.* III 1,7); Bactrian villages to Barcaean deportees (Hdt. IV 204); Milesian *chōra* to Pedasus (*ibid.* VI 20); Mesopotamian villages to Parysatis *eis zōnen* (Xen. *Anab.* I 4,9); Anthylla to the Egyptian ruler's wife to provide shoes (Hdt. II 98,1); Babylon to Zopyros *atelea nemesthai* (Hdt. III 160,2).

instead and I will let them be autonomous, thus preserving the Treaty of Boiotios" — which seems a lot to read into Xenophon's report, especially given the preponderant importance of the contrast between Cyrus *as the king's brother* and Tissaphernes: the stress is on the fact that Cyrus deserves favour because he is Artaxerxes' brother, not on the difference between *dothēnai hoi... tas poleis* (what Cyrus wants) and *archein autōn* (what Cyrus says of Tissaphernes). Indeed the natural reaction is to take the sentence as identifying the two phraseologies.[22]

Lewis 1977: 121 assumes that if Tissaphernes controlled the cities legitimately *qua* satrap, it must have been as satrap of either both Caria and Ionia or Caria-with-Ionia and then adduces reasons for doubting such a situation. (a) "Xenophon never speaks of Ionia, only of the cities". I cannot see that this has much weight. (b) The proposed situation would have the improbable consequence that Artaxerxes' alleged lack of concern about the war between Tissaphernes and Cyrus (Xen. *Anab.* I 1,8) amounted to tolerance of an "actual shift in provincial frontiers". But since Artaxerxes was being "surprisingly tolerant anyway" (albeit in return for receiving his tribute and — he hoped — seeing Cyrus distracted from rebellion) I doubt that this consequence is particularly improbable. General views about the centralization or otherwise of empire, also mentioned by Lewis, are not really relevant: the situation was a special one. (c) There is no parallel for the coupling of Caria and Ionia, for Ionia always goes with Sardis, if with anything. But (again) the situation was a special one. If the Lydian satrapy was simply vacant during Cyrus' absence Ionia could have been transferred to Tissaphernes to avoid a hiatus in Persian control of the newly re-acquired Greek cities (it would be a pity if this were endangered because of suspicions about Cyrus). Alternatively Tissaphernes may actually have been given Lydia and then, when Artaxerxes was prevailed upon to rehabilitate Cyrus, permitted to retain at least Ionia as a consolation (or even as an expected source of conflict with Cyrus).

II.A.4. Lewis (1977: 122 n.98) suggests that the *dasmoi* might be "some small obligation which the King gets even though he has made the bulk grant" (of revenue to Tissaphernes). Xenophon does use *dasmos* of things other than royal tribute, viz. tribute from Kerasous to Sinope (Xen. *Anab.* V 5,10) and more pertinently, income from the property of (normally) absentee Persian grandees granted *hopōs dasmophorētai te autois deuro* (Xen. *Cyr.* VIII 6,4). But in a context dealing with transmission of 'due', 'normal' or 'appropriate'

[22] Cyrus ignores his earlier position vis-à-vis the cities when demanding to be given them by Artaxerxes. One might infer that his position in 407-5 was different from what he now requested and therefore not relevant, and then suggest that there had been a treaty along Lewis' lines but that Artaxerxes has decided to ignore it and resume full control through Tissaphernes. But this overvalues Xenophon's silence in a very brief resumé.

(*gignomenoi*)[23] tribute to the King it seems unreasonable to identify the *dasmoi* as anything other than the whole royal tribute. Nor is there anything to suggest that in despatching the tribute to Artaxerxes Cyrus was not doing what Tissaphernes would have done had he been in control of the cities. To get any hint of that we should at least need a word order which placed more stress on *basilei*; and we could reasonably expect the point to be made explicitly. It should also be stressed that this piece of evidence will not necessarily be altogether relevant to our main problem. For even if there were a Treaty of Boiotios along the lines Lewis suggests, Artaxerxes might still have reclaimed the tribute for himself once the war was over — just as Darius could have granted it to Cyrus in 407 even if there was not a Treaty of Boiotios along Lewis' lines.

II.B. Other Evidence.

II.B.1. In 400 there was a Spartan garrison in Chalcedon (Xen. *Anab.* VII 1,20), and Pharnabazus is represented as alarmed lest the Cyreans in Chrysopolis (part of Chalcedonian territory) should enter his own *chōra* (*ibid.* 2). Inference from the latter point alone that Chalcedon was not part of Pharnabazus' *chorā* might be insecure (cf. *ibid.* VI 4,24 where his forces fight near Kalpe in Bithynia "in order to keep the [Cyreans] out of Phrygia"—for Bithynia was surely part of Pharnabazus' province), but the Spartan garrison certainly shows that one Asiatic Greek city was not in 400 simply and solely part of the Persian empire. But it was not autonomous either, so the situation provides no support for the postulated Treaty of Boiotios and must be regarded either as the result of a local agreement that Chalcedon was a special case, being part of a natural unit with Byzantium (Lewis 1977: 137),[24] or as a sign that, whatever had once been the case, no treaty making a general determination of the status of Asiatic Greek cities was now regarded as being in force.

II.B.2. Both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus were party to infringements of Greek city autonomy in this period. Tissaphernes interfered in Miletus to restore citizens who had fled to him after the oligarchic coup in 405 (Xen. *Anab.* I 1,7; Plut. *Lys.* 8; Diod. XIII 104,5; Polyaen. I 45,1; VII 18,2); and Pharnabazus exercised control of various cities in the Troad through his

[23] cf. Xen. *Hell.* VII 4,33; *Cyr.* V 4,51; Dem. 38,25; this, rather than 'accrued', is also the sense in passages referring to interest or multiplied penalties, Isoc. 17,37; Dem. 24,82; 35,11. (Prof. S.L. Radt suggested to me that *gignomenoi* goes closely with *apo tōn poleōn*, the sense being simply 'the tribute that came in from the cities'. But the position of *basilei* spoils the analogy with the usage illustrated in Vahlen 1911: 216f. in which an adverb/adjective/participle enclosed between article and noun goes closely with the phrase immediately following the noun.)

[24] Byzantium and Chalcedon shared a harmost in 405 (Xen. *Hell.* II 1,2) and the garrison of 400 was under the Byzantium harmost's command.

subordinate Mania, some of whose additions to the holdings of her predecessor Zenis may incidentally have occurred after 407 (Xen. *Hell.* III 1,10ff.). Lewis passes no comment about Miletus but does admit that the Troad cities constitute a *prima facie* breach of his Treaty of Boiotios (1977: 123; 128 n.123). Why only *prima facie*? It is true that Mania and her garrisons were Greek, not barbarian: but even if this might have made the inhabitants feel slightly less unhappy, it is not relevant to the breach of the Treaty.[25] Once again, if the treaty had existed in the form he suggests, it was now being ignored.

II.B.3. Lewis (1977: 114) notes that Sparta sought peace with Athens in 410 and 408/7 without known reference to Persia (Diod. XIII 52f.; Androt. *FGrH* 324 F44) and infers that the Treaty of 411, which required such reference, had lapsed. But provision for joint negotiation of peace will surely have appeared in the treaty of 408/7 (whatever it said about autonomy), so the lack of evidence for Persian involvement in the peace made in 404 is presumably equally good evidence that the new treaty was no longer being respected. The same conclusion emerges from Sparta's demand for tribute (which presumably applied to mainland Asiatic Greeks)[26] and political interference through decarchies (which certainly did: cf. Xen. *Hell.* III 4,21), for these are consistent neither with Lewis' Treaty of Boiotios nor with complete surrender of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia. And a similar disregard for proprieties is suggested by Lysander's retention of the balance from the *phoroi* which Cyrus had made over 'for the war' and which ought to have been returned when the war was finished. (Of course, it is possible that the treaty could be interpreted as saying that any surplus should be given to Cyrus, who was not available in late 404).

II.B.4. The question of the *status quo* at the end of the war is also raised by some passages of fourth-century Athenian rhetoric mentioned by Lewis (1977: 109). Plato and Isocrates distinctly state that Sparta surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to Persia "at the end of the war" (Isoc. 4,122) or at some date before 392 (Pl. *Mx.* 245B). There is no explicit reference to a treaty, so we do not have to assume them to be claiming that a surrender was executed smoothly under the terms of some particular international agreement. But the fact that by 402 the chief question for many Asiatic cities was which Persian grandee to support makes their statements reasonably acceptable rhetorical representa-

[25] Lewis' reference (1977: 123 n.101) to the possibility that Xen. *Cyr.* VII 4,9 — the Hellespontine Greeks are Cyrus' subjects but do not have to accept barbarian garrisons — actually reflects 4th century conditions gives the game away since those conditions would be the ones created by the King's Peace.

[26] *Ath. Pol.* 39,2 (Athens, Eleusis); Diod. XIV 10,2 (*hoi katapolemēthentes* — i.e. Athens and her erstwhile subjects); perhaps Isoc. 12,67f. Polyb. VI 49,8 and Isoc. 4,132 speak of islanders' tribute, but only before 404 and after 386 respectively.

tions of the truth, and there is no suggestion that Sparta ever wished during 412-404 to protect the cities from surrender. But Lewis alleges that two other passages produce 'another version', distinct enough to raise the possibility that Sparta did not entirely surrender the Ionians. (i) Isocrates 4,137: Artaxerxes rightly despises the Greeks because their folly has allowed him to achieve what none of his ancestors did, viz. control of the Asiatic Greeks admitted by both Athens and Sparta. Now the assent of Athens as well as Sparta may be "the only difference between what Artaxerxes achieved and what is commonly believed of Darius II" (Lewis 1977: 109) — the suggested inference being that what is commonly believed about Darius is wrong — but it is surely a very substantial difference. The King's Peace did give Persia a generally and explicitly accepted title to Asia Minor for which previous history showed no parallel. So Isocrates is not making any unguarded admissions here about the situation at the end of the war. (ii) Isocrates 12,105: in contrast with Athens' persistent hostility to Persia, the Spartans were so greedy for naval hegemony that they contemporaneously (i) promised to free the Athenian allies (when inciting them to revolt) and (ii) promised to give the Asiatic Greeks to Persia (when negotiating alliance). But once Athens was beaten they broke their word by (i) enslaving Athenian allies worse than helots and (ii) supporting Cyrus' rebellion. Isocrates does indeed say that the Spartans offered the Greek cities to Persia without adding that she actually gave them. But this is more likely to be because he continued to think that Sparta had surrendered them (cf. 4,122) but could not say so since it did not constitute a breach of promise then because he had now changed his mind (for no obvious reason) and thought that they had not surrendered them but was unwilling to say so because it might seem too creditable.

III. 400-395.

Lewis (1977: 121f.; 139ff.) adduces material for this period (i) to show that the Persian King could complete an arrangement which left the Asiatic cities autonomous provided they paid *dasmos*, (ii) to show that nobody commented that in fighting for the autonomy of the cities the Spartans were reneging on an earlier concession of those cities to Persia, and (iii) to argue that Tissaphernes' decision to exert pressure on the cities in 400 was made at his own discretion and to infer that the Ionians had at some stage been tied to him in a 'private', non-satrapal capacity.

As to (i), Artaxerxes certainly contemplated a qualified grant of autonomy in 395. But one can see that his predicament (cf. Lewis 1977: 140f.) provided a stimulus. This is less obviously true for Darius twelve years earlier. As to (ii), this silence must be set against Tithraustes' failure to notice that his suggestion that the Greek cities should be autonomous but pay tribute would merely re-

establish a previous agreement (Xen. *Hell.* III 4,25).[27] We had better not draw any inferences from either silence. The fact is that the sources describe events after 400 without any reference to the previous *status quo* except to say that the Greek cities had sided with Cyrus against Tissaphernes. Point (iii) requires a somewhat longer discussion.

1. One alleged indication that Tissaphernes' decision to recover the Ionian cities was a personal one is the fact that Tithraustes describes him to Agesilaus as "responsible for the troubles caused to the Spartans and Persians" (Xen. *Hell.* III 4,25; Lewis 1977: 121f.) But Tissaphernes was now disgraced and dead, and the King was trying to secure as much as he could by negotiation, so it made sense to shift the blame onto Tissaphernes and seek thereby to create a bond of sympathy between Persian and Spartan. But to do so involved misrepresentation as far as troubles caused to Sparta were concerned (Artaxerxes had been actively interested in the war since at least 398/7) and can equally well have done so in relation to trouble caused to Persia. (Notice that whereas Diodorus states baldly that Artaxerxes actually considered Tissaphernes responsible for the war (XIV 80,6), what Xenophon reports him as actually thinking is that Tissaphernes was responsible for *to kakōs pheresthai ta heautou* — in context a judgment on bad conduct of the war not on its inception.)

2. In early 397 the Ionian cities called for the abandonment of the truce with Tissaphernes which had given them protection from his attacks and *de facto* autonomy, claiming that it was in his power to concede autonomy if he wished and suggesting that he would be more likely to do so if his Carian *oikos* were threatened (Xen. *Hell.* III 2,12). This apparently presumes Tissaphernes' discretion in the matter. But when military pressure was applied the upshot was Derkyllidas' demand that *the King* should grant autonomy (*ibid.* 20). So the Ionians' view was apparently not the only possible one. Some other items which might be thought to bear on this issue should be noted.

(a) When Derkyllidas first reached Asia Minor he allegedly faced the possibility of fighting both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus (*ibid.* III 1,9). At least by some date in 399, therefore, the Spartans considered that they were engaged in the liberation of all Asiatic Greeks from all Persian satraps, not just in a war with Tissaphernes about his claim to personal control of the Ionian cities.[28]

(b) According to Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F30) there were Spartan *angeloi* in Persia in 398/7,[29] which apparently shows that the Spartans considered the

[27] Unlike Wade-Gery 1958: 225 and Lewis 1977: 142, I can detect no 'ring of a restatement' in Xenophon's text.

[28] Xen. *Anab.* VII 6,1 — Thibron has been despatched to fight Tissaphernes — hardly proves that a different view prevailed slightly earlier; on any view Tissaphernes was the initial target.

[29] This was during the preliminary arrangements for the Persian naval campaign and before Conon's appointment, and must predate the context of *Hell.* III 2,20, *pace* Lewis 1977: 140 n.40.

war to be the King's business before the campaigning season of 397 — though it could, I suppose, be claimed that the *angeloi* were to ask him to restrain his satrap from making purely personal threats to the Asiatic Greeks.

(c) By early summer 397 at the latest Tissaphernes was *stratēgos tōn pantōn*, i.e. had some special overall authority in western Anatolia. The date of his appointment has been debated (the language of Xen. *Hell.* III 2,13 rather suggests 398/7[30] against which one has to set Westlake's observation that it would have been rather quixotic of Artaxerxes to elevate Tissaphernes when it was Pharnabazus who was showing energetic interest in the war), but it does not in any case have anything certain to tell us about the nature of his war with the Greeks. If Tissaphernes was *stratēgos* in 400, we might compare his similar position in 412 (Thuc. VIII 5,4; Andrewes 1981: 13-16), when he (and Pharnabazus) had been charged by Darius with the recovery of the Greeks' tribute (which certainly also meant their recovery as imperial subjects), and infer that Artaxerxes was behind Tissaphernes' demand to the Greeks in 400 and meant by it that they should become his subjects. But we must recognize that the position could also have been conferred in 400 because Tissaphernes was being rewarded for his services in 401/0 by getting all of Cyrus' *archē* (Xen. *Hell.* III 1,3), in which case it would have no immediate bearing on the question in hand. If, on the other hand, Tissaphernes was not *stratēgos* until 398/7, his appointment will reflect Artaxerxes' new active interest in the war, and the bearing of the *stratēgia* on the earlier relations of Tissaphernes and the cities is simply part of the general question of whether the king's active involvement from 398/7 implies a lack of interest or responsibility prior to that date (see below).

The matters just discussed therefore either have no clear bearing on Tissaphernes' supposedly personal war or suggest that a different view from that of the Ionians in early 397 was possible even before that date. But there is obviously room for doubts, and we must further appreciate that Derkyllidas' attitude at the Maeander plain conference (Xen. *Hell.* III 2,20) does not necessarily invalidate that of the Ionians slightly earlier. By the time of the conference the King was certainly taking an active part in what, on Lewis'

[30] *Pace* Westlake 1981: 261, whose linguistic argument for appointment in 400 is uncompelling. To sustain that date we would need to dispel the impression that Pharnabazus visited Tissaphernes precisely in 397 because it was only then that he became *stratēgos*, i.e. we have to take the passage to mean (just) 'Pharnabazus was visiting Tissaphernes to protest strongly his willingness to co-operate with his superior, something made necessary by a secret resentment at that superiority caused *inter alia* by anger at being deprived of Aeolis' (for this translation of *allōs te gar hypephthonei* etc. cf. Thuc. V 61,4; contrast Westlake's "for he was secretly envious of Tissaphernes because of his command and was especially resentful at losing Aeolis", which Thuc. VIII 38,2 might justify). But it seems unreasonable to disregard the otherwise gratuitous *apededeikto* (rather than *ēn*) and the formal treatment of Tissaphernes' appointment and the desire to offer support as equipollent reasons for Pharnabazus' visit.

view, had once been Tissaphernes' war and this may only have become clear to Derkyllidas when he met Tissaphernes; so his request for the King to grant autonomy could reflect a genuine change in understanding of the situation, and the question is whether the Ionians' understanding before the campaign of 397 was correct then or at any time since 400. The only grounds they might have had for that understanding which are at all amenable to discussion are (i) the nature of Tissaphernes' original demand and (ii) deductions from his subsequent behaviour. To take the latter first, Tissaphernes had initially demanded something of the Ionians, but was then fairly quickly prepared to reach an agreement which protected him from military attack at the cost of abandoning attempts to enforce his original demand and which had been permitted to run for over a year of apparent quiescence.[31] So the view that he was under no obligation to press his demands and could formally drop them at will might have seemed reasonable. So, what were his demands? Or rather, were there any demands he could reasonably have been supposed to be making which might not be authorized (indeed required) by the King?

Xenophon (*Hell.* III 1,3) reports the Ionians as saying that Tissaphernes wanted them to be subject to him (*hypēkoous heautōi*). Other things being equal, there is nothing unreasonable in taking this to mean 'subject to him *qua* satrap', i.e. ultimately to Artaxerxes. But unless it was thought that Artaxerxes had changed his mind and Tissaphernes was disregarding new instructions, there would be no ground for saying in 397 that autonomy was *epi Tissaphernei*. Does taking *hypēkoous heautōi* absolutely literally make things any easier?

Artaxerxes cannot have had *no* view about the Asiatic Greeks when he sent Tissaphernes back to the west in 400. Moreover, the situation under the postulated Treaty of Boiotios (autonomy, but payment of tribute which is then granted as personal property to Tissaphernes), even if it brings the cities into a relationship with Tissaphernes personally not as satrap, nonetheless represents a royal disposition about erstwhile imperial subjects — i.e. we cannot say that *hypēkoous heautōi* is just an emotive description of a demand that the cities pay tribute for Tissaphernes' personal advantage, because such a demand should still properly have been regarded as emanating ultimately from the King. Tissaphernes' discretion about grants of autonomy must therefore indicate that Artaxerxes has requested Tissaphernes to do something about the cities but that the request that they should be *hypēkoous heautōi* diverged from the King's wishes. In practice this must mean that Artaxerxes ordered him to resume tribute-collection (whether for his personal profit or not) while respec-

[31] There is no evidence that Tissaphernes was already summoning reinforcements from the east; that is not attested until 396 (Xen. *Hell.* III 4,6; 4,11), though if those reinforcements arrived during the three month truce with Agesilaus, they may have been summoned in 397.

ting the cities' autonomy and that Tissaphernes chose also to demand their subjection. But this has unwelcome consequences.
(i) Why should Artaxerxes limit his aims to enforcement of the supposed terms of the Boiotios Treaty? All parties seem to have been ignoring them after 404 (cf. above), and the Spartans and Asiatic Greeks had just sided with a rebel against Artaxerxes' authority. Lewis rightly remarks that Tissaphernes might have considered the treaty no longer binding in view of the Cyrus' episode, and the same surely goes for Artaxerxes. How can he have possibly wanted less than the cities' reincorporation in the empire? (ii) The Greeks' desire for military action in 397 to make Tissaphernes concede autonomy seems on the present hypothesis to mean that they are allowing that they will nonetheless pay tribute to him. This does not seem very likely: they initially appealed to Sparta to protect their *eleutheria* (which must include freedom from tribute), and in the negotiations of summer 397 Derkyllidas demanded autonomy *tout court*, which in a formal context ought to mean freedom of tribute in the absence of a clear statement to the contrary (Xen. *Hell.* III 1,3; 2,20).

The position is therefore that while Tissaphernes' alleged discretion does not make sense if he had been demanding the reintegration of cities into the empire, the postulation of Lewis' Treaty of Boiotios does not seem to improve matters a great deal.

There remains the matter of Tissaphernes' and Artaxerxes' inactivity in 400-398/7. Tissaphernes' lack of energy does not prove that the demand for Greek subjection was not the King's demand or that the war with Sparta was not the King's war. Even when the King was certainly involved Tissaphernes was prepared to make an on-the-spot decision in summer 397 not to fight Derkyllidas, despite Pharnabazus' urgings and the very good chance of an important victory (Xen. *Hell.* III 2,18f.); and he appears to have adopted a strictly defensive posture in 396-5. Moreover his willingness to divert Derkyllidas against Pharnabazus in 399 (Xen. *Hell.* III 1,8f.) because of personal enmity inevitably suggests comparison with Tithraustes' behaviour in 395, apparently also motivated by *echthrotēs* (*ibid.* III 5,25f.). Tithraustes was the King's special emissary and must have had some instructions about the war (he later turns up paying Conon's fleet: *Hell. Oxy.* 19(14) 1,3) but it is not easy to believe that they included pursuit of a vendetta against the Dascylium satrap. So Tissaphernes' pursuit of such a vendetta is not an indication that he is not supposed to be carrying out Artaxerxes' instructions. Nor, finally, does the fact that Artaxerxes only seems to take a hand from 398/7 demonstrate that he did not want the subjection of Ionia in 400. In or before 412 his predecessor had instructed Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus to recover the Asiatic Greeks without apparently giving them any special resources to achieve this end; they are simply left to get on with it as best they can. The same can be true in 400. The chief difference is that, whereas Darius was never

prepared to deploy his naval power to secure his wishes, Artaxerxes was prepared to do just that (with excellent results) and, moreover, was prepared to do it only two years into the conflict. If anything he is remarkable for his energy, not the reverse.

Summary

It is not in dispute that the combination of autonomy and payment of tribute represented a status for which Greek diplomacy provided a precedent (the Peace of Nicias, Thuc. V 18,5), and one which a Persian King could, in the right circumstances, contemplate conceding to the Greeks of Asia Minor.[32] It is not very obvious that the circumstances of 408/7 or the subsequent behaviour of the Asiatic Greeks require us to postulate such a concession, but they could doubtless be held consistent with it, if necessary. What is really crucial, however, are the formal statements about conditions in western Asia Minor which might be adduced as positive indications that the Greeks' status after 408/7 was unusual — the evidence, that is, without which nobody could reasonably think of raising the question at all. This fundamental category of evidence contains just three items, (i) Cyrus' *idioi phoroi*, (ii) the circumstances described in Xenophon's *Anabasis* I 1,6-8, and (iii) Tissaphernes' alleged discretion about granting autonomy. Two of these, it should be noted, refer to periods after both Sparta and Persia had apparently started to ignore the provisions of whatever arrangement had been made in 408/7, be it Lewis' Treaty of Boiotios or a treaty surrendering the Greeks to Persia, and may not, therefore be a relevant guide to the contents of that arrangement. (Its actual inefficacy at the end of the war perhaps does something, though not as much as one would like, to explain the absence of explicit references back to it in later contexts.) In any case, none of the three items seems to display the requisite cogency: (i) can only establish that the cities' royal tribute was not being treated in the standard fashion, not that there had been a grant of autonomy; and Lewis' explanation of what was being done with the tribute is not the only possible one. (ii) actually speaks of a satrap's *archē* over the cities and of the despatch of their tribute to the king — circumstances which on the face of it betoken an ordinary state of subjection to Persia. (iii) does fit Lewis' thesis, on the assumption that the satrap was exceeding his instructions in demanding the Greek cities' subjection — but this has the surprising consequence that both the Greeks and Artaxerxes must be in favour of a return to combined autonomy and tribute-payment. One would not expect this to be

[32] Tribute-paying regions like Judaea, Phoenicia or Cilicia, which are sometimes described by modern historians as having 'internal autonomy' (e.g. Dandamayev 1972: 22) do not provide a true analogy to such a status (military obligations are an obvious area of distinction) or make its concession more probable except in extreme circumstances.

true of either, least of all of Artaxerxes. At any rate, I find it much less easy to accept than the alternative, which is to believe that the Ionians' claim about Tissaphernes' discretionary powers was either simply wrong (a mistaken inference from his rapid abandonment of attempts to make them subject) or was only ever intended to mean that, if things were made sufficiently uncomfortable for him, he could and would successfully urge Artaxerxes to withdraw his claims to suzerainty.

PERSISCHER IMPERIALISMUS UND GRIECHISCHE FREIHEIT*

(Zum Verhältnis zwischen Griechen und Persern in frühklassischer Zeit)

G. Walser - Bern

Den Hauptteil des herodoteischen Werkes macht die Schilderung des Xerxesfeldzuges von 480/479 aus, der mit den Siegen von Salamis und Plataiai endet. Alles Vorangehende ist gleichsam Vorgeschichte dieses grossen Konflikts, den Herodot schon im Proemium des ersten Buches mit der pointierten Diskussion über die Ursprünge der griechisch-asiatischen Feindschaft einleitet. Der Standort des Betrachters ist Athen. Hier is die berühmte Beurteilung der persischen Feldzugspläne abgefasst. VII 138 berichtet Herodot:

> Der Kriegszug des Königs richtete sich dem Namen nach nur gegen Athen, in Wahrheit war es auf ganz Hellas abgesehen. Die Hellenen waren seit langem darüber unterrichtet, aber sie konnten sich nicht zu gemeinsamen Vorgehen einigen. Manche hatten dem Perserkönig Erde und Wasser gegeben und vertrauten darauf, dass sie von den Barbaren nichts Böses erdulden würden. Die anderen, die die Forderung zurückgewiesen hatten, schwebten in grosser Furcht, denn ganz Hellas hatte nicht Schiffe genug, um den Angreifern entgegentreten zu können, und im Volke wollte man nichts vom Kriege wissen und stand ganz auf Seiten der Perser.
> *139.* Ich muss daher offen meine Meinung sagen und darf die Wahrheit nicht verschweigen, so unangenehm sie den meisten hellenischen Städten klingen mag: hätte auch Athen den Angreifer gefürchtet, hätten die Athener ihre Stadt verlassen oder hätten sie sich samt ihrer Stadt dem Xerxes ergeben, so hätte kein Hellene gewagt, dem König zur See entgegenzutreten. Und hätte Xerxes zur See keinen Gegner gefunden, so wären die Dinge zu Lande folgendermassen gegangen. Die Peloponnesier konnten soviel Mauerzinnen, wie sie wollten, auf dem Isthmos errichten, die Lakedämonier wären trotzdem von allen Bundesgenossen, Stadt um Stadt, im Stich gelassen worden, nicht aus freien Stücken, sondern aus Not, denn die persische Flotte hätte eine Stadt nach der anderen genommen. Und von allen verlassen wären sie dann den Heldentod gestorben. Vielleicht hätten sie sich auch mit Xerxes verständigt, nachdem sie den Abfall aller anderen hellenischen Städte gesehen. In beiden Fällen wäre jedenfalls Hellas unter das persische Joch gekommen; denn ich kann nicht einsehen, welchen Nutzen die Mauer über den Isthmos haben sollte, wenn der König das Meer beherrschte.
>
> Daher ist es nur die reine Wahrheit, wenn man die Athener die Retter von Hellas nennt. Der Lauf der Dinge hing allein davon ab, wie die Athener entschieden. Dadurch, dass ihre Wahl auf die Erhaltung der hellenischen

* In grösserem zusammenhang sind die vorliegenden gedanken niedergelegt in Walser 1984.

> Freiheit fiel, weckten sie ganz Hellas zum Widerstand, soweit es nicht medisch gesinnt war, und ihnen ist nächst den Göttern die Zurückweisung des persischen Angriffs zu verdanken. Nicht einmal durch die ängstlichen, furchterregenden Orakelsprüche aus Delphi liessen sie sich bewegen, Hellas im Stich zu lassen. Sie harrten aus und erwarteten mutig den Angreifer...

An dieser bekannten athenischen Widerstandsdeklaration aus dem Hochgefühl der attischen Archè interessiert uns in unserem Zusammenhang nicht die Geschichtsklitterung der Situation von 480 — sie ist schon von Thukydides I 18,2 zurückgewiesen worden — sondern die These des unbeschränkten persischen Imperialismus. Herodot hat die Absichten des Grosskönigs schon in einem früheren Kapitel vorgetragen, wo er VII 8 Xerxes im Kriegsrat sagen lässt:

> „Wenn wir die Athener und deren Nachbarvölker, die das Land des Phrygers Pelops bewohnen, unterworfen haben, so dehnen wir das persische Reich so weit aus, dass es mit dem Himmel zusammenstösst. Kein Nachbarland Persiens soll dann mehr die Sonne bescheinen, sondern alle Länder machen wir zu einem einzigen Reich und ziehen durch ganz Europa. Denn man sagt mir, dass keine Stadt und kein Volk auf Erden mehr den Kampf mit uns wagen kann, wenn einmal die, von denen ich sprach, aus dem Wege geräumt sind. So sollen alle, sei es verdient oder unverdient, unser Sklavenjoch tragen"

Herodots These von den persischen Absichten auf das westliche Mittelmeer ist bekanntlich von Ephoros aufgenommen worden (Diodor XI 1,4-5) und hat zusammen mit dem angeblichen oder wirklichen Karthagerbündnis zu den Diskussionen über die persischen Weltreichpläne geführt, die in der neueren Forschung andauern. Viele Neuere sahen das vergilische *imperium sine fine dedi* in Herodots Achämenidenkönig vorgezeichnet, und wer Herodots Darstellung bis zum Kulminationspunkt von Plataiai durchgeht, erkennt den persischen Drang nach dem Westen und seine Stationen: Unterwerfung des Lyderreiches, der Ionier, Makedoniens, der agäischen Inseln, von ganz Hellas. Erst die athenische Abwehr setzt der persischen Expansion Grenzen und bewahrt ganz Europa seine Freiheit. So raisonierte man im perikleischen Athen und rechtfertigte damit den Zwang der attischen Seeherrschaft über die Aegäis und die ionische Küste. Dass Herodots Perserverständnis ideologisch bestimmt war, erkennt der heutige Leser am besten aus den pragmatischen Schilderungen des Thukydides, in denen von persischen Welteroberungsplänen nicht mehr die Rede ist. Die griechisch-persischen Kämpfe sind von den leiderfahrenen Augen des Beobachters seiner Zeit zur Eigengesetzlichkeit der Kriegsläufe zusammengeschrumpft. Der epochale Ost-West-Gegensatz Herodots ist bei Thukydides unter der Geissel des Grossen Krieges zur Geringfügigkeit herabgesunken wie die Erinnerung an den troischen Krieg.

Wie aber stellt sich im Widerstreit der beiden klassischen Berichterstatter

dem modernen Betrachter das griechisch-persische Verhältnis dar? Was waren aus heutiger Sicht die Anstösse der griechisch-persischen Konflikte, die Herodot ideologisch ausdeutet, Thukydides aber gleichsam entmythologisiert? Ich möchte diese Fragen an drei Beispielen diskutieren, die in den Darstellungen viele Kontroversen hervorgerufen haben, an der Geschichte der Eroberung Ioniens, des Sturzes des Polykrates von Samos und des Ionischen Aufstandes. Aus allen drei Beispielen lassen sich, so glaube ich, einigermassen deutlich die persischen Intentionen und die griechisch-kleinasiatischen Verflechtungen herauslesen.

Die Tatsache, dass wir von allen diesen Vorgängen keine persischen Berichte besitzen, braucht nicht ausdrücklich vorausgeschickt zu werden, wie überhaupt das ganze griechisch-persische Verhältnis nur aus den einseitigen griechischen Quellen erläutert werden muss. Es sei hier einzig betont, dass sich in den Achämeniden-Inschriften nirgends ein Auftrag zur Welteroberunbg finden lässt, wie ihn später Vergil dem Augustus nahegelegt hat. Schaeder (1941) hat in einem berühmten Aufsatz den altorientalischen Weltreichsgedanken vom persischen Herrschaftsanspruch abgehoben und gezeigt, dass die Achämeniden wohl ihr religiöses und moralisches Recht auf die Herrschaft über *die Länder aller Stämme,* oder über *die Länder vieler Stämme* (Xerxes) proklamieren, aber nicht auf den Besitz der gesamten bewohnten Welt. Umsomehr ist also zu fragen, wie die Eroberung Ioniens und die Züge von Marathon und Salamis zustande gekommen sind.

1. Die persische Eroberung Ioniens.

Als Kyros im Jahre 547 das lydische Reich stürzte, übernahm er vom letzten Mermnadenherrscher neben den lydischen Gebieten bis zum Halys auch die kleinasiatische Küste mit den ionischen Städten. Ionien geht also als dynastische Erbschaft an die Perser, und die Behandlung des Kroisos durch den Sieger Kyros zeigt, dass die Perser zunächst wohl nichts anderes im Sinne hatten als die bisherigen Verhältnisse im lydischen Reich bestehen zu lassen. Über dieses ältere ionisch-lydische Verhältnis hier nur soviel, dass zwischen dem Königshaus und der ionischen Aristokratie enge Verbindungen, auch verwandtschaftlicher Art, bestanden, dass die Mermnaden als reiche Gönner der panhellenischen Heiligtümer galten (Stiftungen des Kroisos an die Branchiden: Hdt. I 92; an Delphi: Hdt. I 51), dass die Ionier aber zu Kriegsfolge im lydischen Heer verpflichtet waren, was Herodot gegenüber einer früheren Eleutheria (I 6) hervorhebt. Im Einzelnen muss das ionisch-lydische Verhältniss von Stadt zu Stadt verschieden gewesen sein. Mit einzelnen Poleis bestanden offenbar Einzelverträge (etwa Milet und Ephesos), andere Gemeinden waren in der Hand starker pro-lydischer Parteien (*hoi Ludizontes*) und in einzelnen Städten waren lydische Garnisonen eingesetzt. Beim Kampf des

Kroisos gegen Kyros waren ionische Kontingente im lydischen Heer, und vielleicht hat bei den milesischen Truppen der alte Thales die Schlacht von Pteria beobachten können. Nach Herodot I 76 versuchte Kyros vor der Schlacht, die Ionier zum Abfall von ihrem Dienstherrn Kroisos zu bewegen, welcher Aufforderung sie aber nicht nachkamen.

Nach dem Fall von Sardes 547 ist das ionische Küstengebiet als ehemalige lydische Herrschaft in die Kapitulation des Kroisos einbezogen worden. Herodot I 141 berichtet, dass die ionischen und äolischen Städte Kyros ihre Unterwerfung zu den gleichen Bedingungen angeboten hätten, die ihnen die Lyder gewährt hatten. Aber Kyros sei nicht darauf eingegangen, wie er in dem schönen Gleichnis der im Netz zappelnden Fische repliziert, nur Milet bekam einen neuen Vertrag. Darauf hätten sich die anderen *Poleis* auf die Verteidigung vorbereitet und um Hilfe nach Sparta geschickt. Die Spartaner lehnten das Hilfsgesuch ab, aber es scheint bis zum Abmarsch des persischen Heeres von Sardes, im Frühjahr 546, zu keinen persischen Angriffen auf die Küstenstädte gekommen zu sein. Man wird annehmen, dass die Ionier die persischen Heeresbewegungen um Sardes genau beobachteten und feststellen konnten, dass keine Angriffe gegen die Küste vorbereitet wurden. Die Verteidigungsanstalten und das Hilfsgesuch nach Sparta mögen deshalb vielleicht als Vorwegnahme späterer Massnahmen nach dem Paktyes-Aufstand, angesehen werden.

Bekanntlich hat der von Kyros eingesetzte lydische Schatzmeister Paktyes nach Abzug der persischen Armee den Aufstand gegen die neuen Landesherren begonnen. Anstatt den Mermnadenschatz nach Ekbatana zu senden hat er ihn zur Insurrektion gegen die Perser verwendet, und das Gold wird bei den *Ludizontes* der ionischen Städte seine Wirkung nicht verfehlt haben. Es gelang den aufständischen Lydern und Ioniern die Besetzung und Plünderung der Stadt Sardes, aber sie hatten nicht mit der energischen Gegenwehr der persischen Besatzung auf der Zitadelle gerechnet. Die eingeschlossene Truppe auf der Burg ergab sich nicht, und die nach wenigen Wochen anrückende Entsatzarmee der Perser brachte die lydische Hauptstadt bald wieder in ihren Besitz. Der Grosskönig selbst erschien nicht mehr auf dem Kriegsschauplatz, sei es dass die Vorbereitungen für den babylonischen Krieg seine Anwesenheit in Persien erforderte, sei es dass er seine Generäle für fähig hielt, allein mit der Rebellion fertig zu werden. Der Leiter des Aufstandes Paktyes floh mit den Restbeständen des Kroisosschatzes nach dem festen Kyme, offenbar schon bevor die persische Strafexpedition vor Sardes angekommen war. Nun erfolgte in den Monaten zwischen dem Sommer 546 und dem Ende des Jahres 544 die militärische Bestrafung der aufständischen, ionischen Städte, welche die Gemeinden Priene, Phokaia, Teos, Klazomenai, Lebedos, Kolophon, Ephesos, Myus und Erythrai traf. Milet wurde von der persischen Strafaktion ausgenommen da die Stadt sich offenbar am Aufstand nicht beteiligt hatte. Die

Unterwerfung der ionischen Städte ist gekennzeichnet durch den Mangel an gemeinsamer Gegenwehr, aber durch viele Beratungen auf dem Panionion. Von diesen Sitzungen dürfte auch die Hilfsgesandschaft nach Sparta ausgegangen sein, die Herodot I 152 meldet. Aber die Spartaner schätzten die ionische Uneinigkeit und die persische Überlegenheit richtig ein und versagten den Ostgriechen ihren Zuzug.

Das Schicksal des Paktyes ist bei Herodot I 157 anschaulich geschildert. Aus Rücksicht auf seine reiche Reisekasse gaben ihm die Kymeer zuerst Asyl; als aber die Emissäre des persischen Generals Mazares seine Auslieferung forderten, schickten sie den Verfolgten nach Mytilene. Als die persischen Boten auch auf die Insel Lesbos kamen, waren die Mytilenäer gegen gutes persisches Geld zur Auslieferung bereit. „Der Handel kam aber nicht zustande", wie Herodot I 160 erzählt, denn die Kymeer holten Paktyes zu Schiff wieder ab und schafften ihn nach Chios. Hier flüchtete er sich in das Heiligtum der Athena Poliuchos, wurde aber von den Chiern herausgeschleift und den Persern übergeben. Für diesen Asylbruch erhielten sie von den Persern die Stadt Atarneus übergeben, welche in der Teuthrania, direkt gegenüber der alten Handelskonkurrentin Mytilene liegt. Man mag gerade aus der Paktyes-Episode die allgemeine politische Haltung der Ostgriechen ermessen. Von gemeinsamem Widerstand der Städte gegen Persien kann keine Rede sein. Die einzelnen Gemeinden wie Milet, Kyme, Chios verfolgten ihre eigene Aussenpolitik, die sich nach dem Nutzen für die Stadt, nicht nach den Beschlüssen des Panionions, geschweige denn nach einer panhellenischen Idee richtete. Es ist nicht überliefert, ob die Perser die Ionier bei ihrer Eingliederung in die lydische Satrapie besonders hart bestraften. Sicher wurden sie als persische Untertanen dem Grosskönig steuerpflichtig. Ob dieser Phoros höher oder niedriger war als die Abgaben, welche vorher die Mermnaden erhoben hatten, wissen wir nicht. La Bua (1980) beurteilt den neuen persischen Steuerdruck geringer als den früheren lydischen, aber Vieles spricht dafür, dass die persische Administration den lydischen Phoros unverändert übernommen hat.

Wie nun der Grosskönig die Unterwerfung Ioniens beurteilt hat, ist nicht überliefert. Man kann aber vermuten, dass der Achämenide die ionischen Städte nicht als besondere politische Grösse betrachtet hat, sondern als Teil des lydischen Reiches, das ihm durch die Kapitulation des Kroisos zugefallen war. Aufstände nach vollendeter formaler Unterwerfung waren weder für Kyros noch für seine Nachfolger ungewohnte Vorgänge, und sie mussten mit der Strenge des Feudalrechtes geahndet werden. Dareios hat dies nach seinen Erfahrungen mit den sogenannten Lügenkönigen in der Inschrift von Behistun bestätigt. Besondere Feindschaft gegen Griechen lässt sich aus dem persischen Vorgehen nicht ablesen, und wohl ebenso wenig ein persischer Imperialismus, welcher über den Rahmen des ehemals lydischen Reiches hinauszielte. Man

wird sich zu erinnern haben, dass Kroisos, nicht Kyros, den Krieg um die Halysgrenze begonnen hat.

2. Der Sturz des Polykrates von Samos

Als nächstes Beispiel, das von den einen als gezielte persische Expansion nach dem Westen, von den andern als ostgriechisch-kleinasiatische Verflechtung angesehen wird, möchte ich die Vorgänge um den Sturz des samischen Tyrannen Polykrates im Jahre 522 anführen. Der Tod des berühmten Seeräuberkönigs und reichsten Fürsten in der Aegäis war eine Sensation in der spätarchaischen griechischen Welt und ist deshalb mit einem Kranz von Legenden umgeben, welche die historischen Vorgänge teilweise zudecken. Das ist deswegen merkwürdig, weil der Hauptberichterstatter, Herodot, 70 Jahre nach den Ereignissen, eine Zeitlang auf Samos lebte und die Gelegenheit zu Erkundungen besass. Nach Herodot III 120ff. fiel Polykrates der persönlichen Feindschaft des persischen Statthalters in Sardes, Oroites, zum Opfer. Als Grund für seinen Hass gibt Herodot zwei Versionen an, die eine, dass der daskyleische Satrap Mitrobates seinen Kollegen in Sardes zur Besetzung von Samos und Beseitigung des Tyrannen aufgestachelt habe, die andere, dass Polykrates einen Gesandten des Oroites verächtlich behandelt habe, als gerade der Sänger Anakreon von Teos im Palast zu Samos vortrug. Um des Polykrates habhaft zu werden, erzählt Herodot, habe sich Oroites folgende Intrige einfallen lassen: Er liess Polykrates melden, er fühle sich von König Kambyses bedroht und wolle ihm, dem Samier, einen Teil seiner Schatzkammer geben, wenn er ihn vor dem Grosskönig schütze. Er solle einen Vertrauensmann von Samos nach Sardes schicken, der die Schätze in Augenschein nehmen könne. Auf dieses Geschäft sei der Tyrann eingegangen und habe seinen Sekretär Maiandrios in die Schatzkammer des Satrapen gesandt. Oroites habe dem samischen Abgesandten acht Kisten voll Steine, bedeckt mit einer Lage Gold präsentiert, welche Ausstellung der Schreiber für gut befand und den grossen Reichtum des Persers nach Samos berichtete. Darauf sei Polykrates, ungeachtet aller Warnungen mit grossem Gefolge nach Magnesia gefahren und dort elend umgebracht worden. Den Leichnam liess Oroites als eines Hochverräters kreuzigen. Soweit der Bericht Herodots, der vermutlich mehr über die Tragödie wusste als er aufschrieb, dem aber daran lag, den Sturz des mächtigen und reichen Tyrannen ins Verderben drastisch zu schildern und die Infamie des persischen Satrapen zu zeichnen. Neuere Betrachter halten den bösen Charakter des Persers nicht für genügend zur Erklärung der Vorgänge. Vieles spricht dafür, dass der Schreiber Maiandrios, der sich so bereitwillig von den goldüberdeckten Steinkisten des Oroites hatte täuschen lassen, die Hand mit in der Verschwörung hatte, denn er wurde Nachfolger des Tyrannen in Samos (vgl. Roisman 1985). Gewiss war dies kein einfacher *grammatistēs*, sondern ein

adliger Anhänger der samischen Opposition, wie seine Proklamation der *Isonomia* und die Einrichtung des Kultes des *Zeus Eleutherios* vermuten lassen. Polykrates hatte Feinde an der kleinasiatischen Küste seit seinem Krieg gegen Milet und in allen ionischen Städten, die er durch den Kaperkrieg geschädigt hatte. Sein Bruder Syloson lebte als Emigrant seit Jahren am Hofe von Susa und wird nicht versäumt haben, den Grosskönig gegen Polykrates einzunehmen. Man wird sich bei Hofe auch der Unterstützung des Ägypters Amasis durch den Tyrannen von Samos erinnert haben, obwohl dieses Bündnis den Ägyptern im Krieg gegen Kambyses keine praktische Hilfe brachte. Wichtige Feinde des Tyrannen waren die Spartaner und Korinther, die zu mehreren Malen versucht hatten, den Seekönig zu stürzen. Die wichtigste Gegnerschaft aber dürfte dem Tyrannen auf der eigenen Insel erwachsen sein, wo der entrechtete Adel und nach der Geldentwertung zu Ende seines Régimes auch die breite Bürgerschaft vom Gewaltherrscher befreit zu sein wünschten. Alle Gegner scheinen sich in der Intrige des persischen Satrapen geeinigt zu haben, sodass Oroites als eine Art Vollstrecker des ost- und festlandgriechischen Willens gegen die Tyrannis erscheint. Er wird es nicht schwer gehabt haben, den Grosskönig von der Notwendigkeit dieses Tyrannenmordes zu überzeugen. Der persische Statthalter scheint uns hier eingebunden in die Interessen seiner Provinz und seiner ionischen Untertanen; die Tat hat keine antihellenische Tendenz. Herodot macht sie freilich zum Exempel orientalischer Perfidie, und lässt ihr auch die gerechte Strafe folgen, die Hinrichtung durch den neuen Grosskönig Dareios. Aber die Ungnade des Dareios dürfte weniger mit der Polykrates-Affaire zu tun haben als mit dem Umstand, dass Oroites im Thronkampf nicht für den Usurpator Dareios Stellung genommen hatte.

3. Der Beginn des Ionischen Aufstandes

Der ionische Aufstand der Jahre 500-494 wird von der klassischen Tradition als Vorspiel zum persischen Angriff auf Hellas betrachtet. Herodot V 97 sagt, dass mit den Schiffen, welche die Athener dem Aristagoras von Milet zu Hilfe sandten, das Unglück für Griechen und Barbaren begonnen habe. Das 19. Jhdt. sah in der Auseinandersetzung einen Nationalkrieg zwischen Hellenen und Barbaren. Beloch (1914: 1) überschreibt das Kapitel 'Die Erhebung gegen die Fremdherrschaft' und ähnlich urteilt noch Bengtson (1977: 156): „Zum ersten Mal in seiner Geschichte ist das persische Weltreich auf den nationalen Widerstand eines Volkes gestossen". Handelt es sich bei diesem Krieg wirklich um persisch-imperialistisches Vordringen nach dem Westen und um eine national-politische Auseinandersetzung? Die nachfolgenden Bemerkungen sollen zeigen, dass solche Urteile anachronistischen Charakter haben und das historische Verhältnis zwischen Griechen und Persern verfälschen.

Eine Schwierigkeit für die Erhellung der Vorgänge besteht darin, dass Herodot, unsere einzige Quelle, von anti-ionischem Ressentiment erfüllt ist. Er beurteilt die griechischen Brüder in Kleinasien negativ und spart nicht mit Kritik an ihrer Politik. Trotzdem lassen sich die Anstösse zum Aufstand mit einiger Sicherheit rekonstruieren. Wie Seibert (1979) gut gezeigt hat, nimmt die Bewegung in der Stasis der Insel Naxos ihren Anfang. Die vertriebenen Oligarchen (Hdt. V 30: *hoi pacheis*) wenden sich an Aristagoras, den Stadtherrn von Milet, und bitten ihn um ionisch-persische Hilfe für ihre Restitution. Das Gesuch zeigt die weiträumige Verbindung der griechischen Aristokraten, denn Naxos liegt 175 km von Milet enfernt. Dass Milet Teil des persischen Reiches war, scheint die Naxier nicht gestört zu haben, genau so wenig wie früher die Athener, die 507 beim drohenden Angriff der Spartaner ein formelles Hilfsgesuch an Artaphernes, Bruder des Dareios und Satrap in Sardes, gerichtet und mit den Persern einen förmlichen Bündnisvertrag abgeschlossen hatten. Später ist dieser Vertrag von den Athenern nicht mehr anerkannt worden, aber die Rechtslage muss für den Grosskönig 507 ziemlich eindeutig gewesen sein: die Athener hatten sich in seine Schutzherrschaft begeben, und er konnte die Intervention Athens gegen Sardes im Jahre 498 kaum anders denn als Vertragsbruch betrachten.

Der Zug des Aristagoras mit persischer Unterstützung nach Naxos führte nicht zur Restitution der *Pacheis*, sondern zu grossen Verlusten und Kosten, für welche sowohl die griechischen Aristokraten als auch der persische Statthalter den Aristagoras verantwortlich machten. Schon während der Expedition war der Konflikt zwischen den persischen Heerführern und dem milesischen Politiker, der persönliche Pläne für eine Tyrannis in Naxos hegte, offenbar geworden. So ergriff Aristagoras die Flucht nach vorne und versuchte, seine Person durch Ausnützung der milesischen Parteigegensätze zu salvieren. Er trat offen zur Partei des Demos (Hdt. V 37: der *isonomiē*) über, liess unter den Flottenmannschaften die oligarchischen Parteigänger festnehmen und proklamierte den Abfall vom Grosskönig. Praktisch mochte das bedeuten, dass die Ekklesien in den ionischen Städten dem Grosskönig Tribut und Heeresfolge aufkündigten und die aristokratischen Parteien austrieben. Bei den Verhandlungen in Milet soll nach Herodot V 36 einzig der Logograph Hekataios vom Aufstand abgeraten haben, weil er die Machtmittel des persischen Reiches gekannt habe, vielleicht aber auch — wie man aus einer Diodornotiz (X 25,4) schliessen kann — weil er zur pro-persischen Partei in Milet gehörte. Der Aufruf des Aristagoras hatte in einigen Küstenstädten Erfolg, wo man die regierenden pro-persischen Tyrannen vertrieb. Herodot nennt den Sturz der ionischen Tyrannis allgemein, aber eine Prüfung der Städteliste ergibt, dass der Umschwung nur in Kyme, den Inseln Lesbos, Chios, Samos und den beiden karischen Gemeinden Mylasa und Termera zustande kam. Als Aristagoras im Mutterland Unterstützung suchte, wurde er in Sparta abgewiesen (Hdt V 49-

54), aber in Athen und Eretria freundlich aufgenommen. Als Grund für das Mitmachen der Athener am Aufstand nennt Herodot die Anwesenheit des vertriebenen Tyrannen Hippias in Sardes, wo der Peisistratide mit Einverständnis der Perser seine Wiedereinsetzung in Athen betrieb. Im Interessenkonflikt zwischen dem früheren persischen Bündnis und der Abwehr der Tyrannis haben die Athener nach innenpolitischen Gesichtspunkten entschieden. So fahren die 20 athenischen Trieren, verstärkt durch 5 eretrische Schiffe aus, landen an der kleinasiatischen Küste gegenüber Samos; die Mannschaft marschiert über den Tmolos nach Sardes und brennt die Stadt nieder. Hippias, bei der persischen Besatzung auf der Zitadelle, kann aber nicht gefasst werden, da die Burg energisch verteidigt wird wie beim Paktyesaufstand von 546. So bleibt den Athenern nichts als der rasche Rückzug ans Meer und die Einschiffung übrig, welche Bewegung eher wie eine überstürzte Flucht vor den anrückenden persischen Truppen aussieht als wie eine siegreiche Expedition. Während die Athener und Eretrier nun aus der Bewegung ausscheiden, bringt die ionische Flotte Byzanz und andere Städte an den Meerengen in ihre Gewalt und hat danach auch in Karien und Zypern Erfolge. Ein Prätendent auf dem Thron des zyprischen Königs Gorgos von Salamis benützt die Anwesenheit der Aufständischen zum Umsturz auf der Insel. Die ionischen Schiffe kämpfen erfolgreich mit den phönikischen Flottenaufgeboten, können aber nicht verhindern, dass die Perser den Gorgos schon im Jahre 498 wieder einsetzen. Mit der üblichen Verzögerung kommt nun auch in Kleinasien die persische Gegenoffensive in Gang. Kyme und Klazomenai werden von den Persern unter das alte Régime zurückgebracht. Als die Lage für die Insurgenten in Milet kritisch wird, setzt sich Aristagoras mit seinen Parteigängern rechtzeitig ab und segelt an die thrakische Küste. Herodot zeiht ihn deshalb der Feigheit (V 124). Offenbar war aber der Demos in Milet weiterhin so mächtig, dass die Stadt im Aufstand verharrt und dem alten Stadtherrn Histiaios, der vom Persischen Hof zurückkam, den Einlass verweigert. Wie Herodot VI 5 beschreibt, vertrauen die Milesier auf die Stärke ihrer Flotte und die Hilfe der Inseln Lesbos, Chios und Samos. Diese vor Milet aufgefahrene ionische Bundesflotte erleidet dann 495 die vernichtende Niederlage bei Lade gegen die persischen Seeaufgebote. Aus dem Referat Herodots (VI 7-17) ist ersichtlich, dass die Griechen die Seeschlacht nicht wegen militärischer Unterlegenheit verloren, sondern aus politischer Uneinigkeit. Der phokäische Flottenadmiral war unbeliebt — seine Heimatstadt stellte nur 3 Schiffe zur Flotte — und der grösste Teil der samischen Kontingente verliess vor der Schlacht die Linie im Vertrauen auf die persischen Versprechungen. So reduzierte sich der Widerstand auf die Stadtverteidigung von Milet, den die Perser erst nach längerer Belagerung brechen konnten (Hdt VI 18-20). Wie Herodot berichtet traf die überlebenden Milesier die Deportation nach Ampe am persischen Golf. Man wird sich bei dieser Massnahme keine völlige

Entvölkerung der Stadt vorstellen, sondern wie bei den älteren assyrischen Deportationen das Wegführen der Handwerker, also bei Milet der Werftarbeiter für die Flottenstation des achämenidischen Indienhandels. Ernst Herzfeld hat in seinem letzten Buch (1968: 9) vermutet, dass es sich bei den ionischen und karischen Holztransporteuren der Charta von Susa um die verschleppten Milesier handelt.

Überblickt man die Ursachen und den Verlauf der ionischen Erhebung unter dem Gesichtspunkt des allgemeinen griechisch-persischen Verhältnisses, so ergibt sich, dass weder von gezielten expansionistischen Tendenzen der Perser noch von nationalen Gegensätzen die Rede sein kann. Die Konflikte ergeben sich fast zwangsläufig aus den engen Verflechtungen zwischen griechischer Stadtpolitik und dem Anspruch der persischen Ordnungsmacht. Die persische Politik gegenüber den Griechen erscheint nicht offensiv oder griechenfeindlich, sondern reaktiv und auf die Bewahrung der Verhältnisse ausgerichtet. Die Stadtregimente von Athen 507, von Milet 500 und von Salamis auf Zypern 499 engagieren die persische Macht in ihren innerstädtischen Auseinandersetzungen, ohne sich wohl immer über die Folgen dieses Engagements im Klaren zu sein. Die Perser folgen diese Interventionseinladungen zögernd und zum Teil widerstrebend, wobei die westlichen Satrapen mehr Bereitschaft zeigen als der weitentfernte Hof in Susa. Es dürfte dem Grosskönig oft Mühe bereitet haben, die Satrapen in ihren ehrgeizigen Plänen zurückzubinden und ihnen ihre Doppelstellung als unabhängiger Gebietsherr und als der Krone verpflichteter Vasall in Erinnerung zu rufen. Mit dem Schwächerwerden der achämenidischen Zentralgewalt im Laufe des 5. und 4. Jhdt. wird das Dilemma der verbrieften Satrapie-Hausmacht und des grossköniglichen Beamten immer akuter. Die griechischen Politiker haben diese Schwäche des persischen Systems wohl erkannt und für ihre Zwecke ausgenützt.

Es muss an dieser Stelle auch auf das verschiedene Staatsverständnis von Griechen und Persern hingewiesen werden. Die Poleis verstehen sich als eine Vielzahl von souveränen Staatskörpern, deren Beziehungen untereinander den politischen Erfordernissen des Tages unterworfen sind. Die Ekklesie-Beschlüsse sind ihnen massgebend, weshalb Staatsverträge ohne weiteres abgeschlossen, umgestossen, verändert oder neu gefasst werden können. Dem altorientalischen Herrscher, in dessen Tradition der Grosskönig steht, sind solche von Tag zu Tag abgeänderten Abmachungen fremd. Seine Entscheidungen beanspruchen wenigstens theoretisch lange Dauer, und er kann die ständig wechselnden griechischen Stadtregimente nicht als gleichwertige Vertragspartner betrachten. Er sendet seine königlichen Dekrete, wie die Formel des Königsvertrages lautet, den Untertanen von Susa herab (*tēn eirēnēn katepempsen*) und bindet sie so an seinen königlichen Willen. Eine Aufkündigung des grossköniglichen Gebotes von griechischer Seite ist grundsätzlich

nicht möglich, weshalb ein Vorgang wie der athenische Überfall auf Sardes als Rebellion angesehen werden muss. Als Beauftragter des höchsten Gottes Ahura Mazda ist Dareios gehalten, wie er in der Inschrift von Bisutun sagt, Rebellionen zu ahnden.

Ich möchte die Darlegungen über den Ionischen Aufstand hier abschliessen und nicht auf die Diskussionen über die wirtschaftlichen Hintergründe eingehen, die in der Forschung einen grossen Platz einnehmen. Beim Rückblick auf die anderen griechisch-persischen Konflikte darf vielleicht eine generelle Parallele aus der späteren Weltgeschichte nicht übergangen werden: Das klassische Werk von Maurice Holleaux über den römischen Imperialismus (1921) stellt dar, wie die Römer gleichsam wider Willen in die Kämpfe der hellenistischen Mächte hineingezogen worden sind. Das territoriale Ausgreifen Roms ist viel weniger aus expansivem Antrieb als durch ständige Einladungen und Nötigungen der hellenistischen Umwelt geschehen. Ähnlich scheinen mir die Griechen das persische Reich in ihre Kämpfe und Auseinandersetzungen hineingezogen zu haben. Die Griechen, nicht die Perser, scheinen in den von uns geschilderten Kriegen der aktive Teil zu sein.

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